Explaining noise trader risk: evidence from Chinese stock market by Xu, X
Explaining Noise Trader Risk: Evidence from Chinese Stock Market 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Xiaoming XU  
School of Economics Finance and Marketing 
 College of Business 
RMIT University 
 January 2015 
M Sc Economics and Finance
Declaration 
I certify that except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author alone; 
the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any other academic 
award; the content of the thesis/project is the result of work which has been carried out since the 
official commencement date of the approved research program; any editorial work, paid or unpaid, 
carried out by a third party is acknowledged; and, ethics procedures and guidelines have been 
followed.  
Xiaoming Xu
July 2015
i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the help and 
support of my family, the academic, library, and computer laboratory staff of the Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology, my friends, and all those who have directly and 
indirectly contributed to this work. 
Associate Professor Vikash Ramiah has been the most open-minded senior supervisor I 
have ever encountered. I am very thankful for his guidance, expertise, and support 
through all these years. I would like to express my sincere thanks to my second 
supervisor, Professor Sinclair Davidson, for his research expertise and positive and 
constructive feedback. It is important to extend my gratitude to Binesh Seetanah and 
conference participants at EFMA for their valuable comments on my project. This 
research would not have been possible without the support of the staffs from Beijing 
Technology and Business University. I would also thank Natalie Pavey for editing 
assistance. 
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, my daughter Congmo 
and my husband Yilang for their support and love through all these years. 
ii 
TABLE of CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ i
TABLE of CONTENTS ................................................................................................ ii
LIST of TABLES .......................................................................................................... vi
LIST of FIGURES ..................................................................................................... viii
LIST of Abbreviation .................................................................................................... ix
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 3
1.1 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................. 4
1.3 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY .............................................................. 6
1.4 THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS ............................................................................... 7
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE ........................................................................................ 9
1.6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS .............................................................................. 10
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................. 11
2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 11
2.2 IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MODERN FINANCE AND 
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE?................................................................................. 16
2.3 MARKET ANOMALIES AND EVIDENCE OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
.................................................................................................................................. 19
2.3.1 MOMENTUM TRADING ......................................................................... 20
2.3.2 CONTRARIAN PROFITS ......................................................................... 22
2.3.3 OVERREACTION ..................................................................................... 24
2.3.4 UNDERREACTION................................................................................... 25
2.3.5 INFORMATION PRICING ERROR ......................................................... 29
2.3.6 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 31
2.3.7 MARKET CONDITIONS .......................................................................... 33
2.3.8 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ................................................................ 33
2.3.9 SEASONALITY ......................................................................................... 34
2.4 NOISE TRADER RISK ..................................................................................... 35
2.5 MARKET SENTIMENT AFFECTS RETURN ................................................ 38
 iii 
 
2.6 FUNDAMENTALS AND NOISE TRADERS ................................................. 40 
2.6.1 VOLUME ................................................................................................... 41 
2.6.2 EARNINGS ................................................................................................ 42 
2.6.3 FIRM SIZE ................................................................................................. 42 
2.6.4 LEVERAGE ............................................................................................... 43 
2.6.5 CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (CAPEX) ...................................................... 44 
2.6.6 SALES ........................................................................................................ 45 
2.7 TYPES OF TRADERS ...................................................................................... 45 
2.8 QUANTIFYING NOISE TRADER RISK ........................................................ 47 
2.9 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 51 
CHAPTER THREE: AN APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION-ADJUSTED 
NOISE MODEL TO THE SHENZHEN STOCK MARKET ..................................... 53 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 53 
3.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY ....................................................................... 56 
3.2.1 DATA ......................................................................................................... 56 
3.2.2 METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 57 
3.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS .................................................................................... 63 
3.3.1 SHENZHEN COMPOSITE MARKET INDEX, DRAGON INDEX AND 
MARKET INEFFICIENCY ................................................................................ 63 
3.3.2 CAPM BETA, BAPM BETA, BEHAVIOURAL ERRORS AND 
MARKET INEFFICIENCY ................................................................................ 66 
3.3.3 COMPUTATION OF NOISE TRADER RISK ......................................... 72 
3.3.4 ALPHA AND NOISE TRADERS’ EFFECTS .......................................... 74 
3.3.5 GAMMA AND INFORMATION TRADERS’ EFFECTS ........................ 78 
3.3.6 MU AND NOISE TRADER RISK............................................................. 81 
3.3.7 GRAPHS OF NOISE TRADER RISK MEASURED BY MU .................. 84 
3.3.8 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NOISE TRADERS AND 
INFORMATION TRADERS .............................................................................. 89 
3.3.9 UNDERREACTION................................................................................... 92 
3.3.10 OVERREACTION ................................................................................... 93 
3.3.11 INFORMATION PRICING ERROR (IPE).............................................. 94 
3.3.12 SUMMARY OF RESULTS ..................................................................... 95 
3.3.13 UNDERREACTION, OVERREACTION AND IPE ACROSS 
INDUSTRIES ...................................................................................................... 96 
3.4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 102 
 iv 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND 
RETURN.................................................................................................................... 158 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 158 
4.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND RETURN ....... 160 
4.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................................... 161 
4.3.1 DATA ........................................................................................................ 161 
4.3.2 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 161 
4.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ............................................................................... 163 
4.4.1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: NOISE TRADER RISK (MU) AND 
RETURNS ......................................................................................................... 163 
4.4.2 SYSTEMATIC NOISE EFFECT AND CASH NOISE EFFECT WHEN 
MEASURED USING LAGGED MU ............................................................... 167 
4.4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: BEHAVIOURAL ERROR AND RETURN
............................................................................................................................ 172 
4.4.4 SYSTEMATIC NOISE EFFECT AND CASH NOISE EFFECT WHEN 
USING LAGGED CHANGE IN BEHAVIOURAL ERROR ........................... 175 
4.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 176 
CHAPTER FIVE: EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS, SEASONALITY AND 
MARKET SENTIMENT ON NOISE TRADER RISK ............................................ 210 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 210 
5.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................................... 211 
5.2.1 DATA ........................................................................................................ 211 
5.2.2 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 211 
5.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS .................................................................................. 215 
5.3.1 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND NOISE TRADER RISK 
(MEASURED BY MU) ..................................................................................... 215 
5.3.2 SEASONAL ASPECTS OF NOISE TRADER RISK (MEASURED BY 
MU) .................................................................................................................... 220 
5.3.3 HOLIDAY EFFECT OF NOISE TRADER RISK ................................... 221 
5.3.4 MARKET SENTIMENT EFFECT AND NOISE TRADER RISK ......... 226 
5.3.5 ROBUSTNESS TEST USING BEHAVIOURAL ERROR AS A 
MEASURED OF NOISE TRADER RISK ........................................................ 227 
5.4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 231 
CHAPTER SIX: ARE SOME FINANCE FUNDAMENTALS ASSOCIATED WITH 
NOISE TRADER RISK? ........................................................................................... 232 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 232 
 v 
 
6.2 DATA ............................................................................................................... 234 
6.3 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................... 234 
6.3.1 EXPLAINING NOISE TRADER RISK WITH FINANCE 
FUNDAMENTALS ........................................................................................... 234 
6.3.2 TESTING WHETHER FINANCE FUNDAMENTALS CONTRIBUTE TO 
OVERREACTION, IPE AND UNDERREACTION ........................................ 239 
6.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ............................................................................... 241 
6.4.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF SINGLE FACTOR ANALYSIS ON NOISE 
TRADER RISK WHEN MEASURED BY MU ................................................ 241 
6.4.2 CORRELATION AMONG FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS ..................... 244 
6.4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EACH FINANCE FACTOR AS SINGLE 
EXPLANATORY OF NOISE TRADER RISK (MEASURED BY MU) ......... 247 
6.4.4 MULTIPLE FACTOR ANALYSIS OF NOISE TRADER RISK 
MEASURED BY MU ........................................................................................ 249 
6.4.5 FUNDAMENTAL EFFECTS ON NOISE TRADER RISK (MU) 
COMBINING WITH EFFECTS OF SEASONALITY, FINANCIAL CRISIS 
AND MARKET SENTIMENT ......................................................................... 260 
6.4.6 BINARY CHOICE ESTIMATES: OVERREACTION AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR ............................................................................. 265 
6.4.7 BINARY CHOICE ESTIMATES: EXPLAINING IPE WITH 
FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS ........................................................................... 272 
6.4.8 BINARY CHOICE ESTIMATES: UNDERREACTION WITH 
FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS ........................................................................... 277 
6.4.9 ROBUSTNESS TEST USING BEHAVIOURAL ERROR AS A 
MEASURED OF NOISE TRADER RISK ........................................................ 280 
6.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 280 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 336 
7.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 336 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THESIS ................................................................................ 337 
7.3 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS ................................................... 343 
7.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH................................................... 347 
REFERENCE ............................................................................................................. 350 
 vi 
 
LIST of TABLES 
 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Returns on the Shenzhen Composite Market 
Index and Returns on the Dragon Index ...................................................................... 65 
Table 3.2: Average CAPM beta, BAPM beta and Behavioural Error (BE) for the 
period 2002-2010 for 180 Chinese firms ..................................................................... 71 
Table 3.3: Computation of Alpha, Gamma and Mu .................................................... 73 
Table 3.4: The Descriptive Statistics for the Mean Alpha ........................................... 75 
Table 3.5: Number of Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH across the 180 Firms . 78 
Table 3.6: The Descriptive Statistics for the Mean GAMMA ..................................... 80 
Table 3.7: The Descriptive Statistics for the Mean MU .............................................. 83 
Table 3.8: Number of Overreaction, IPE and Underreaction across 180 Firms on the 
Information Days ......................................................................................................... 91 
Table 3.9: Number of Firms in Each Industry ............................................................. 97 
Table 3.10: T-Statistics of Difference on Underreaction across Industries for 180 
Sample Companies from Period 2002 to 2010 ............................................................ 99 
Table 3.11: T-Statistics of Difference on IPE across Industries for 180 Sample 
Companies from Period 2002 to 2010 ....................................................................... 100 
Table 3.12: T-Statistics of Difference on Overreaction across Industries for 180 
Sample Companies from Period 2002 to 2010 .......................................................... 101 
Table 4.1: Number and Percentage of Significant, Systematic Noise Effect and Cash 
Noise Effect Estimated by Lagged Mu ...................................................................... 165 
Table 4.2: Number and Percentage of Significant, Systematic Noise Effect and Cash 
Noise Effect Estimated by Lagged Change in BE ..................................................... 173 
Table 5.1.A: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment effects on Noise 
Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 ............................................................................. 217 
Table 5.1.B: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment effects on Noise 
Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 ............................................................................. 218 
Table 5.1.C: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment effects on Noise 
Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 ............................................................................. 219 
Table 5.2.A: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise 
Trader Risk (Behavioural Error) for 2002-2010 ........................................................ 228 
Table 5.2.B: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise 
Trader Risk (Behavioural Error) for 2002-2010 ........................................................ 229 
 vii 
 
Table 5.2.C: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise 
Trader Risk (Behavioural Error) for 2002-2010 ........................................................ 230 
Table 6.1: Single Fundamental Analysis of Noise Trader Risk when Measured by Mu
.................................................................................................................................... 243 
Table 6.2: The Correlation Matrix of Guangxi Guitang (Group) Company Limited 246 
Table 6.3: The Relationship between Noise Trader Risk (measured by Mu) and 
Fundamental Factors for period 2002-2010 ............................................................... 248 
Table 6.4: The Relationship between Noise Trader Risk (Measured by Mu) and 
Fundamental Factors for Period 2002-2010 .............................................................. 250 
Table 6.5.A: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and 
Market Sentiment on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 ................................ 261 
Table 6.5.B: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and 
Market Sentiment on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 ................................ 262 
Table 6.5.C: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and 
Market Sentiment on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 ................................ 263 
Table 6.5.D: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and 
Market Sentiment on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 ................................ 264 
Table 6.6: The Relationship between Overreaction and Fundamental Factors for 
period 2002 -2010 ...................................................................................................... 266 
Table 6.7: The Relationship between IPE and Fundamental Factors for period 2002 
-2010 .......................................................................................................................... 274 
Table 6.8: The Relationship between Underreaction and Fundamental Factors for 
period 2002 -2010 ...................................................................................................... 279 
Table 7.1: Summary of Possible Outcomes in an Inefficient Market ........................ 349 
viii 
LIST of FIGURES 
Figure 3.1: Average CAPM Beta and Average BAPM Beta of 180 Firms for the 
Period 2002-2010 ......................................................................................................... 66 
Figure 3.2: Daily Noise Trader Risk in Celebrities Real Estate Development Group 
Company Limited ........................................................................................................ 86 
Figure 3.3: Daily Noise Trader Risk in Shandong Xinneng Taishan Power Generation 
Company Limited ........................................................................................................ 87 
Figure 3.4: Daily Noise Trader Risk in Shenzhen Tellus Holding Company Limited 88 
 ix 
 
LIST of ABBREVIATION 
 
 
 
BAPM Behvioural Asset Pricing Model  
BE Behavioural Error 
CAPM Captial Asset Pricing Model  
CNE Cash Noise Effect  
EMH Efficient Market Hypothesis  
IPE Information Pricing Error  
IANM Information-Adjusted Noise Model  
SNE Systematic Noise Effect  
SZSE Shenzhen Stock Exchange
1 
ABSTRACT 
We test for noise trader risk in China stock market through the interaction between 
noise traders and information traders by applying the Information-Adjusted Noise 
Model. Information traders tend to underreact, overreact or increase information 
pricing error (IPE effects) on the stock market. Consequently information traders in 
China drive price away from fundamental level rather than correcting for the price 
error. We test our model using data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We finally 
present evidence that the market is informational inefficient. The most common 
violation of information efficiency is overreaction and information pricing error. 
Liquidity, profitability, size, leverage, capital expenditure, price to book ratio, financial 
crisis, seasonality and market sentiment are used to explain noise trader risk. 
The existing literature confirms the existence of noise trader risk in developed markets 
like the US and Australia but little has been done in emerging markets. The literature 
suspects the existence of noise trader risk in China but there is no ‘direct and 
appropriate methodology’ that has been used to quantity this risk. Furthermore there is 
a relatively thin (almost inexistent) literature on the interaction between noise traders 
and information traders in the Chinese stock market. The main contributions of this 
paper are (1) we show an interaction between noise traders and information traders in 
terms of overreaction, underreaction and information pricing errors, (2) we show 
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whether there are opportunities to profit from these noise traders, (3) we explain the 
causes noise trader risk and (4) we created a database for information arrival in China. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The traditional finance school of thought argues that rational processors of 
information always dominate the market and they always ensure that asset prices 
reflect all fundamentals. Any other traders are referred to as noise traders and are 
assumed to be insignificant in the financial market. However, behavioral finance has 
provided abundant direct empirical evidence against this section of traditional finance. 
Noise traders significantly influence asset pricing through noise trader risk, and 
professionals (sophisticated users) can make mistakes through underreaction, 
overreaction and may even turn into noise traders (referred to as information pricing 
error).  
 
The status of emerging financial markets1 leads us to believe that asset prices in 
China are not trading at their desired fundamental values. It is therefore important to 
(1) explore whether the divergence in asset prices can be explained by the noise 
trading theory, and (2) delve into the fundamental determination of noise trader risk in 
                                                 
1
 It is generally assumed that the emerging market is less efficient than the developed market. The 
causes of less efficiency are due to certain market imperfection such as illiquidity (Chaordia et al., 
2005), a low degree of competition (Mobarek and Keasey, 2000), a lack of market transparency (Blavy, 
2002), a number of structural and institutional specificities (El-Erian and Kumar, 1995) and a 
developing ‘equity culture’ (Aloui, 2005). In the less efficient market, EMH does not hold and asset 
prices are easy to be mispriced.’ The current literature (such as Wang et al. 2011) has provided the 
evidence of asset mispricing in Chinese stock market. 
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the Chinese stock market. The first part of this research tests for noise trader risk in 
Shenzhen stock market through the interaction between noise traders and information 
traders by applying the Information-Adjusted Noise Model (IANM). The second part 
of this study examines whether opportunities to profit from noise traders exist. The 
major contribution of this research lies in the third and fourth parts of the thesis where 
an effort is made to explain the origin of noise trader risk in terms of finance 
fundamentals (such as liquidity, leverage, price to book ratio, profitability, size and 
capital expenditure), financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment.   
 
1.2 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Efficient market hypothesis (EMH) argues that noise traders are marginal traders who 
disappear as a result of arbitrage trading activities. Black (1986) questions this 
paradigm and recognizes the importance of noise traders as it contributes to the 
liquidity of a market. A subsequent study by De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldman (1990) provides direct empirical evidence against this section of the EMH 
by showing that this type of traders influences the market through noise trader risk. 
Following the publication of their research, the research interest in the area continues 
to grow when the problem of identification of a noise trader is later simplified by 
Shefrin and Statman (1994) who classify any trader not trading on information as 
noise traders. This leads to the development of a number of models such as those of 
Sias, Starks and Tinic (2001), Osler (1998) and Ramiah and Davidson (2007) that 
attempt to quantify noise traders. Whilst the earlier segment of the literature focused 
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on the development of models to capture the effects of  noise traders, current 
research is being undertaken to test the validity of these existing models and to 
provide further explanations as to why noise trading occurs. 
 
There is an existing body of literature that discusses the various disturbances in asset 
prices in China. For instance, Chen, Rui and Wang (2005) show that Chinese 
investors tend to overreact to good (bad) news and to underreact to bad (good) news 
in a bullish (bearish) market. Lee and Rui (2000) conclude their paper by arguing that 
foreign investors may lack knowledge of the Chinese market. When we consider other 
research papers in this area, it leads us to believe that asset prices in China may not be 
trading at their desired fundamental values. For example other studies like Chang et 
al. (2000), Chiang et al. (2010) and Liu at al. (2012) show that there exist a number of 
market anomalies within that market. In light of this recent evidence, China provides 
an ideal and natural testing ground for examining why irrational behaviour occurs in 
terms of noise trader risk.  
 
In this thesis I have asked and answered the following major research questions 
(1) Is Shenzhen stock market efficient? 
(2) What is the most common violation of market efficiency in the Shenzhen 
stock exchange? 
(3) Is noise trading strategy profitable in China? 
(4) Can fundamental factors explain noise trader risk in Shenzhen stock market?  
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(5) Can finance fundamentals explain overreaction, underreaction or IPE? 
(6) Do other factors such as financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment 
affect noise trader risk? 
 
1.3 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
Quantitative methods are used to find the answers to the research questions described 
in the previous section. The Information-Adjusted Noise Model (IANM) developed 
by Ramiah and Davidson (2007) is used in the first empirical chapter to capture the 
interaction between noise traders and information traders where this model has the 
capability of detecting overreaction, underreaction and information pricing error 
(IPE). This technique is highly dependent on the availability of firm-specific 
information—a variable which, unfortunately, is not readily available and had to be 
hand collected (a long process that generated a unique data set). The IANM process 
involves calculating the mean change in the behavioral error (BE) attributable to noise 
traders, the proportion of the mean change in behavioral error attributable to 
information traders, and testing if the variation in behavioural errors is explained by 
information arrival. Behavioral error is defined as the difference between the beta 
measured by captial asset pricing model (CAPM) and beta measured by behavioural 
asset pricing model (BAPM) where the BAPM beta is estimated using a sentiment 
index (Dragon Index). The second methodology follows Davidson and Ramiah (2010) 
to test if noise trading strategy is profitable where it is regarded as a direct test of the 
practical potentials of the IANM. By linking the measure of noise trader risk with an 
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asset return, it is possible to determine whether noise trading is a rewarding exercise 
where three outcomes are expected. In the first case, if there is no statistical 
relationship between noise trader risk and return, it implies that noise traders do not 
affect the return of assets. The second possibility is that a positive relationship is 
observed and this occurrence is referred to as systematic noise effect (SNE). The third 
possibility is cash noise effect (CNE) where a negative relationship is observed. 
 
The literature does not test how finance fundamentals explain noise trader risk. In this 
thesis, we test fundamental causes of noise trader risk by using turnover ratio, 
earnings per share, p per share, debt to equity ratio, book to price value, capital 
expenditure, seasonality and financial crises. Dummy variables were used to capture 
the effects of financial crises and seasonality. To model how fundamentals explain 
overreaction, underreaction and IPE, binary dependent variables are used to represent 
these three occurrences which are then regressed on the fundamentals variables—the 
independent variables.  
 
1.4 THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS  
From a general point of view, we confirm that previously developed models (for 
developed countries) can be used in alternative/emerging markets such as China. We 
show that the inadequate data collection mechanism in emerging countries presents a 
real challenge in that hand collection of the data stretched the completion time of the 
research project. The benefits of this thesis are that it provides a quantitative 
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explanation to the phenomenon of overreaction and underreaction. More importantly, 
this study enables one to observe the behaviour of information traders towards noise 
traders and, in particular, the circumstances wherein information traders commit 
mistakes. The results show that there is evidence of noise trader risk, IPE, 
underreaction and overreaction in China. Moreover, we show a weak relationship 
between noise trader risk and return of equity asset. Such evidence challenges the 
notion of the EMH but is consistent with the emerging literature on Chinese equity 
markets. 
 
The major contribution of this thesis is being proposed to explain noise trader risk, 
overreaction, underreaction and IPE with finance fundamentals. According to our 
findings noise trader risk, overreaction, underreaction and IPE are explained by 
liquidity, size, profitability, capital expenditure, price to book ratio and leverage. 
There is evidence to support that seasonality, financial crises (e.g Global Financial 
Crisis) and market sentiment affect noise trading activities as well. 
 
This thesis contributes to the economic literature in terms of extending the work of 
Blume and Easley (1994), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (1998), Shefrin and Statman (1994), Sias, Starks and Tinic 
(2000), De Long et al. (1990), Osler (1998), Lee et al. (2002) Verma and Verma 
(2006), Ramiah and Davidson (2007), Davidson and Ramiah (2011), Bender, Osler 
and Simon (2013) and Hu and Wang (2013). In particular, this research provides 
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additional explanation as to which type of fundamental factors noise traders tend to 
react more. 
 
More specifically, the first contribution of this thesis is that it provides a quantitative 
explanation to the interaction between noise traders and information traders in terms 
of overreaction, underreaction and information pricing errors by applying the 
Information-Adjusted Noise Model of Ramiah and Davidson (2007) in an emerging 
market environment. The second contribution is that this research examines whether 
there are opportunities to profit from noise traders in the Chinese equity markets. The 
third and major contribution of this thesis is that it tests whether fundamental factors 
explain noise trader risk, overreaction, underreaction and IPE. The fourth contribution 
is in terms of a creation of a database for information arrival in China2.  
 
 
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two reviews the 
literature; Chapter Three describes the methodology used and provides empirical 
evidence of existence of noise trader risk, overreaction, underreaction and IPE in 
China; Chapter Four details the method used and provides empirical evidence of 
systematic noise effect (SNE) and cash noise effect (CNE); Chapter Five provides 
                                                 
2
 The hand collected data for information arrival in terms of dummy variables for the period 1 January 
2002 to 24 August 2010 has been created.  
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empirical evidence on how financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment affect 
noise trader risk; Chapter Six proposes to provide empirical evidence on how noise 
trader risk, overreaction, underreaction and IPE are explained by liquidity, size, 
profitability, capital expenditure, price to book ratio, leverage, seasonality and 
financial crises; and Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by summarizing the major 
findings of the empirical analysis. It emphasizes the key contributions of this research 
and provides a robustness test to validate the empirical findings. Finally, it proposes 
possible opportunities for future research.  
 
1.6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS  
According to our results, (1) there is strong evidence of noise trader risk in Shenzhen 
stock market, (2) the most common violations of market efficiency are IPE and 
overreaction which implies that Chinese information traders contribute to noise trader 
risk, (3) equity traders have a lower probability to profit from noise trader risk in the 
long run but higher probabilities in the short run, (4) fundamental factors such as 
liquidity, leverage, profitability, firm size, price to book ratio and capital expenditure 
affect noise trader risk, (5) financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment influence 
noise trader risk, and (6) fundamental factors explain overreaction, underreaction and 
IPE, as well.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Peterson-Drake and Fabozzi (2010) state that the one of the major roles of financial 
markets is to facilitate the exchange of goods and services by bringing opposite 
parties together through the establishment of rates of exchange. The ‘double 
coincidence of wants’ ensures that a transaction between two parties occurs and the 
transaction meets their mutual needs. Divergence in opinion is essential for the 
liquidity of financial markets when opinions are formed by market participants such 
as households, companies, government and the rest of the world. Financial institutions 
and financial instruments are developed to facilitate the transfer of funds between 
surplus and deficit units. When we combine the market participants, financial 
institutions and instruments, it results in a complex market system. To understand the 
market place, one must study each of these three components. The literature review of 
this thesis focuses on the first component, namely, market participants. As market 
participants are human beings, it is important to understand human behaviour to 
comprehend how the financial market works. 
 
The Modern Finance School postulates that financial asset prices reflect all available 
information under the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) while implicitly assuming 
that market participants within the financial system are rational processors of 
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information. Any other kinds of traders are (1) considered as marginal, (2) assumed to 
be irrational, (3) expected to be temporary and (4) referred to as noise traders. For 
these reasons, finance academics prior to the 1980s did not pay much attention to 
noise trader/irrational behaviour but the emergence of market anomalies triggered an 
interest in noise trading activities and irrational behaviour. The importance of such 
studies was recognized with Daniel Kahneman winning in the Nobel Prize in 2002. 
 
The term ‘noise trader’ is used to describe an investor who makes investment 
decisions without the use of finance fundamentals, has poor market timing, follows 
trends and tends to overreact and underreact to good and bad news. For instance, 
Black (1986) describes noise traders as investors who do not trade on the basis of 
information whilst Bender, Osler and Simon (2013) find evidence that noise traders 
use technical analysis in the form of the ‘head-and-shoulders’ chart pattern. Arrow 
(1982) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985) provide evidence in favour of the 
‘overreaction hypothesis’ whereas Bernard (1992), Bernard and Thomas (1989, 
1990), Freeman and Tse (1989), Mendenhall (1991) and Wiggins (1991) provide 
evidence in favour of the underreaction hypothesis. There is a significant amount of 
empirical evidence showing that noise traders are involved in liquidity trading (Foster 
and Viswanathan 1990, 1993, Dow and Gorton 1993, Pagano and Roell 1996), 
hedging (Dow and Gorton 1994) and speculation (De Long et al. 1990). De Long et 
al. (1990), Campbell et al. (1993) and Wang (1994) argue that a proportion of rational 
traders will behave as irrational traders. Furthermore, De Long et al. (1990) and Lee, 
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Shleifer and Thaler (1991) demonstrate that noise traders are active and that they do 
influence market prices. The growing evidence in terms of existence of noise traders 
implies that there is heterogeneity among traders, namely information users (rational 
traders) and noise traders (irrational traders).  
 
The first generation of studies in the area concentrated on the development of 
methodologies to identify noise traders in specific markets (see Lee et al 1991, Sias, 
Starks and Tinic 2000, De Long et al. 1990, and Osler 1998) and the second 
generation focused on identifying noise traders in a general manner (see Ramiah and 
Davidson 2007, Davidson and Ramiah 2010 and Bender, Osler and Simon 2013). 
Currently, the third generation is to explain their behaviour. (This thesis contributes to 
the third generation.) If we look at the literature on underreaction and overreaction, 
we find that academics have been developing models to understand how noise traders 
behave and more specifically their researches are to understand what causes 
information traders to underreact and overreact.  
 
Another question that has been addressed in the literature is what are the rationales of 
individual investors? The modern finance school fails to provide an adequate answer 
to this question. To comprehend the rationales of noise traders scientists have been 
using psychological models to understand the psychology of investors, giving rise to 
the concept of the ‘psychology of the market’. When psychological models are 
combined with traditional methods of finance, it is called ‘behavioural finance’. 
 14 
 
Sewell (2005) defines that behavioural finance is the study of the influence of 
psychology on financial practitioners’ behaviour and its effect on markets. The 
behavioural finance school of thought allows for market inefficiency on the basis that 
market participants are subject to common human errors which arise from heuristics 
and biases—where the objective is to explain why market participants make 
systematic errors which is contrary to the EMH. There are several types of biases and 
examples of them are illusory correlation3, conservatism4, egocentric bias5, cognitive 
dissonance6, overconfidence7, anchoring bias8, self-serving bias9, representativeness 
heuristics 10 , confirmation bias 11 , fundamental attribution error12 , framing13  and 
hindsight bias14. 
                                                 
3
 It is the phenomenon of a human believing in predictive relationship that does not really exist 
(Bender, Osler and Simon, 2013) 
4
 Basu (1997) states that accountants with conservatism prefer to require a higher degree of 
certification to recognize good news than bad news in financial statements.  
5
 Epley and Caruso (2004) argue that egocentric bias exists when moral judgments about fairness and 
unfairness are based on people’s automatic evaluative responses.  
6
 Festinger (1957) explains cognitive dissonance by using an example whereby a person is confronted 
with a bad experience after having made a choice will be looking for justifications of his past decision 
and tend to ignore the dissonant information. 
7
 Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009) use psychological factors to explain that overconfident investors 
tend to overrate their own beliefs. 
8
 Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find that anchoring bias makes a human rely strongly on a particular 
trait and affects human’s probability-based decisions. 
9
 Miller and Rose (1975) find that self-serving bias occurs when people tend to attribute their 
successes to internal or personal factors but blame their failures on external factors. 
10
 Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find that representativeness heuristics occurs when people make 
judgments by using similarity, for example, the more representative A is of B, the higher the judged 
probability that A originated from B. 
11
 JaeHong, Prabhudev, Bin, Alok and Rajagopal (2013) state that confirmation bias occurs either 
when investors selectively seek information that is consistent with their prior beliefs, expectations and 
hypotheses or when investors interpret ambiguous information in a manner that enhances confidence in 
their prior beliefs, expectations and hypotheses. 
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Given that the literature allows for both rational traders and irrational ones, it implies 
that we have heterogeneity among traders—a state where traders tend to have 
different posterior beliefs and any divergence in opinions is likely to result in trading 
activities. Odean (1998) argues that under these circumstances trading volume tends 
to increase, and other studies like Shefrin and Statman (1994) and Ramiah and 
Davidson (2007) argue that this will result in noise trader risk. Davidson and Ramiah 
(2010) go one step further to show that noise trader risk is priced as they find a 
statistical relationship between noise trader risk and return. Unfortunately, the current 
literature on noise trader risk does not provide any further explanation as to what kind 
of fundamentals are preferred by noise traders and if there is any particular pattern 
(seasonality) that they prefer to follow. The purpose of this thesis is to bridge this gap 
in the literature. 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on the behaviour of noise traders and analyses the 
consequences of having noise traders in the market. First, a distinction between the 
modern finance school and the behavioural finance school is made (section 2.2). 
Section 2.3 outlines various market anomalies (momentum trading, contrarian profits, 
                                                                                                                                            
12
 Ross (1977) finds that fundamental attribution error is the tendency for underestimate the impact of 
external factors and to overestimate the role of internal factors in controlling behavior. 
13
 Fox and Dayan (2004) state that investors react to the same shares in different ways depending on 
how it is presented, for example, investors may feel disappointed when a positive frame (net gains) is 
presented and investors may feel rather satisfied when a negative frame (losses) by comparing other 
investors’ outcomes. 
14
 Fischhoff (1975) state that people’s judgement may be biased by hindsight distortion if the guide is 
overconfident and this bias occurs when outcomes seem more inevitable in hindsight than in foresight. 
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overreaction, underreaction, information pricing error, technical analysis, market 
condition, global financial crisis and seasonality) which I use as evidence that markets 
tend to trade at irrational levels. Section 2.4 discusses the literature behind noise 
trader risk. Section 2.5 reviews the literature on how market sentiment affects returns. 
Section 2.6 covers the relationship between market fundamentals and noise traders. 
Section 2.7 describes types of traders. The last section elaborates the methodologies 
that have been used to quantify noise trader risk. 
2.2 IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MODERN FINANCE AND 
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE? 
Haugen (1999) classifies the finance evolution as having three eras: Old Finance, 
Modern Finance and New Finance where the last era contains behavioural elements. 
The ‘Old Finance Era’ focused on financial statement analysis and the nature of 
financial claims (for instance, equity holders, dividend policy, interest and principals 
of debt instruments) whereas ‘Modern Finance’ focused on valuation based on 
rational economic behaviour. One of the key underlying assumptions of modern 
finance is that the market is always efficient wherein there is an allowance for the 
possibility of a quick deviation from the fundamental values that is expected to be 
short-lived due to arbitrage opportunities. During the 1980s we saw an emergence of 
papers challenging the modern finance doctrine. The 1990s gave birth to the New 
Finance era which deals with inefficient markets (generally motivated by behavioural 
models). Initially, there was a major distinction between modern finance and 
behavioural finance advocates, but lately we have seen a number of behavioural 
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concepts that have been well accepted within the modern finance school. For instance, 
momentum and contrarian effect were recognized as temporary effect in the modern 
finance area.’ has been added. The behavioural finance discipline has grown 
significantly since the 1990s whereby there are numerous academic journals, research 
centres, consultancy firms, and work groups that are dedicated to this doctrine. 
Recently we have seen an emergence of the ‘quantitative behavioural finance’ 
discipline. 
 
Behavioural finance can be defined as the application of psychology to explain market 
anomalies. The focus on interpersonal behaviour and the role of social forces in 
governing behaviour is known as social psychology15. Behavioural models allow for 
the fact that market participants can make mistakes in their valuations (cognitive 
errors) where the goal of behavioural finance is to help managers to recognize their 
own mistakes and as well those of others, understand the reason for mistakes, and also 
help them to avoid future mistakes. The academic research in this area covers a series 
of topics such as representativeness bias, overconfidence, self-serving bias, gambler’s 
fallacy, hindsight, panic, herding behaviour, status quo, survivorship bias, money 
illusion, loss aversion, attachment, disposition effect, recovery, familiarity, illusion of 
control, home bias, conservatism and even narcissism (Aktas, Bodt and Roll 2014). 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, prices are expected to follow a Bayesian 
framework but behavioural finance argues that human behavior ten to influence stock 
                                                 
15
 Allport (1985) defines social psychology as that it is the scientific study of how the actual, imagined, 
or implied presences of others influence human's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. 
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prices (including the biases discussed previously). The assumptions of the behavioural 
models are similar to the traditional ones but some differences are observed, namely, 
(1) investors do not simply look at mean-variance figures to make investment 
decisions as they may be influenced by other non-statistical characteristics such as 
taste, preference and other psychological factors, (2) investors may perceive trends 
even though there is no obvious pattern, (3) imperfect information exists given that 
there is heterogeneity among traders, (4) different investors tend to have different 
investment opportunities as it depends on their taste. Herding behaviour may result in 
a common taste and (5) the market is not necessarily in equilibrium and arbitrage 
opportunities exist but may be subject to market sentiment. The purpose of 
behavioural finance is to supplement the work of modern finance. 
 
Shefrin and Statman (1994) assume a heterogeneous capital market whereby noise 
traders tend to distort certain principles of finance. Theorem II and Theorem IV of 
Shefrin and Statman’s (1994) work defines the Behavioural Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (BEMH) as follows: 
 
Prices are efficient if and only if: 
I. Traders’ errors are uncorrelated with wealth. 
II. Noise trading errors are averaged to zero. 
Thus the presence of noise traders can result in a behavioural inefficient market.  
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Modern finance era started in the early 1950, when Harry Markowitz introduced 
portfolio optimization theory which was then followed by Miller and Modigliani 
(M&M) who develop the M&M Irrelevance Theorem. Sharpe-Lintner gave birth to 
asset pricing models with the powerful CAPM while Fama (1970, 1991 and 1998) set 
out the conditions for the various forms of market efficiency—the efficient market 
hypothesis. During the 1970s, Black and Scholes pioneered option-pricing theory and 
Robert Merton and Myron Scholes received the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics. 
Moreover, Fama won the Nobel Prize jointly with Robert Shiller and Lars Peter 
Hansen in 2013. The contribution of modern finance is unquestionable and, until now, 
financial systems continue to rely on these paradigms. However, modern finance has 
failed to provide valid arguments for the persistence of market anomalies, and this has 
been viewed as a drawback of modern finance16. 
 
2.3 MARKET ANOMALIES AND EVIDENCE OF IRRATIONAL 
BEHAVIOUR 
In this section, the aim is to demonstrate that EMH does not necessarily hold at all 
times, giving rise to irrational behaviour. Various market anomalies (or empirical 
regularities) are introduced to demonstrate that market behaviours that are 
inconsistent with asset pricing models such as the CAPM, Fama and French 
three-factor model (Fama and French 1993) and Carhart four-factor model (Carhart 
                                                 
16
 It should be noted that there is a counter argument that believes that Modern Finance does not fail to 
provide valid arguments for the persistence of market anomalies—on the basis that there is the problem 
of obtaining a good proxy for the market portfolio. 
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1997) and often defy rational explanation. Modern finance theories fail to adequately 
explain why these anomalous behaviours persist whilst behavioural finance theories 
provide psychological reasons for why they happen. Towards the end of this section, 
the role played by noise traders in certain anomalies (when documented) is 
highlighted. 
 
2.3.1 MOMENTUM TRADING 
Both individual investors and institutional investors are exposed to the challenges of 
asset allocation. Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) and Vora and Ginnis (2000) 
discuss the complexity for an individual even at the most basic level of choosing 
between stocks and bonds. At present, there is an ongoing debate on the profitability 
of the high-frequency tactical asset allocation strategy known as momentum trading 
or return continuations. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) argue that arbitrageurs can take advantage of momentum strategies by buying 
well-performing stocks and by simultaneously short-selling poor-performing 
stocks—thus making superior profit. These findings are not confined to the US equity 
markets as Rouwenhorst (1998) observes momentum profits in 12 European 
countries, Rouwenhorst et al. (1999) document momentum profits in emerging 
markets, Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000) provide further evidence using 23 stock 
market indices, Hameed and Kusnadi (2002) show similar behaviour in Asian markets 
and Connolly and Stivers (2003) present evidence in the UK and Japanese markets.  
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Another vein of the literature attempts to explain why this market anomaly persists. 
To date, researchers have used asset-pricing models, behavioural finance, 
macroeconomic factors, seasonality and a restricted set of finance variables in their 
efforts to clarify this phenomenon. Applying the three-factor model, Fama and French 
(1998) fail to establish any relationship between these abnormal profits and their three 
systematic risks. Behavioural scientists, on the other hand, seek to explain the 
observed profits with behavioural phenomena such as expectation extrapolation 
(DeLong et al. 1990), conservatism in expectations (Barberis et al. 1998), biased 
self-attribution (Daniel et al. 1997), a disposition effect (Grinblatt and Han 2001), and 
selective information conditioning (Hong and Stein 1999). Menkhoff and Schmidt 
(2005) describe momentum traders as investors who seek to profit from trend analyses 
whereas Chordia and Shivakumar (2000) report that momentum strategies perform 
well during good macroeconomic conditions, trading volume, earnings and size of the 
firm are the three main finance variables that have been used to explain momentum 
profits. Asness et al. (2013) find that the value and momentum are correlated with 
each other. Such finding is provided by Cakici and Tan (2014) who also find that 
value and momentum are smaller and more negatively correlated for large stock than 
small stock, macroeconomic risk, funding liquidity risk and stock market liquidity 
risk. Nevertheless, the literature appears to be unsettled in terms of what drives 
momentum profit (liquid stocks versus illiquidity premium, profitable or unprofitable 
firms and small firms or large firms). The existing empirical results show that high 
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levels of these factors account for abnormal profits but there is conflicting evidence 
on whether low levels of these variables may also lead to abnormal profits. 
 
The lessons that can be drawn from this literature review is that (1) market anomalies 
such as momentum profit persist across various international stock markets, (2) the 
evidence provided challenge the efficient market hypothesis, (3) the first wave of 
studies tends to detect momentum profits across various markets and the second wave 
focuses on explaining why it occurs, (4) studies of momentum have recently gathered 
an increased interest among finance academics, and (5) researchers have not tried to 
explain momentum profits with noise trader risk.  
 
2.3.2 CONTRARIAN PROFITS 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) define a contrarian investment strategy as one that exploits 
negative serial dependence in asset returns in terms of purchasing poorly performing 
stocks and short-selling well-performing stocks. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) are 
among the first academics to suggest the idea of contrarian profits as they challenge 
the efficient market hypothesis by arguing that contrarian profits are the result of the 
psychological aspect of naïve investors who tend to pay more attention to recent 
information and less attention to prior data, resulting in overreaction. Similar to the 
momentum anomaly, there has been extensive literature in support of the profitability 
of contrarian profits. There are several studies that document contrarian profits in 
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European markets namely Brouwer, Van Der Put and Veld (1997) cover France, 
Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom; Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (1999) 
look into France and Germany; Forner and Marhuenda (2003) study the Spanish stock 
markets; Novak and Hamberg (2005) capture the Swedish stocks; and Antoniou, 
Galariotis and Spyrou (2005) cater for Greece. Within the Asia Pacific region, Chin, 
Prevost and Gottesman (2002) find contrarian profits in New Zealand; Yoshio, 
Hideaki-Kiyoshi and Toshifumi (2002) and Chou, Wei and Chung (2007) document 
contrarian behaviour in Japan; Hameed and Ting (2000) consider the Malaysian stock 
market; Lo and Coggins (2006) and Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) report 
contrarian profits in Australia. 
Interestingly, there have been numerous papers that document irrational behaviour in 
the form of contrarian profits within the Chinese market. For instance, Kang, Liu and 
Ni (2002) find statistically significant short-term contrarian profits in China whilst 
Otchere and Chan (2003), Leung and Li (1998), Fung (1999) and Ramiah et al. (2011) 
report contrarian profits within the Hong Kong market. Otchere and Chan (2003) 
follow the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in their analysis and detect a 
small but significant degree of overreaction prior to the Asian financial crisis. They 
argue that price reversals are more pronounced for winners than for losers and that 
this can be due to cultural differences. Ramiah et al. (2011) investigate whether it is 
possible to achieve contrarian profits from cross-listed firms and study firms that are 
listed in Hong Kong and Mainland China stocks (i.e., those listed on either the 
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Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges) and cross-listed in Australia, United 
Kingdom, USA, Singapore, and Europe. They document contrarian profits as high as 
8.01% per month for the dually-traded companies. The lesson that can be drawn from 
this segment of the literature review is that there is an irrational trading behaviour in 
terms of contrarian behaviour within the Chinese stock market. Furthermore, there is 
no study to explain whether contrarian profits originate from noise trader risk.  
 
2.3.3 OVERREACTION 
Research in experimental psychology suggests that ‘overreaction’ occurs when traders 
either overweight present information or underweight past information. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) can be regarded as the leading empirical study to examine the 
overreaction hypothesis, and the evidence provided challenges the efficient market 
hypothesis. Subsequent papers such as Chopra et al. (1992) reinforce the findings of 
De Bondt and Thaler in terms of asymmetry in overreaction, arguing that individuals 
tend to overreact more than institutions as individuals predominantly hold small firms 
whereas institutional traders own larger companies. Further evidence emerged in 
support of the overreaction hypothesis and examples of the papers are Lakonishok et 
al. (1994), Dreman and Berry (1995), Lobe and Rieks (2011) and Farag (2014). 
Similar to previous anomalies, the literature tends to detect overreaction and then 
attempts to explain why it happens. Odean (1998) and Graham, Harvey and Huang 
(2009) use psychological factors to explain that overconfident investors tend to 
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overrate their own beliefs which in turn leads to excessive trading. Barberis, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1998) develop a model to examine the role of both overreaction and 
underreaction within the financial market and use the Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
results of representativeness bias to explain overreaction. Chen, Rui and Wang (2005) 
show that Chinese investors have a tendency to overreact to good news and 
underreact to bad news in a bullish market. Ramiah and Davidson (2007) introduce 
the information-adjusted noise model (IANM) which has the capability of measuring 
how noise traders overreact to news arrival. They show that there is a relatively low 
level of overreaction to news arrival within the Australian market. The lesson that can 
be drawn from this subsection is that noise traders have been used as an explanatory 
variable to explain the overreaction hypothesis. While noise traders do not appear to 
explain overreaction, there is strong evidence that it explains underreaction. 
 
2.3.4 UNDERREACTION 
Ramiah and Davidson (2007) argue that underreaction occurs when information 
traders take the correct action but fail to clear error caused by noise traders. In this 
case, information traders have underreacted to this new arrival. Interestingly, their 
empirical results show that the interaction between information traders and noise 
traders leads to underreaction in the Australian equity markets. They study the 
interaction between the two categories of traders over the period 2000-2002 where 
they consider 12,273 information arrivals within 46 companies that were investigated. 
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On a daily basis, they test the efficiency of the market by analyzing whether 
underreaction, information pricing error (IPE) or overreaction prevails—where these 
different effects are then broken down into positive or negative. Their findings show 
that, in general, the efficient market hypothesis does not hold as noise traders appear 
to be present in the market 60 percent of the time which is classified into five percent 
overreaction, 25 percent underreaction and around 35 percent of IPE.  
 
Underreaction to firm-specific information is not a new phenomenon as there exists a 
literature on how investors react to accounting and finance information. There is a 
significant portion of the literature that suggest that investors do not fully incorporate 
earnings announcements into the pricing of assets and examples of these studies are 
Ball and Brown (1968), Bernard and Thomas (1989), Bartov (1992), 
Narayannamoorthy (2006) and, more recently, You and Zhang (2012). Another recent 
study by Fischer (2012) explores underreaction within certain sectors and finds that 
while investors underreact to earnings news (captured by post-earnings-announcement 
drift), they overreact to product news in the form of subsequent stock price reversals 
of the initial reaction. It is worth noting that certain studies (such as You and Zhang 
2012 and Bernard 1992) have the ability to detect both overreaction and 
underreaction. Earlier papers such as Bernard (1992) also highlight that there might 
exist an underreaction which in turn can cause overreaction—implying that investors 
tend to underreact to initial earnings announcements and subsequently overreact. 
Studies carried out by Freeman and Tse (1989), Bernard and Thomas (1990), Wiggins 
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(1991), Mendenhall (1991) and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) argue that 
post-announcement drift occurs because asset prices fail to reflect current levels of 
earnings and subsequent earnings announcements come as a surprise to market 
participants. His framework assumes a naïve expectation model where prices are 
predictable—implicitly implying that the forecasting errors can be either positively or 
negatively autocorrelated in a pattern (see Bernard 1992). Bernard was intrigued 
about the existence of a naïve expectation approach, and he questioned why such a 
trend/autocorrelation in the lags failed to disappear. He argues that there may be some 
other kind of systematic risk factors (including noise trader risk) that prevented the 
reversals. The noise trader risk argument is also supported by Andreassen (1987 and 
1990) who suggests that certain systematic psychological forces can influence price 
behaviour.  
 
There are other researchers who support the underreaction hypothesis. For instance, 
Cutler et al. (1991) examine autocorrelations in various indexes for different horizons 
and report positive autocorrelations in excess returns for these indexes for holding 
periods of 1 to 12 months. Evidence of autocorrelation is used to support the 
underreaction hypothesis, implying that there is a delayed reaction with prices slowly 
adjusting to the new information—hence the emergence of trends in returns.  
Bernard and Thomas (1990) observe a positive autocorrelation in earnings in the first 
three quarters and a change into negative autocorrelation in the fourth quarter—such 
outcome has been perceived as a mean reverting process. Jegadeesh and Titman 
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(1993) provide further evidence as they detect autocorrelation over six month 
horizons where such evidence is linked to momentum profits. Underreaction 
hypothesis is used to explain momentum profits as it is assumed that slow adjustment 
to new information leads to returns continuations—henceforth winners continue to be 
winners and losers continue to lose. 
 
Following Edwards (1968), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) use conservatism 
bias to explain underreaction. Within the cognitive psychology literature, 
conservatism is a bias that may occur when human beings are processing information 
whereby there is a tendency to rely more on previous knowledge/information and less 
on new information. When applied to the stock market, it may lead traders to slowly 
adjust to new information. The recent literature shows that investors tend to 
underreact to announcements about earnings, dividends, stock splits and others. In 
their experiment, Barberis et al. find that individuals have a tendency to update their 
posteriors in the right direction but by a smaller magnitude that is required where the 
right direction and magnitude is provided by a Bayesian framework. 
 
The lessons that we have learnt from the underreaction literature is that financial 
markets are not limited to one kind of irrational behaviour. The evidence presented 
shows that market participants have the ability to first underreact and it is that same 
underreaction that can lead to overreaction. The paper by Ramiah and Davidson 
(2007) suggests that other effects such as information pricing error may also occur as 
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they explain that IPE occurs because information traders turn into noise traders. It is 
therefore important to review the literature on why professionals make mistakes. 
 
2.3.5 INFORMATION PRICING ERROR 
The implication of the efficient market hypothesis is that information traders are 
sophisticated users who end up making the right investment decisions, but recent 
evidence challenges this notion. For instance, Ramiah and Davidson (2007) detect the 
information pricing error whereby information traders turn into noise traders. They 
argue that when information traders do not oppose noise traders but decide to join 
them by adding to the existing errors, this is regarded as an information pricing error 
(IPE), in other words, IPE implies that sophisticated users, like professional traders, 
behave as noise traders and increase noise trader risk, this is because they act on noise 
as if it was information. There is a significant portion of the literature that 
demonstrates that professionals tend to make mistakes and there is another part of the 
literature that explains why they make such mistakes.  
 
Cordell, Smith and Terry (2011) argue that the dual burden phenomenon explains 
why professionals commit errors. Dual burden phenomenon refers to the instance 
where people with less experience believe they know more with greater certainty than 
people with more experience. Cordell et al. compare two groups of financial planners 
– the first group has earned the one certification and the second group has more than 
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one qualification and has specialized skills. They report that the first group with the 
less knowledge tends to be more confident giving rise to be dead burden phenomenon. 
Griffin and Tversky (1992) show that when predictability is low, financial analysts 
might even be more overconfident than the novices because they overweight their 
models and the theories that they believe in. Overconfidence as a phenomenon in the 
work place has been documented by Frank (1935) who reports that traders are 
overconfident about their ability and their overconfidence increases with the personal 
importance of the task. Abreu and Mendes (2012) investigate the relationship between 
investors’ overconfidence and trading frequency and their results show that both 
overconfidence and non-overconfidence in information results in more trading. They 
contribute to the literature by showing that overconfident investors trade less 
frequently when they collect information via family and friends, and 
non-overconfident investors trade more frequently when they use specialized sources 
of information. Their findings are consistent with the behavioural finance literature in 
that overconfidence leads to higher trading volume. For example, Statman, Thorley 
and Vorkink (2006) provide evidence that trading volume is higher after periods of 
high returns as investment success increases the degree of overconfidence. De Bondt 
and Thaler (1995) argue that overconfidence is an important behavioural factor that 
explains the trading puzzle and Odean (1998) argues that high level of trading volume, 
volatility and poor quality of price are consequences of overconfidence. Barber and 
Odean (2001) argue that men are more overconfident than women, leading men to 
trade more than women. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) show that overconfident 
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managers tend to overestimate future returns from their firms’ investments and argue 
that overconfident managers have a tendency to delay loss recognition. 
 
Self-attribution bias is another behavioural bias that explains why professionals make 
sub-optimal decisions. Taylor and Brown (1988) show that people tend to have 
unrealistically positive views about themselves and the behavioural finance literature 
shows that the effects of this bias is similar to that of overconfidence bias whereby 
traders tend to trade excessively (see Glaser and Weber 2007, Deaves, Lüders and 
Luo 2009 and Graham, Harvey and Huang 2009). The point that this thesis wants to 
make in this section is that overconfidence and self-attribution tend to make investors 
trade below the optimal trading point leading to excessive trading/mistake. 
 
2.3.6 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
The efficient market hypothesis dictates that investors cannot consistently earn 
abnormal returns using historical data. Technical analysis uses past market data to 
predict stock prices and there is an on-going debate between believers of efficient 
markets and behavioural scientists. Financial analysts use charts to discern patterns 
that help them to make their investment decisions and one example of this technique 
is the head-and-shoulders approach. Bender, Osler and Simon (2013) use the 
head-and-shoulders chart pattern to identify an ‘illusory correlation’ in financial 
markets. They provide evidence that technical analysis is alive and well in that they 
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report trading volume is over 60% higher than normal around the time when 
head-and-shoulders patterns are observed. Furthermore, they provide evidence that 
trading on these signals is not profitable—implying that this technique is an ‘illusion’. 
They explain that their findings about head-and-shoulders trading fit Black’s (1986) 
description of noise traders where traders trade on noise as if it was information. They 
conclude that technical analysis, in aggregate, contributes significantly to noise 
trading.  
 
As part of the academic debate, Campbell, Lo and MacKinley (1997) refer to 
technical analysis as ‘the black sheep of the academic finance community’. 
Nevertheless, when we look at the growing literature about momentum and contrarian 
profits, we can see that technical analysis is becoming a matter of interest for many 
academics. Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) report that most investment banks and 
trading firms employ financial analysts who rely on technical analysts for their trading 
decisions and the fact that there are institutions that are willing to invest in such 
resources implies that there must be benefits associated with this technique. We 
gather from the studies of Park and Irwin (2007) and Billingsley and Chance (1996) 
that about 60% of commodity trading advisors and between 30% - 40% of currency 
traders use technical analysis as a major tool in their decision-making process. Sturm 
(2013) discusses whether market efficiency and technical analysis can co-exist and 
argues that the presence of noise deviates stock prices away from its fundamentals. 
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Hoffmann and Shefrin (2014) find that investors receive dramatically lower returns by 
using technical analysis. 
2.3.7 MARKET CONDITIONS 
Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari (1989), and Fama and French (1992) show that 
contrarian strategies earn high returns due to increased systematic risk. Using stock 
market returns, they argue that the risk of loser portfolios has a significantly strong 
inverse relation with weak market conditions, whereas winning portfolios have a 
weak positive relation, thereby allowing a contrarian investor to earn abnormal returns 
during weak markets. The strength of the relation between portfolios and the market 
tend to shift during bull markets, with winner portfolios having a stronger positive 
relation, making contrarian strategies less profitable. Griffin et al. (2003) find 
contradictory evidence in different international markets, with momentum portfolios 
generating strong returns in weak and strong markets. Antoniou et al. (2007) provide 
the evidence that momentum profitability is attributable to asset mispricing that 
systematically varies with market conditions. The lesson that can be drawn from this 
literature is that market anomalies are driven by market conditions. 
2.3.8 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
There is an increasing amount of literature on how the global financial crisis (GFC) 
has affected the financial system. Sinn (2008) indicates that the subprime mortgage 
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crisis was the fourth major banking crisis since World War II and Hormats (2008) 
argues that toxic securities issued in the US were sold to many financial institutions 
all over the world, which weakened the global economy. Masood, Aktan and Pariente 
(2010) show that when the housing bubble burst, it triggered a liquidity shortfall in 
the US banking system that quickly spilled over to the rest of the world. Xafa (2010) 
argues that the 2007 GFC is still having an impact around the world after three years. 
Ramiah, Zhao and Moosa (2014) and Ramiah, Zhao, Graham and Moosa (2014) show 
that the GFC had a significant effect on working capital management. For these 
reasons, it is important to check the effect of this crisis on the behaviour of noise 
traders.  
 
2.3.9 SEASONALITY 
As discussed earlier, there is a significant amount of research demonstrating that 
arbitrageurs can earn excess profits from overreaction, prior to transaction costs. 
Using weekly data, Lee et al. (2003) attempt to explain contrarian profits with factors 
such as measurement errors, seasonality, volume, firm size and transaction cost. They 
argue that these profits are primarily driven by firm size, with overreaction to 
firm-specific information. Following Dreman and Lufkin (1997), Monagle et al. 
(2006) employ monthly data to test if these trends persist within specific industry 
sectors. Lo and Coggins (2006), on the other hand, use daily and intra-day returns and 
apply the same strategy to the top 200 stocks in Australia where they show that hourly 
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estimated profits are positive at short lags and then quickly diminish. Ramiah, 
Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) show that contrarian profits tend to be higher in 
certain months, advocating for the need to control for seasonality. For these reasons, it 
is interesting to check the effect of this seasonality on noise traders.  
 
2.4 NOISE TRADER RISK 
In the previous section, we discussed various kinds of irrational behaviour that exists 
in the financial market system. One point worth noting is that the literature tends to 
cite noise traders in their discussion. In this section we concentrate on the noise 
traders. Unlike other behavioural finance segments, the noise trading literature is 
relatively thin but has been growing rapidly since the year 2000. The aim of this 
section is to show that noise traders increase volatility in the market, causing noise 
trader risk. 
 
Black (1986) provides a definition for noise traders but fails to develop a model that 
will capture noise trader effects. Lee et al. (1991) attempt to capture the behaviour of 
noise traders by studying closed-end funds where a large pool of small investors 
usually invests. Closed-end funds are firms that are listed on major stock exchanges 
that invest almost exclusively in the securities of other publicly traded companies. 
The price of a closed-end fund is determined by market forces where there is a 
tendency for the price to differ from net asset value of the fund’s assets which has 
been referred to as the ‘closed-end fund puzzle’. Lee et al. explain this puzzle using 
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behavioural finance explanation such as ‘differential clienteles’ whereby individual 
investors prefer mutual funds while institutional investors choose individual shares 
and replicating the portfolios. If we then assume that small investors trade more on 
the basis of noise, then the closed-end fund will become more risky—explaining the 
discount compared to the replicated portfolio. One implicit assumption of this 
argument is that small investors trading on noise alter the systematic risk which 
triggers a discussion on the risk associated with noise trading—which has been 
referred to as noise trader risk. De Long et al. (1990) argue that the discount could be 
regarded as a measure of sentiment in the market indicating that when noise traders 
are excessively bullish, the discount should decrease and the reverse is expected when 
noise traders are bearish. Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1995) find that changes in 
country-fund discounts reflect a risk that is associated with the sentiment of US 
investors. Brown (1999) shows that unusual levels of individual investor sentiment 
are associated with greater volatility of closed-end investment funds. Mueller and 
Pfnuer (2013) study the net asset value spread in real estate investment trusts (REIT) 
and postulate that the price of REITs shares may reflect noise trader’s sentiment. 
 
Brown (1999) supports the hypothesis that irrational investors acting on noisy signals 
could cause systematic risk whilst Odean (1998) shows that volatility increases with 
noise trading. Nguyen and Daigler (2006) find that uninformed traders cause 
excessive variability in the trading volume when they face return or volatility shocks. 
De Long et al. (1990) argue that under certain conditions, noise traders may earn more 
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than the rational traders, nonetheless, this may not be because they have additional 
skills but most likely because they have a higher risk exposure. Furthermore, they 
show that some ‘sophisticated users’ namely informed investors convert into noise 
traders as it pays to act as noise traders.  
 
Following the publications of Shleifer and Summers (1990) and De Long et al. 
(1990), noise trader risk became an additional risk factor that has to be evaluated in 
addition to market volatility besides the rational expectations. Several models have 
been developed and proposed to measure the volatility caused by noise traders at the 
start of the second millennium. Lee et al. (2002) use (1) the Investors’ Intelligence of 
New Rochelle as a sentiment proxy, (2) a series of independent advisory services that 
was rated by the editor of Investors’ Intelligence’s editor and (3) a GARCH model to 
evaluate the impacts of sentiment on returns and volatility where they demonstrate 
that changes in the sentiment are negatively correlated with the market conditional 
volatility—implying that volatility increases when investors become more bearish and 
vice-versa. However, Verma and Verma (2006) use the American Association of 
Individual Investors (AAII) sentiment index and an EGARCH model to check for the 
asymmetric effects of sentiment, arguing that volatility is more affected by bullish 
sentiment. Wang et al. (2009), on the other hand, employ other models such as 
GJR-GARCH, EGB2 and SWARCH models to explore the effects of investor 
sentiment on the Taiwan Futures Exchange. Using an EGARCH model, Uygur and 
Tas (2014) investigate whether earnings shocks have more influence on the 
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conditional volatility in high sentiment periods in the US, Japan, Hong Kong, UK, 
France, Germany, and Turkey, and found that earnings shocks have more influence on 
conditional volatility when the sentiment is high.  
 
Low (2004) argues that noise traders can inflate asset price volatility, particularly 
during market downturns and this creates a debate around the asymmetric volatility. 
Avramov et al. (2006) argue that asymmetric volatility is governed by the trading 
dynamics of informed and uninformed trades although they do not have a direct 
measure for informed/uninformed trades—they assume that the selling activity on the 
negative return days is dominated by uninformed (noise) traders and that selling 
activity on positive return days is dominated by informed traders. Kittiakarasakun, 
Tse and Wang (2012), on the other hand, use a direct measure in terms of a trader 
identification that distinguishes between informed and uninformed trades from the 
Computer Trade Reconstruction dataset but still confirms the findings of Avramov at 
al. (2006). In a similar vein, Baklaci, Olgun and Can (2011) show that noise traders 
contribute significantly to the volatility in spreads and that the duration of the 
volatility impact is short lived. 
 
2.5 MARKET SENTIMENT AFFECTS RETURN 
Currently there is an on-going discussion about whether market sentiment reflects the 
behaviour of noise traders but there is no general consensus on this matter—this is 
what we explain in this section. A number of researchers have referred to market 
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sentiment effects as noise traders. In this section of the literature, we allow for the 
notion that market sentiment can be highly correlated with noise traders and we will 
view the term ‘market sentiment’ as noise trading. The goal of this section is to 
illustrate that noise trading activities (proxied by sentiment index or any other 
measure) affect returns. 
 
In their explanation of the closed-end fund puzzle, Lee et al. (1991) argue that the risk 
factor caused by small investors may account for the difference between net asset 
value and the price and this can be used as evidence that noise trader risk is priced.  
Using the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index as a proxy for investor sentiment, 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) show that consumer confidence explains the time 
variation in equity portfolio returns and other studies such as Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) and Qiu and Welch (2004) support their findings. Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
alter the way of estimating a sentiment index by averaging six widely accepted 
proxies for investor sentiment namely volume traded, dividend premium, closed-end 
fund discount, the number and first-day returns on IPOs, and the equity share in new 
issues. Each proxy is regressed on macroeconomic variables such as industrial 
production, growth in employment, and recession indicator to filter out the effects of 
macroeconomic news. Their results show that in periods of low (high) sentiment, 
speculative stocks have greater (lower) future returns on average than bond-like 
stocks. Brown and Cliff (2005) also explore the relationship between investor 
sentiment and returns and report that previous returns are important determinants of 
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sentiment indexes. Aase, Bjuland and Øksendal (2012) show that noise traders do not 
lose on average while informed investors make zero expected profits. Davidson and 
Ramiah (2010) use two different proxies for noise trading where the first is change in 
behavioural error and the second is the residual from the behavioural error after 
controlling for firm-specific information and find evidence that these two proxies are 
related to returns. They identify three possible relationships namely (1) when no 
relationship between noise trader behaviour and return is observed implies that the 
market becomes behaviourally inefficient; (2) a positive relationship is referred to as 
systematic noise effect; and (3) a negative relationship is referred to as cash noise 
effect. 
 
2.6 FUNDAMENTALS AND NOISE TRADERS 
Ramiah and Davidson (2007) argue that using a sentiment index to capture the 
behaviour of noise traders is not sufficient as there are various factors such as 
firm-specific information, portfolio rebalancing and liquidity reasons that affect 
trading behaviour. To that end, they control for arrival of firm-specific information in 
their measure of noise trader risk. The literature on how firm-specific 
information/fundamentals affect noise trading is almost inexistent within the finance 
discipline. Nevertheless, within the accounting discipline, Chau, Dosmukhambetova 
and Kallinterakis (2013) study the relationship between International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IRFS) and noise trading activities where they report that the 
adoption of IFRS has enhanced the stability and informational efficiency of capital 
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markets by promoting information based trading which end up reducing the impact of 
noise traders. 
 
2.6.1 VOLUME  
Kyle (1985) argues that in continuous auction equilibrium, the quantity traded by 
noise traders follows a Brownian motion process. This implies that an ex ante 
doubling of quantities traded by noise traders induces insiders and market makers to 
double quantities they trade, but has no effect on prices leading to the doubling of 
profits for insiders. Campbell et al. (1993) find that trading volume and stock return 
autocorrelation are inversely related, suggesting that rational, risk-averse market 
participants have a tendency to accommodate for the buying and selling pressures of 
uniformed investors or noise traders. Odean (1998) provides evidence that 
overconfidence increases trading volume and volatility and leading to underreaction. 
Sond, Tan and Wu (2005) find that the relationship between volatility and volume is 
driven mainly by the number of trades on Chinese stock market. Furthermore 
Groenewold, Tang and Wu (2003) observe a contemporaneous V-shaped relationship 
between stock returns and market turnover for Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong 
stock markets. Dennis and Mayhew (2002) investigate the relative importance of 
factors such as leverage ratio, volume and firm size when explaining volatility of 
stock and their empirical findings assert that there is a positive correlation between 
size and volume. They also report that in studies involving various fundamentals, the 
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problem of multicollinearity cannot be ignored. There is a rich literature on trading 
volume but the literature fails to adequately address the issue of how volume and 
noise trading are related.   
 
2.6.2 EARNINGS  
An early study by Ball and Brown (1968) develops the link between earnings 
announcements, expectations and share prices. Other studies such as Jones, Latane 
and Rendleman (1982) and Easton and Harris (1991) analyze earnings as an 
explanatory variable for stock return. Copeland, Dolgoff and Moel (2004) support 
prior studies in that they find significant results when the cross-section of 
market-adjusted stock returns is regressed against changes in analyst expectation of 
short-term and long-term earnings. Uygur and Tas (2012) show that bad news 
(negative earnings shocks) cause more volatility than good news (positive earnings 
shocks). Similar to trading volume, we find a relatively large amount of literature on 
earnings but the literature on how earnings affect noise trader risk is thin.  
 
2.6.3 FIRM SIZE  
Fama and French (1993 and 1996) posit that a three-factor model largely captures the 
average returns on U.S. stock market portfolios and Chui and Wei (1998) confirm 
such a relationship. Drew and Veeraraghavan (2001) extend this literature by showing 
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a relationship between firm size, book-to-market equity and average stock returns for 
several Asian markets. Furthermore, Drew, Naughton and Veeraraghavan (2003) 
show that small and growth firms generate superior returns than big and value firms. 
The first study of Fama and French triggered a debate among academics over these 
three factors and to that end we apply this debate on the noise trading. Palomino 
(1996) shows that noise traders prevail more in small firms, since the market for small 
firms’ stock are less competitive than the market for large firm’s stock. However, 
there is still little literature that discusses whether noise traders prevail more in large 
or small organisations, value or growth firms.  
 
2.6.4 LEVERAGE 
If we start with the classic work of Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miller (1977), 
we find the debt literature shows that a tax shield on interest payments on debt places 
a premium on the value of a firm. However, Miller’s subsequent incorporation of 
personal tax effects greatly reduces tax advantages of debt. Modigliani (1982) 
contributes to this literature by suggesting that an optimal capital structure may 
involve a trade-off between tax shelters on debt, inflation, and personal tax effects. A 
few years later, Myers and Majluf (1984) present the pecking order theory to explain 
the tendency to rely on internal funds and the preference for debt rather than equity.  
Myers (1977 and 1984), Flannery (1986), Graham (1996) and many others focus on 
long-term financial management. Bowman (1980) shows empirically that market 
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value measurement of owners’ equity is important in assessing the effect of financial 
leverage on risk. He finds that the market value measurement of debt does not appear 
to be important, however, this may be attributed to noise in his estimates of the 
market value of private debt. Ryan (1997) finds that systematic equity risk is 
positively associated with sources of financial leverage. Barkham and Ward’s (1999) 
findings imply that property shares are likely to provide a return that can differ 
markedly from the return on the underlying assets over a relatively long period. 
Although leverage is a major component of the finance literature, the relationship 
between leverage and noise trading is almost inexistent. 
 
2.6.5 CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (CAPEX) 
Yang-Tzong, Alt and Gordon (1993) document that cost cutting exercises in 
inefficient capital expenditure tend to have a positive effect on the market value of 
firms. On the other hand, Copeland, Dolgoff and Moel (2004) investigate the 
relationship between total return of shareholders and capital expenditure but fails to 
establish a statistically relationship. Surprisingly the literature on capital expenditure 
is relative thin compared to other factors like debt and firm size. We did not find any 
relationship between noise trading and capital expenditure. 
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2.6.6 SALES 
There is no economic literature to date on the role of sale in noise trader risk. The 
rationale for adding this variable is based on a preliminary study conducted by 
Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) that considers sales announcements by 
loser firms. We assume that fundamentals investors incorporate a firm’s sales figures 
into their asset allocation decisions. Intuitively, any negative sales announcement 
would be expected to decrease profitability expectations for the firm.   
 
2.7 TYPES OF TRADERS 
Trading usually takes place when market agents assign different values to a particular 
asset. Based on literature such as Black (1986) and Shefrin and Statman (1994), there 
are two categories of traders in the market, namely information traders (sophisticated 
investors) and noise traders.  Shefrin and Statman (1994) argue that information 
investors trade on the basis of fundamental information and process information 
rationally, and thus they are expected to make a profit out of it. Easley, Hvidkjaer and 
O'Hara (2002); Vachadze (2001); Blair, Poon and Taylor (2001); Gervais, Kaniel and 
Mingelgrin (2001); Pritamani and Singal (2001); Chen, Mohan, and Steiner (1999); 
Atkins and Basu (1995); Berry and Howe (1993); and Penman (1987) examine the 
profitability of trading on information and reports that it is profitable.  
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Black (1986) defines noise traders as those not trading on the basis of information. In 
other words, noise traders are those who trade without basing their expectations on 
information but on any other basis. From an early 1990, we have seen a growing body 
of literature that suggests that information traders would overreact or underreact to the 
price errors caused by noise traders, and these studies include Arrow (1982), Bernard 
(1992), Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Freeman and Tse (1989), Mendenhall 
(1991), Wiggins (1991), Ramiah and Davidson (2007), Fischer (2012) and Fabozzi, 
Fung, Lam and Wong (2013). The overreaction and underreaction can be considered 
as evidence that information traders do not process information rationally in the 
financial markets. The behavioural finance studies including Lee, Shleifer and Thaler 
(1991), Odean (1998), Shiller (1979; 1981; and 1984), Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Cordell, Smith and Terry (2011) point out that 
professionals (information traders) commit mistakes by trading on behavioral biases 
(for example, overconfidence) and this can be viewed as evidence that information 
traders on occasions behave as noise traders. Ramiah and Davidson (2007) developed 
an information-adjusted noise model, and argue that it is difficult to distinguish 
between information traders and noise traders based on who has an excellent ability to 
process the information or who has the right information in the market. To simplify 
the identification process, they consider all traders that trade on the days where 
firm-specific information is announced as information traders and traders are 
classified as noise traders if they trade when there is no announcement. 
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2.8 QUANTIFYING NOISE TRADER RISK 
Sias, Starks and Tinic (2000), De Long et al. (1990), Osler (1998), Lee et al. (2002) 
Verma and Verma (2006), Ramiah and Davidson (2007) and Hu and Wang (2013) are 
among the researchers who have attempted to quantify noise while other models such 
as Blume and Easley (1994), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Shefrin and Statman (1994) incorporate noise trading 
in their models. Sias, Starks and Tinic (2000) use closed-end funds as their testing 
grounds and this has a limitation in that it cannot be applied to other categories of 
listed companies.  Osler (1998) identifies noise traders in the US equity markets 
using the ‘head-and-shoulder’ chart pattern and, once more, this model is limited to 
technical analysis traders. In the models of Lee et al. (2002), Verma and Verma 
(2006) and Hu and Wang (2013), they fail to control for the effects of firm-specific 
factors. The rest of this section focuses on Ramiah and Davidson (2007) and 
Davidson and Ramiah (2011) because the methodology used in this research is based 
on these two publications. As the study by Ramiah and Davidson (2007) is a 
continuation of the work of De Long et al. (1990) and Shefrin and Statman (1994), we 
touch on their methodologies as well. 
 
The model proposed by De Long et al. (1990) is as follows:  
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where  stλ  is the demand for risky assets by informed investors; ntλ is the demand 
for risky asset by noise traders, r is the fixed dividend, tp  is the stock price at time 
t, γ  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and 2 1+tpt σ  is the one period 
variance of  pt+1 at time t. They assume that informed investors in period t correctly 
perceive the distribution of returns from holding the risk assets while noise traders at 
time t misperceive the expected price of the risky asset by an independent and 
identically distributed normal random variable tρ : 
 
),(.~ 2* pt N σρρ  
 
where *ρ is the mean misperception measuring the average ‘bullishness’ of noise 
traders, and 2pσ  is the variance of noise traders’ misperception of the expected return 
per unit of the risky asset or some element of noise traders’ risk. They assume that 
noise traders maximize their own expectation of utility given the next period 
dividend, the one-period variance of  pt+1, and their false belief that the distribution 
of the price of the next period has a mean tρ above its true value. The implication of 
the work of De Long et al. is that there is an element of noise trader risk that modern 
finance fails to consider, leading to a misspecified CAPM. To that end, Shefrin and 
Statman (1994) develop a Behavioural Asset-Pricing Model (BAPM) as an analog to 
the standard CAPM. The BAPM allows for the heterogeneity among traders and 
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produces behavioural beta which contains both traditional beta and noise trader risk. 
BAPM is similar to the traditional CAPM, with the exception that the market portfolio 
uses a sentiment index. With this concept in mind, Ramiah and Davidson (2007) 
estimate both the CAPM (see Equation 2.3) and BAPM (see Equation 2.6). 
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iiftit rrrr εβα ~]~~[~~ +−+=−                      Equation 2.3 
 
where  itr~  is the asset i’s return at time t, ftr~   is the risk-free return at time t, mtr~   
is the return on the market at time t, itε~ is the error term, iα is the intercept of the 
regression equation and ciβ is the CAPM beta. Equation 2.3 is re-written to represent 
the efficient beta ( Biβ ) or the behavioural beta and the noise element ( iη ) 
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where the noise element ( iη ) can be written as the difference between the CAPM beta 
and the efficient beta (BAPM beta) and is referred to as Behavioural Error (BE). 
Equation 2.5 shows how BE is estimated and is regarded as a proxy for noise trader 
risk. 
 
i
BE = iη = Ciβ   - Biβ                            Equation 2.5 
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The BAPM of Shefrin and Statman (1994) is used to estimate the behavioural beta 
and this is illustrated in Equation 2.6. 
 
itft
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where Bmtr~  is the return on the behavioural market portfolio at time t. The behavioural 
market portfolio is represented by a sentiment index (Mums and Dads Index) which is 
made up of the ‘preferred stocks’ of small investors. 
 
The methodology used to calculate BE assumes indices would change only when 
there is a divergence in opinion caused by irrational traders but fails to allow for new 
information arrival. To extract the firm-specific information from the BE, Ramiah and 
Davidson use the information-adjusted noise model and is represented by the equation 
below. 
 
ititit INFOBE εβα ++=∆                        Equation 2.7 
 
where  INFO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when there is a news 
announcement and zero otherwise. α  is the mean change in the behavioural error 
caused by  noise traders, β  shows contribution of the information trader to the 
behavioural error, and βαµ +=  reflects net change in behavioural error after the 
interaction between noise and information traders. Mu ( µ ) is regarded as the measure 
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of noise trader risk. This model shows the interaction between noise traders and 
information traders and has the capability of detecting overreaction, underreaction and 
IPE. Their results show evidence of these three effects in the Australian equity 
markets with IPE and underreaction as the two major problems. 
 
Davidson and Ramiah (2010) go one step further to test if the proxy for noise trader 
risk (BE) and noise trader risk (Mu) has a relationship with the return of the 
underlying asset. They estimate the following two equations respectively and they 
provide evidence that these two measures are related to returns. 
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2.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined some major market anomalies that have been published in 
the area of irrational trading. The general lack of explanation as to what is causing 
these anomalies has led many researchers to mention the unknown factor, or 
unidentifiable risk factor that others have referred to the noise trader risk. Noise trader 
risk was not a very well documented area prior to the year 2000 but we have seen a 
number of papers attempting to quantify the impact of noise trading post the year 
2000.  
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According to the literature, there are reasons to believe that traders do not operate 
rationally. Traditionally, modern finance has been marginalizing the effects of 
irrational traders. However, the growing interest in the area of behavioural finance has 
triggered another wave of studies in the area of irrational trading. In particular, we 
have seen a rise in the number of papers in the area of quantitative behavioural 
finance and in this chapter we cite a series of these papers.  
 
The lessons that we have learnt from this chapter is that markets are not always 
efficient in that there are many market anomalies. Financial economists are working 
towards explaining these effects and one factor that they tend to highlight is noise 
trader risk. Although it has been highlighted on numerous occasions, to this date, 
there is no empirical work that has tried to explain a market anomaly using noise 
trader risk with the exception of the closed-end fund puzzle, arguably as there is no 
generally accepted model when it comes to quantifying noise trader risk. There have 
been several models that have been proposed but the application of some models is 
too restrictive while others are misspecified (in terms of not controlling for 
firm-specific information). Given that these models are relatively new, it is vital to 
test them in alternative markets to find out how reliable they are. Based on the 
literature review presented in this chapter, the model of Ramiah and Davidson (2007) 
has been chosen for further testing.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION-ADJUSTED 
NOISE MODEL TO THE SHENZHEN STOCK MARKET 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Efficient market hypothesis (EMH) argues that noise traders are marginal traders who 
disappear as a result of arbitrage trading activities. Black (1986) questions this 
paradigm and recognizes the importance of noise traders as they contribute to the 
liquidity of a market. Subsequent studies such as De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldman (1990) [DSSW (1990) thereafter] provided direct empirical evidence 
against this section of the EMH by showing that this type of trader influences the 
market through noise trader risk. Research interest in the area continued to grow when 
the problem of identifying a noise trader was later simplified by Shefrin and Statman 
(1994) who classified any trader not trading on information as a noise trader. This led 
to the development of a number of models such as Sias, Starks and Tinic (2001), 
Osler (1998) and Ramiah and Davidson (2007) that attempt to quantify noise traders. 
Whilst the earlier segment of the literature focused on the development of models to 
capture noise traders, current research is being undertaken to test the validity of these 
existing models. In this study, we test for the existence of noise traders as another 
form of market inefficiency. 
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One of the underlying assumptions of most asset pricing models is homogeneity 
among traders in a perfect capital market scenario which was later relaxed by Shefrin 
and Statman (1994), leading to the behavioural asset pricing model (BAPM). They 
postulate that there are two types of traders, namely, noise traders and information 
traders, which cause heterogeneity amongst traders. Furthermore, in the behavioural 
finance literature, we detected four subcategories of noise traders namely small retail 
investors (or mums and dads), wealthy individuals, smart money and sophisticated 
traders. The introduction of sophisticated users in the model changes the dynamics of 
the market in that the proportion of noise traders increases significantly and the 
consequences cannot be negligible. There is enough evidence to demonstrate that 
professionals-sophisticated users can commit mistakes through underreaction, 
overreaction and may even turn into noise traders themselves. Ramiah and Davidson 
(2007) refer to the third mistake as information pricing error (IPE) and provide 
evidence of this issue and underreaction in the Australian equity market. DDSW 
(1990) is another classic paper that validates the presence of noise traders through 
noise trader risk which in turn diverge market prices away from the fundamental 
values.  
 
There is a new wave of studies that discuss the various disturbances in asset prices in 
China. For instance, Chen, Rui and Wang (2005) show that Chinese investors have a 
tendency to overreact to good (bad) news and underreact to bad (good) news in a 
bullish (bearish) market. Lee and Rui (2000) conclude their paper by arguing that 
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foreign investors may lack knowledge of the Chinese market. When we consider other 
research papers in this area, it leads us to believe that asset prices in China may not be 
trading at their desired fundamental values. Our research explores whether these 
divergences in asset prices (if any) can be explained by noise trading theory. Given 
the recent evidence of irrational behaviour within the Chinese market, China provides 
an ideal testing ground for our hypothesis and we focus on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE). Using the information-adjusted noise model (IANM) developed by 
Ramiah and Davidson (2007), we test whether there is noise trader risk, overreaction, 
underreaction and IPE on the Shenzhen A-share market. Hence, our contribution is 
that it is the first study that simultaneously tests for noise trader risk, overreaction, 
underreaction and IPE in that market. Our findings do not support the EMH in that we 
observe a strong presence of noise traders in China. Our results show that the Chinese 
market trades at irrational values in most of the cases that we studied. We provide 
evidence of overreaction, underreaction and IPE in the Shenzhen market.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 3.2 describes the data and methodology; 
section 3.3 contains our empirical estimates and discusses the results; and section 3.4 
outlines our conclusion.  
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3.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1 DATA  
The daily stock return for all listed firms, volume traded, number of shares 
outstanding, price, risk free rate and market return used in this study were obtained 
from DataStream. Information arrival is captured through the announcements made 
on SZSE and we hand collected this data from SZSE website. The information data is 
available from 2001. Until 24th Aug 2010, there are 1119 listed companies in the 
SZSE. The total capital stock outstanding was almost RMB 32 billion. We started 
collecting the data randomly and it was clear at 700 listed companies that it was going 
to be impossible to collect all of the information about the 1119 listed companies. 
Firms that did not have enough information to conduct our tests were removed from 
the sample. Furthermore, companies that were delisted and died completely during the 
sample period are excluded as well. This may lead to potential survivorship bias. In 
total, we dedicated one year to data collection based on the largest companies as 
measured by market capitalisation. Because manual collection is a long and expensive 
exercise, the sample is finally left with 180 firms covering the period 2002 to 2010, 
specifically, from the 1st January 2002 to 24th August 2010.  
 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange groups information announcements fall into almost twenty 
categories which include annual report, half year report, quarter report, allotment 
notice, equity, convertible bonds issue, warrant announcement, change in stock right, 
employee share options, dividend rate, actives report, asset acquisitions, results of 
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AGM, changes in substantial shareholding, changes in governance/regulation, risk 
hints, related-party transactions, clarification notice and any other announcements that 
might potentially move stock price.  
 
3.2.2 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of Ramiah and Davidson (2007) is followed closely in this 
experiment. In an effort to capture the noise trader risk, we start by estimating the 
CAPM using the formula below. 
 
r − r = ϕ + β
r − r + ε	            Equation 3.1 
 
where r is the asset i’s return at time t, r is the risk free rate of return, r is the 
daily return on the Shenzhen Composite Market Index, epsilon(ε)	 is the error term, 
phi(ϕ) is the interception equation (E(∅) = 0) and β is the CAPM beta. 
 
The second step is to estimate the behavioural asset pricing model (BAPM) and 
Equation 3.2 below illustrates this model 
 
r − r = ⍵ + β
R − r + ε	                             Equation 3.2 
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where omega (⍵) is the interception equation (E(⍵) = 0) and β is the BAPM 
beta. R  is the return on the sentiment index at time t and the remaining variables 
are defined as in Equation 3.1. The difference between BAPM and CAPM lies in the 
sentiment index. Consistent with Ramiah and Davidson (2007), we followed the 
preferred stock hypothesis to build our sentiment index and we utilize the top ten 
preferred stocks on the SZSE to form this behavioural index. Such an index, however, 
already exists in a different form in China and is known as the Dragon index.  
 
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are estimated on a daily basis using a window of the previous 
260 days and the daily CAPM and BAPM betas are generated. On a daily basis, the 
difference between these two betas is estimated and this is referred to as behavioural 
error (BE). It is represented by:  
 
BE = β
 − β

                                              Equation 3.3 
 
Shefrin and Statman (1994) use this as a measure to determine whether the market is 
behaviourally inefficient and we can regard this as a naïve proxy for noise trading 
activities. The variation in behavioural error (∆BE) can be explained by a number 
of factors including firm-specific information, external information arrival, portfolio 
rebalancing, liquidity trades as well as noise trading activities. Holding external 
information arrival, portfolio rebalancing, liquidity trades constant, we control for 
firm-specific information in the BE. This leads to the implicit assumption that the 
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unexplained variation in BE is a direct result of noise trading activities and is regarded 
as noise trader risk. The process of extracting the information content out the BE is 
known as the information-adjusted noise model (IANM) and is shown in Equation 3.4 
below. 
 
∆BE = α + γIE + ε																																																																											      Equation 3.4  
 
where IE is the firm-specific information (i.e. the new information release). 
Information arrival can be interpreted differently from different traders. What 
constitute good news for one trader may be perceived as bad news by another trader 
as they can both have different prior and posterior beliefs. IE does not distinguish 
between good news and bad news and takes the form of a dummy variable. The 
dummy variable takes the value of one on information arrival day and zero otherwise, 
no matter how much information is released on that date. If there is an information 
announcement, but stock trading 17  is suspended, we move the information 
announcement to the date when stock starts to trade again. Alpha (α) is the mean 
change in the behavioral error attributable to noise traders and gamma (!) is the 
proportion of the mean change in behavioral error attributable to information traders.  
 
According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), noise traders are marginal 
traders who disappear as a result of arbitrage trading activities. If the EMH is to hold, 
                                                 
17
 Note that Chinese trading regulations prevent stock value from changing by more than 10% per day. 
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then the IANM (i.e. the change in behavioural error) must be equal to zero (∆BE =
0). When ∆BE ≠ 0,, it implies that the market is inefficient as noise traders exist in 
the market.  
        
Given that a dummy variable is used in Equation 3.4, this equation is simplified to the 
following equation on non-information days as the dummy variable equals zero. 
 
∆BE = α + ε																																																																											           Equation 3.4.1 
 
Information traders enter the market only when there is new information arrival. In 
the absence of news arrival, any trader in the model is a noise trader and this is shown 
in Equation 3.4.1.  
 
On information days, a number of possibilities may arise. For instance, noise traders 
may commit an error (α > 0) and information traders (!) can react in three different 
ways, namely, no reaction (! = 0), oppose the noise traders (! < 0) or even join the 
noise traders (! > 0). When information traders do not react, it creates another form of 
inefficiency as there is still a residue of α in the market. In a scenario where 
information traders oppose noise traders, the market will be efficient if and only if the 
magnitude of error α is equal to the magnitude of ! (|$| = |!|) as there will be no 
residue left). When the information traders fail to clear the entire error α, a residue 
will remain in the system. In the event that the information traders join the noise 
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traders, the residue α will be increased by !. The residue discussed under these 
different scenarios is our measure of noise trader risk (µ) and can be written as:  
 
% = $ + !                  Equation 3.4.2 
 
According to the IANM, the EMH will hold when Equation 3.4.2 equals zero as there 
is no noise trader risk on the market. The existence of noise trader risk (% = $ + !	 ≠
0) implies that the market is inefficient and this gives rise to three different effects 
namely underreaction, overreaction and information pricing error. When a noise 
trader commits an error (α > 0) and the information traders oppose them but fail to 
ensure that the EMH holds, it shows that the information traders have underreacted to 
this news arrival. This situation is labeled as positive underreaction (U+) and when α 
< 0, and an information trader underreacts, it is labeled as (U-). If the information 
traders were to oppose the noise traders but overshoot the magnitude of alpha, then 
we have an overreaction scenario. When the information traders do not oppose the 
noise traders but decide to join them by adding to the existing errors, this is regarded 
as an information pricing error (IPE). Similar to underreaction, both overreaction and 
IPE can be positive and negative, i.e. O (+), O (-), IPE (+) and IPE (-). For any of the 
above inefficient market to hold, the following sets of conditions need to prevail 
namely: 
 
Condition for U (+) to occur requires α > 0, ! < 0 and µ  > 0  (C1) 
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Condition for U (-) to occur requires α < 0, ! > 0 and µ  < 0     (C2) 
Condition for O (+) to occur requires α < 0, ! > 0 and µ  > 0    (C3) 
Condition for O (-) to occur requires α > 0, ! < 0 and µ  < 0   (C4) 
Condition for IPE (+) to occur requires α > 0 and ! > 0    (C5) 
Condition for IPE (-) to occur requires α < 0 and ! < 0    (C6) 
 
The sentiment index in China is not readily available and was constructed. It consists 
of the top ten popular stocks on the SZSE A-share and, similar to the market, we refer 
to that index as the Dragon index. The Dragon index was then calculated as per 
Equation 3.5.  
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where Si is the number of shares outstanding in stock i, Si0 is the number of shares 
outstanding at time t=0, Pi0 is the price of stock i at time t=0, and I0 is an arbitrary 
multiplier. The arbitrary multiplier is a fixed value that allows us to get a value close 
to the Shenzhen Composite Market Index for comparison and graphical illustrations. 
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3.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.3.1 SHENZHEN COMPOSITE MARKET INDEX, DRAGON INDEX AND 
MARKET INEFFICIENCY  
Finn and Koivurinne (2000) believed that if it is possible to outperform an index over 
a long period, then the benchmark index must be necessarily ex ante inefficient. They 
provide evidence of inefficiency of the All Ordinaries Index. Table 3.1 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the two indices, the Shenzhen Composite Market Index 
(SCMI) and the Dragon Index, used in the estimation of the CAPM Beta and BAPM 
Beta respectively. In the second column of Table 3.1, we can observe the performance 
of these two indices in terms of return and risk for the entire period 2002-2010. The 
mean return of the Dragon index and the SCMI is 0.69% and 0.04% respectively. 
Such a difference18 is quite large and is consistent across all the remaining sub 
periods. It implies that the behavioural index formed on the preferred stock 
hypothesis, in particular the Dragon index, consistently outperforms the SCMI. The 
variance19 of the Dragon index is also consistently higher than the SCMI. This occurs 
because there is a relatively lower amount of stocks within the sentiment index. 
Although there is a high correlation between them, we can still observe different 
outcomes from these indices. In this study, the Shenzhen Composite Market Index 
(SCMI) does appear to be an inefficient index compared to the Dragon Index. The 
next step will be to determine whether there is a difference between the behavioural 
                                                 
18
 This difference is statistically different from zero as the t-statistics is 21.98. 
19
 There is a statistical difference as the p-value of the F-Statistics is less than 0.05. 
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beta and the CAPM beta. In comparison, Ramiah and Davidson (2007) find that the 
behavioural index return is not statistically higher than price index return in Australia 
but do observe a difference in variability. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Returns on the Shenzhen Composite Market Index and Returns on the Dragon Index 
 
2002-2010 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Dragon Index 
Mean 0.0069  0.0080  0.0104  0.0002  0.0151  0.0119  0.0022  0.0032  0.0064  0.0049  
Median 0.0058  0.0060  0.0123  0.0000  0.0155  0.0126  0.0022  0.0001  0.0050  0.0024  
Stdev  0.0274  0.0443  0.0262  0.0347  0.0332  0.0240  0.0207  0.0193  0.0174  0.0194  
Variance 0.0007  0.0020  0.0007  0.0012  0.0011  0.0006  0.0004  0.0004  0.0003  0.0004  
Obs 2256 168 261 262 261 260 260 262 261 261 
Shenzhen Composite Market Index 
Mean 0.0004  -0.0003  0.0030  -0.0037  0.0037  0.0026  -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0001  -0.0008  
Median 0.0003  0.0011  0.0050  -0.0012  0.0059  0.0031  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Stdev 0.0185  0.0163  0.0205  0.0294  0.0226  0.0136  0.0145  0.0134  0.0104  0.0162  
Variance 0.0003  0.0003  0.0004  0.0009  0.0005  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0001  0.0003  
Obs 2256 168 261 262 261 260 260 262 261 261 
Testing if the returns are different 
t-statistics 21.98***  2.71***  10.16***  3.12***  9.03***  11.68***  2.51**  4.22*** 8.01***  8.70***  
p-Value 0 0.0074 0 0.002 0 0 0.0127 0 0 0 
Testing if the variance is different 
F-Statistic     
(p-Value) 0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0071  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0044  
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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3.3.2 CAPM BETA, BAPM BETA, BEHAVIOURAL ERRORS AND MARKET 
INEFFICIENCY  
The behavioural efficient market hypothesis (BEMH) states that the market is 
efficient if there is no noise trader risk. The simplest method to examine this 
hypothesis is to test if the behavioural error (the difference between two betas) is 
significantly different from zero.  
 
Figure 3.1: Average CAPM Beta and Average BAPM Beta of 180 Firms for the 
Period 2002-2010 
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the average CAPM betas are different from the average BAPM 
betas of 180 sample firms for the period 2002-2010. As expected, the CAPM beta is 
consistently higher than the BAPM beta across all firms. Appendix 3.1 shows the 
BAPM and CAPM beta results across each year (2002 to 2010) where it is evident 
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that CAPM beta is generally higher than BAPM beta. However, we notice that there is 
a relatively small number of anomalies whereby opposite effects were observed in 
Henan Shuanghui Investment and Development Company 20  Limited in 2007, 
Changjiang Securities Company Limited in 2008, and ShanDong ZhongRun 
Investment Holding Group Company Limited, Rongan Property Company Limited 
and China Calxon Group Company Limited in 2009. Additionally the BAPM and 
CAPM betas are estimated for the 734 firms within Shenzhen equity market for the 
period 2002-2010 (see Appendix 3.2) whereby it is clear that there is a major 
difference between traditional betas and behavioural betas. From a graphical point of 
view, there is a noticeable difference between the two types of beta, leading us to 
believe that behavioural error is not likely to be equal to zero.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the mean CAPM beta, mean BAPM beta and mean behavioural error 
(BE) for 180 Chinese firms for the period 2002 to 2010. From the second column of 
Table 3.2, we observe that average CAPM beta is 1.0301, BAPM beta is 0.5740, 
average BE is 0.4561 and that these average are statistically significant. Appendix 3.3 
presents the mean CAPM betas, mean BAPM betas and mean behavioural errors of 
73421 firms within Shenzhen Stock Market over the period 2002 to 2010. From the 
second column of Appendix 3.3, we observe that average CAPM beta is 1.0439, 
BAPM beta is 0.5541, average BE is 0.4898 and that these averages are statistically 
significant. Note that the main reasons for us to provide the results for 180 firms and 
                                                 
20
 There is no difference between firm and company throughout the thesis.  
21
 We get 734 Shenzhen A-Share firms after dropping the firms with insufficient data.   
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734 firms is (1) to show that our results are robust and (2) that it is a tedious job to 
collect firm announcements for all 734 firms and subsequently the results will focus 
on the 180 firms.22  
 
This technique generates highly correlated and dependent betas, which will bias any 
statistical testing. Consequently, the betas need to be corrected for dependence. Using 
the methodology designed by Ramiah and Davidson (2007) to calculate an algebraic 
formula for the variance of the mean of a set of windowed estimates (for a single 
company). n is equal to the number of estimates, L is the length of the window,  is 
the sample variance of the windowed estimates. If we assume that the covariance 
between the estimates of beta is directly proportional to the number of shared 
observations, then the variance of the mean of these estimates is: 
 
                Equation 3.6 
 
When n = L, the actual variance will be reduced to Var ≈ 1.5Vc. As the CAPM betas 
and the BAPM betas are not independent and the CAPM betas and BAPM betas use 
the same dependent variables, the standard error is computed as follows: 
 
                                                 
22
 We carried out a hypothesis testing between means to check if there is any difference in the means 
of the CAPM and BAPM betas and the t-statistics are -10.84 and -3.98 respectively. 
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W is a matrix that represents the weights of each of the companies, and as there are N 
companies, and they are all of equal weights, W 
W=                    =      
 
Σ	is the variance-covariance matrix of a variable across the N different firms. This is a 
matrix that has the variances of the variable (either BAPM betas, CAPM betas or 
behavioural errors) on each asset down the main diagonal and the covariance’s 
between the firms in the off diagonal positions. The variance of the mean is computed 
by finding the product of W. .W1. 
 
All mean betas and mean behavioural errors are statistically significantly different 
from zero in all periods/sub periods studied. Consistent with Ramiah and Davidson 
(2007), we find that CAPM beta is consistently higher than the behavioural beta 
implying that distortion through BE exists in the Chinese equity market, and the 
statistically significant positive BEs for all periods assessed reinforces this view. The 
evidence suggests that noise traders distort prices in the Shenzhen A-share equity 
market. So far the results presented are consistent with prior studies that use sentiment 
indices to capture irrational behaviour and, similar to these prior studies, it is open to 
criticisms in terms of there is no control for information arrival. In the next section, 
we examine the interaction between noise traders and information traders in the 
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Shenzhen stock market by applying the IANM. It should be noted that this has not 
been investigated/documented before. This next step will allow us to address the issue 
of information arrival.  
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Table 3.2: Average CAPM beta, BAPM beta and Behavioural Error (BE) for the period 2002-2010 for 180 Chinese firms 
  2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CAPM Beta 1.0301 1.0186 1.0362 1.0355 1.0241 1.041 1.0139 1.0297 1.065 1.0143 
T-Stats for CAPM beta = 0 701.22*** 1710.49***  6097.21*** 2030.85***  2306.70***  818.72***  1381.01*** 664.73*** 732.17***  4034.09*** 
T-Stats for CAPM beta = 1 20.47*** 31.25*** 212.76*** 69.72*** 54.39*** 32.25*** 18.91*** 19.20*** 44.67*** 57.01*** 
          
BAPM Beta 0.574 0.7585 0.5748 0.4947 0.5784 0.4595 0.5412 0.5729 0.7704 0.3513 
T-Stats for BAPM beta = 0 56.66*** 491.88*** 97.24*** 145.97*** 551.74*** 148.39*** 157.55*** 113.50*** 377.39*** 28.01*** 
T-Stats for BAPM beta = 1 -42.06*** -156.59*** -71.94*** -149.08*** -402.17*** -174.53*** -133.55*** -84.63*** -112.45*** -51.73*** 
          
Behavioural Error (BE) 0.4561 0.2601 0.4614 0.5408 0.4458 0.5815 0.4727 0.4569 0.2945 0.663 
T-Stats for BE = 0 46.29*** 170.73*** 76.88*** 146.94*** 349.88*** 143.32*** 117.18*** 127.35*** 260.27*** 53.77*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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3.3.3 COMPUTATION OF NOISE TRADER RISK 
We examine whether noise trader risk exists within the Shenzhen stock market by 
estimating Equation 3.4. The equation was estimated on a daily basis from 2002 to 
2010, and subsequently alpha, gamma and mu were computed on a daily basis for the 
180 firms. A 260-day window period was used to estimate the daily alphas and betas, 
and the window rolls forward one day at a time. Today’s estimates will be computed 
by using the past 260-day data. This method is used to calculate the daily gammas for 
the entire year, and then the gammas for the whole year are estimated as an average of 
all these rolled-over daily betas. It allows us to analyze the noise trader risk on a 
day-to-day basis.  
 
Table 3.3 presents an extract as to how the data looks for one month (January 2002).  
The behavioural errors (BE) were regressed on the dummy variable (IE) on the 1st of 
January 2002 using the prior 260-day window. The intercept of this regression (alpha) 
is -0.00089 and the value of the slope (gamma) is -0.00581. As there was no 
announcement made on this particular date, the information variable took a value of 
zero, implying that the value of gamma will not affect the noise trader risk (mu), as 
only Equation 3.4.1 must prevail. Accordingly noise trader risk (mu) will be equal to 
the value of alpha -0.00089. We use the same process across all companies/time. 
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Table 3.3: Computation of Alpha, Gamma and Mu  
Date BE INFO (IE) ALPHA GAMMA MU (NTR) 
1/01/2002 -0.01011  0  -0.00089  -0.00581  -0.00089  
2/01/2002 -0.00269  0  -0.00093  -0.00577  -0.00093  
3/01/2002 0.00030  0  -0.00097  -0.00573  -0.00097  
4/01/2002 -0.00767  0  -0.00097  -0.00573  -0.00097  
7/01/2002 -0.00431  0  -0.00104  -0.00566  -0.00104  
8/01/2002 -0.01285  0  -0.00111  -0.00559  -0.00111  
9/01/2002 -0.00187  0  -0.00119  -0.00551  -0.00119  
10/01/2002 -0.01061  0  -0.00124  -0.00546  -0.00124  
11/01/2002 0.00076  0  -0.00127  -0.00780  -0.00127  
14/01/2002 0.00573  0  -0.00127  -0.00781  -0.00127  
15/01/2002 -0.01298  0  -0.00124  -0.00784  -0.00124  
16/01/2002 0.00386  0  -0.00128  -0.00779  -0.00128  
17/01/2002 -0.00275  0  -0.00127  -0.00780  -0.00127  
18/01/2002 -0.00724  0  -0.00128  -0.00779  -0.00128  
21/01/2002 0.00775  1  -0.00134  -0.00774  -0.00908  
22/01/2002 -0.00513  0  -0.00129  -0.00538  -0.00129  
23/01/2002 0.00612  0  -0.00130  -0.00538  -0.00130  
24/01/2002 -0.02092  0  -0.00126  -0.00541  -0.00126  
25/01/2002 -0.00196  0  -0.00133  -0.00534  -0.00133  
28/01/2002 0.00723  1  -0.00137  -0.00530  -0.00667  
 
However, the 21st of January 2002 was an information day and therefore the value of 
gamma influences the noise trader risk. Based on Equation 3.4.2, the noise trader risk 
(mu) is equal to the sum of alpha and gamma, that is -0.00908. On the 25th January 
2002 (no information release), mu was -0.00133 and the next day (due to information 
releases) it increased to -0.00667. This process repeats itself for the remaining days, 
generating the noise trader risk (mu). The mechanism shows a shift between the two 
equations used (i.e. from Equation 3.4.1 to Equation 3.4.2 or vice versa).  
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3.3.4 ALPHA AND NOISE TRADERS’ EFFECTS  
Recall that Alpha (α ) in Equation 3.4 represents the impact of noise traders. It 
symbolizes the mean error of non-information traders (i.e. the proportion of errors that 
is not explained by the independent dummy variable). A statistically significant alpha 
indicates the existence of noise traders on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange irrespective 
of whether there is an information release or not.  
 
Table 3.4 reports the average alpha for all 180 companies the period 2002 to 2010. 
According to Ramiah and Davidson (2007), the standard errors in the computation of 
the t-statistics are not independent and they propose an adjustment to the standard 
errors. This adjustment was applied in all of the t-statistics/standard error estimations. 
The average alpha for the period 2002-2010 is statistically insignificant (see Table 
3.4), implying that traditional finance hypothesis prevails over the long run. Alpha is 
insignificant, suggesting that noise traders do not prevail over the long run. However, 
when our overall sample is broken up into individual years (short term periods), we 
find a strong statistical significance for alpha (except for 2008). We detect a cyclical 
behaviour whereby alpha is significantly positive in one period, becomes significantly 
negative in the subsequent period and then turns back to positive (see Table 3.4). The 
statistically significant alpha support the behavioural school of thought which allow 
for heterogeneity and prove that pseudo information traders affect the prices of 
financial assets.  
 75 
 
Table 3.4: The Descriptive Statistics for the Mean Alpha  
ALPHA 
Period 02-10 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Mean 0.00004  0.00156 -0.00059 0.00000 -0.00036 0.00054 -0.00032 0.00032 0.00075 -0.00106 
Standard Error* 0.00006  0.00005 0.00002 0.00001 0.00003 0.00002 0.00001 0.00004 0.00002 0.00004 
Median 0.00003  0.00159 -0.00062 -0.00002 -0.00023 0.00056 -0.00038 0.00030 0.00076 -0.00103 
ST. Deviation 0.00079  0.00069 0.00020 0.00016 0.00041 0.00025 0.00016 0.00046 0.00030 0.00047 
Kurtosis 15.07190  4.24912 27.46048 7.58249 0.34929 1.98057 1.27882 0.84450 0.70209 0.00765 
Skewness 2.14029  -1.00572 3.62016 -1.11104 -0.58976 -0.73250 0.26678 0.47235 0.03520 -0.05722 
Obs 180  180 180 178 178 178 173 173 172 172 
T-Stats for Mean = 0 0.80  30.42***  -38.58***  0.12  -11.80***  28.90***  -25.92***  9.11***  33.12***  -29.80***  
Note: 1) The computation of the standard error and t-statistics was adjusted for interdependence. 
     2) *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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The sign of alpha can be either positive or negative. The empirical evidence shows 
that alpha is significantly positive in 2010, 2006, 2004 and 2003, and becomes 
significantly negative in 2009, 2007, 2005 and 2002 (see Table 3.4). A negative alpha 
is not different from a positive one as it will mean that the average change in 
behavioural error caused by noise traders is negative (i.e. the noise traders are 
dragging the errors away from the fundamental level). Any action that diverts the 
errors away from the zero error line is considered as an irrational behaviour 
irrespective of whether it is a positive or negative alpha. It is still a mistake and 
therefore a statistically significant negative alpha value also proves the existence of 
noise traders. Ramiah and Davidson (2007) define a positive alpha as ‘Pure Noise’ 
and a negative alpha as ‘Friedman Effect’. According to their definition, Pure Noise 
suggests that noise traders are increasing stock market inefficiency and distorting 
prices away from fundamental values. In this instance, non-information traders are 
responsible for the distortion of market values. They are driving prices further from 
their fundamental values. An enormous amount of literature supports the theory that 
misconceptions and heterogeneity warp finance fundamentals. The existing literature 
explains why alpha is away from zero but does not have a direct measure of noise 
traders. It is a less serious type of error as noise traders cause it. On the other hand, if 
information traders cause the errors, it will be a more serious type of mistake and it 
will fall under the Information Pricing Error. Friedman Effect implies that noise 
traders are trading ‘as if’ they were information traders. By reducing the BE, noise 
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traders are trading in the ‘correct’ direction and ‘returning’ the market to fundamental 
values.  
 
Table 3.5 summarises Appendix 3.4 and represents all of the different effects such as 
Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for all different periods. Out of 180 firms, 
there were 177 firms in 2002-2010, 1 stock in 2002，167 companies in 2003，121 
firms in 2004, 36 enterprises in 2005, 155 stocks in 2006, 47 companies in 2007, 80 
enterprises in 2008, 10 firms in 2009 and 179 stocks in 2010 that showed Pure Noise 
Effect. Details of every single firm and for the different periods are shown in 
Appendix 3.4 and ‘+’ is labelled as Pure Noise. Such results confirm the existence of 
noise traders in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange irrespective of whether there is an 
information release or not. The number of Pure Noise is lower in the one-year 
(short-term) periods rather for the entire 8-year period. The number of Pure Noise is 
cyclical as it tends to increase in one period and subsequently decrease. We observe a 
swing from a Pure Noise (positive alpha) to a Friedman Effect (negative alpha) from 
2002 to 2010. The positive alphas are larger in magnitude. Thus, averaging the alpha 
over the 2002-2010 period results in more Pure Noise—the dominant effect in our 
sample. Appendix 3.4 shows all the firms that were displaying a Friedman Effect 
(which is labelled as ‘-‘) and the respective periods in which they occurred well.  
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Table 3.5: Number of Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH across the 180 Firms 
2000-2002 2002 2003 2004 2005 
PURE NOISE  177 1 167 121 36 
FRIEDMAN EFFECT  1 172 7 43 136 
EMH 2 1 0 11 3 
N/A 0 6 6 5 5 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FIRMS 180 180 180 180 180 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
PURE NOISE  155 47 80 10 179 
FRIEDMAN EFFECT  20 118 85 165 1 
EMH 5 15 15 5 0 
N/A 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FIRMS 180 180 180 180 180 
 
The majority of the firms studied exhibited either the Pure Noise or the Friedman 
Effect. It implies that these firms’ changes in behavioural error were caused by other 
unknown factors (i.e. definitely not from information releases when looking at alpha 
only). The other unknown factors were defined as noise caused by information 
traders. Hence the evidence presented in this section proves that noise traders existed. 
Given that most of the companies did have a noisy element, these results contradict 
the EMH and Table 3.5 shows that there were few companies that had an alpha that 
was not statistically different from zero. 
 
3.3.5 GAMMA AND INFORMATION TRADERS’ EFFECTS  
Based on Equation 3.4, gamma (!) is the proportion of the mean change in behavioral 
error attributable to information traders. For instance, on an information day, noise 
traders may commit a pricing error (i.e. α > 0) and information traders (!) can react in 
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three different ways, namely, no reaction (! = 0), oppose the noise traders (! < 0) or 
even join the noise traders (! > 0). The opposite sign of alpha and gamma implies that 
noise traders and information traders have different reactions in response to the 
information released. Based on IANM, information traders may even turn into noise 
traders as they may take similar positions to noise traders—resulting in the same sign 
of alpha and gamma. Table 3.6 shows the descriptive statistics for the mean gamma 
across 180 firms for the period of 2002-2010. All gammas are statistically significant 
across the period, implying a strong presence of information traders. For the overall 
sample, average gamma is negative and when the sample is disaggregated in years, 
we find that gamma was positive in 2002 and 2003 and then became negative over the 
remaining years. In the next section, we study the interaction between noise traders 
(represented by alpha) and information traders (represented by gamma). Both Tables 
3.4 and 3.6 can be implicitly used to show that (1) information traders take opposite 
actions to noise traders for the whole period 2002-2010 and (2) information traders 
behaved as noise traders in 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009 (i.e. contributed to noise 
trading activities). 
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Table 3.6: The Descriptive Statistics for the Mean GAMMA 
  GAMMA 
Period 02-10 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Mean -0.00042  -0.00164  -0.00037  -0.00054  -0.00067  -0.00056  -0.00023  -0.00034  0.00002  0.00026  
Standard Error 0.00004  0.00005  0.00001  0.00001  0.00001  0.00002  0.00001  0.00002  0.00001  0.00001  
Median -0.00037  -0.00165  -0.00006  -0.00063  -0.00071  -0.00050  -0.00033  -0.00047  -0.00010  0.00031  
ST. Deviation 0.00052  0.00072  0.00019  0.00008  0.00016  0.00032  0.00012  0.00025  0.00016  0.00017  
Kurtosis 0.16591  0.56541  6.42172  0.56024  2.09791  2.75990  0.71460  0.97127  3.79063  4.81836  
Skewness -0.19180  0.24833  -2.18840  0.37268  -0.64004  -0.77160  0.27882  0.29947  0.64497  -0.62601  
Obs 180  180 180 180 180 180 175 175 174 174 
T-Stats for Mean = 0 -10.78***  -30.45***  -25.43***  -86.58***  -54.60***  -23.61***  -24.85*** -17.83*** 1.98*** 20.58*** 
Note:  1) The computation of the standard error and T-statistics was adjusted for interdependence. 
       2) *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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3.3.6 MU AND NOISE TRADER RISK  
On a non-information day, mu is going to be equal to alpha whereas on an 
information day, mu will be equal to alpha plus beta. Analyzing mu is equivalent to 
studying the noise trader risk after noise traders and information traders have 
interacted. The results in Table 3.7 show that the average mu for the period 
2002-2010 is statistically insignificant, but presents a strong presence of noise traders 
within the Shenzhen equity market as mu is statistically significant (t-values are all 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance) for individual years studied. The 
existence of mu is an indication that the Chinese equity market trades at irrational 
levels as noise traders distort the equity prices in the short run, but there is no 
evidence that they do so over the long run. The possible reason of insignificant mu for 
the whole period is that the cyclical behaviour across the sub periods cancels each 
other out. Mu tends to be significantly positive in one period, and then becomes 
significantly negative in the subsequent period, which ends up summing up to zero. 
The main reason for the small magnitude value of mu is mostly because the dependent 
variable is the change in behavioural error rather than the actual level of behavioural 
error. Our finding is consistent with Hu and Wang (2013) who provide evidence that 
investors are irrational in China.  
 
Appendix 3.5 presents noise trader risk (systematic pricing errors represented by mu) 
for all individual firms in different periods. The t-statistics are not reported for brevity 
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purposes but statistically significant mu is represented by an asterisk (*). The results 
show that 98 (out of 180) firms experienced noise trader risk (represented by mu) 
during the period 2002-2010. We find evidence that 172 firms were affected in 2002, 
169 in 2003, 158 in 2004, 167 in 2005, 169 in 2006, 153 in 2007, 145 in 2008, 173 in 
2009 and 180 in 2010 respectively. 
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Table 3.7: The Descriptive Statistics for the Mean MU   
  MU 
Period 02-10 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Mean 0.00000  0.00142  -0.00062  -0.00006  -0.00043  0.00053  -0.00035  0.00030  0.00077  -0.00106  
Standard Error 0.00006  0.00005  0.00002  0.00001  0.00003  0.00002  0.00001  0.00004  0.00002  0.00004  
Median 0.00000  0.00146  -0.00070  -0.00006  -0.00031  0.00054  -0.00038  0.00030  0.00080  -0.00103  
ST. Deviation 0.00078  0.00063  0.00023  0.00017  0.00043  0.00023  0.00019  0.00049  0.00031  0.00046  
Kurtosis 1.29501  5.38443  31.39388  5.86333  0.40597  1.23218  1.16505  0.50691  0.53930  0.05002  
Skewness 0.35856  -1.17367  3.89994  -0.69212  -0.46550  -0.42336  0.41096  0.39172  0.03292  -0.06666  
Obs 180  180 180 180 180 180 175 175 174 174 
T-Stats for Mean = 0 0.03  30.23*** -36.89*** -4.42*** -13.59*** 30.35*** -24.67*** 8.21*** 32.79*** -30.20*** 
Note:  1) The computation of the standard error and T-statistics was adjusted for interdependence. 
       2) *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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3.3.7 GRAPHS OF NOISE TRADER RISK MEASURED BY MU 
Figure 3.2 presents the daily noise trader risk for Celebrities Real Estate Development 
Group Company Limited, where we observed that the mean noise trader risk is 
statistically significant for the period 2002 to 2010. (Please refer to Appendix 3.5 for 
the values.) The line at zero presents the behavioural market efficiency line where 
there is no noise trader risk. Note that the IANM assumes that information traders 
only exist when information is released. Under these circumstances when there are no 
information releases, noise trader risk is expected (to some degree) to be high as 
information traders will not be present to redress the market (i.e. to reduce noise 
trader risk). On information days, sophisticated/information traders are more likely to 
confront noise traders and thus decrease noise trader risk. This may be viewed as 
adopting a contrarian investment strategy. The graph from Figure 3.2 shows that noise 
trader risk in Celebrities Real Estate Development Group Company Limited has been 
deviating from the zero line (efficiency line) but tends to revert towards the zero mean 
line. The spikes in the graph denote that information traders fail to eliminate pricing 
errors caused by noise traders on the information days. The spikes are striking and 
unique characteristics about the noise traders risk graph, and are thus referred to as 
‘spiky graphs23’. The existence of these spikes suggests that information traders of 
Celebrities Real Estate Development Group Company Limited fail to clear the pricing 
                                                 
23
 There are outliers in the measured noise trader risk variable 
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errors, leading this stock to be either overpriced or underpriced on the information 
days. Information traders adopt contrarian investment strategies on the information 
day when alpha is positive (negative) and the spike (i.e. gamma) is downward 
(upward). If spikes go across the zero line, information traders fail to clear the errors, 
it results in noise trader risk (mu). Moreover, information traders mimic noise traders’ 
trading techniques—see when alpha is positive (negative) and the spike is upward 
(downward). One of the potential explanations of why the spikes tend to move 
downwards (upwards) when alpha is positive (negative) is because additional 
information is released. The top (bottom) of the graph shows that noise trader risk 
measured by mu reaches the highest level of 0.0033 (-0.0114) on the information day. 
Celebrities Real Estate Development Group Company Limited announced annual 
report and profit distribution plan on 25 March 2002 and credit guarantee of RMB 50 
million on 9 February 2004. On this information day, alpha and gamma were both 
positive (negative) at the top (bottom), implying that information traders behaved as 
noise traders—resulting in higher levels of noise trader risk. Celebrities Real Estate 
Development Group Company Limited provides a typical example where information 
traders decrease noise trader risk but overshoot the magnified alpha. In total, we have 
208 information days for the period 2002-2010. Out of 208 information days, there 
are 146 days (70.91%) when alpha and gamma have the opposite sign and gamma and 
mu have the same sign (see Appendix 3.7).  
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Figure 3.2: Daily Noise Trader Risk in Celebrities Real Estate Development Group 
Company Limited 
 
 
Shandong Xinneng Taishan Power Generation Company Limited provides an 
example where information traders are more likely to behave as noise traders whereby 
they increase the noise level (see Figure 3.3). On most information days (101 days out 
of 144 information days), alpha is positive (or negative) and the spikes are upwards 
(downwards), leading to noise trader risk to be far away from the efficient line (see 
Appendix 3.7). The highest positive mu is 0.0060 and occurred on 27 October 2004 
when Shandong Xinneng Taishan Power Generation Company Limited announced 
the third quanter report, and an increase in registered capital in another company that 
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is partly owned by Shandong Xinneng Taishan Power Generation Company Limited.   
The largest negative mu is -0.0055, occurring on 13 April 2007 when company 
announced annual report. The mean mu for the period 2002 to 2010 is not statistically 
significant but is statistically significant across the short-term sub periods (see 
Appendix 3.5) as discussed previously. We can now see the visual (Figure 3.3) of 
how the positives and negatives in the short-term periods tend to cancel out each other 
to lead to no effect in the long-run.  
 
Figure 3.3: Daily Noise Trader Risk in Shandong Xinneng Taishan Power Generation 
Company Limited 
 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the daily noise trader risk in Shenzhen Tellus Holding Company 
Limited where we get an opportunity to visualize how information traders decrease 
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noise trader risk but fail to clear the noise. The highest positive mu is 0.00324 and 
occurred on 9 July 2008 when Shenzhen Tellus Holding Company Limited 
announced a significant loss. The largest negative mu is -0.00437, occurring on 21 
May 2009 when information about results of AGM had been announced. We note that 
alpha is negative (positive) and the spike is upward (downward). Appendix 3.6 
records the remaining firms’ noise trader risk graphs.  
 
Figure 3.4: Daily Noise Trader Risk in Shenzhen Tellus Holding Company Limited 
 
 
According to IANM, the sign of alpha and gamma illustrates the interaction between 
noise traders and information traders, and the mu presents the final result of the 
interaction. Statistically significant mu suggests that there is noise trader risk and that 
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information traders failed to correct these behavioural errors, leading to the possibility 
of underreaction, overreaction and information pricing errors. We explore these 
effects in the next section. 
 
3.3.8 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NOISE TRADERS AND INFORMATION 
TRADERS 
When alpha plus beta (mu) is statistically significant, it implies that there is a residual 
mu after intervention by information traders. Whenever EMH is not holding (
0≠+ γα ), it implies that either underreaction or overreaction or information 
pricing error (IPE) will prevail. In other words, if it is not an EMH, it will have to be 
either an underreaction [either U (+) or U (-)] or an IPE [either IPE (+) or IPE (-)] or 
an overreaction [either O (+) or O (-)]. The implication of the IANM is that a 
statistically significant mu represents either an overreaction or underreaction, or IPE. 
The firms that displayed inefficiency after information traders’ involvement are now 
under scrutiny on a day-to-day basis as we categorised them as either overreaction or 
underreaction or IPE.  
 
Table 3.8 shows different irrational behaviours that we observe through the IANM in 
the Shenzhen market for different years, and Appendix 3.7 records the observed 
different irrational behaviours of each firm for the period 2002-2010. Over the period 
2002-2010, we study 28478 information days on the Shenzhen A-share market. We 
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find that EMH in terms of absence of noise traders occurs in only eight instances and 
that the EMH does not hold in 99.97% (28470 inefficient days) of the time. This is 
direct evidence that noise traders do exist in China Shenzhen A-share market and that 
stocks are not traded at their fundamental values. The 99.97% implies that there is 
strong evidence of noise trader risk. Such a percentage is relatively high given that 
Ramiah and Davidson (2007) observed that the Australian market was inefficient 
around 63% of the time. The Australian evidence shows that around 37% of 
information days are efficient which implies that information traders take the exact 
correct action to clear the pricing errors and thus stock prices reverted to their 
fundamental level in a lot of instances. Their results suggest that information traders 
are more professional, and information announcements are better qualified in a 
developed financial system than in a developing country such as China. Such results 
are expected as under developed financial markets tend to have a number of market 
imperfections like regulatory frameworks and uninformed investors. We analyze 
underreaction, overreaction and IPE respectively in the following sections. 
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Table 3.8: Number of Overreaction, IPE and Underreaction across 180 Firms on the Information Days 
  2002-2010 Percentage 
  Number  Percentage z-test 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Underreaction 5241  18.40% 103.784  25.28% 19.89% 13.08% 13.47% 12.08% 11.73% 10.52% 27.56% 37.07% 
U+ 2488 8.74% 28.932  1.12% 19.31% 8.34% 2.49% 10.38% 2.35% 6.47% 1.87% 36.44% 
U- 2753 9.67% 36.137  24.16% 0.58% 4.74% 10.98% 1.69% 9.38% 4.05% 25.70% 0.63% 
IPE 11775 41.35% 281.439  42.93% 44.51% 46.11% 50.18% 41.18% 48.92% 37.11% 44.90% 11.65% 
IPE+ 4257 14.95% 77.030  1.56% 41.45% 25.26% 9.13% 32.58% 9.24% 12.31% 3.38% 9.40% 
IPE- 7518 26.40% 165.694  41.37% 3.06% 20.85% 41.05% 8.59% 39.68% 24.80% 41.52% 2.25% 
Overreaction 11454 40.22% 272.712  31.75% 35.60% 40.81% 36.27% 46.71% 39.33% 52.34% 27.49% 51.28% 
O+ 4730 16.61% 89.891  29.73% 5.74% 13.52% 24.34% 9.67% 19.36% 20.16% 19.20% 2.37% 
O- 6724 23.61% 144.106  2.03% 29.86% 27.29% 11.93% 37.04% 19.97% 32.18% 8.28% 48.91% 
Total Inefficient Days 28470  99.97% 735.365  99.96% 100.00% 100.00% 99.92% 99.97% 99.98% 99.98% 99.95% 100.00% 
EMH 8 0.03% -38.497  0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 0.00% 
INFO 28478 100.00% 735.583  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Note: (1) Z-test is testing if the proportion is greater than 5%. (2) For brevity purposes, the number and Z-test are not reported for the sub periods.  
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3.3.9 UNDERREACTION  
When noise traders commit errors and information traders oppose them but fail to 
ensure that the EMH holds, it shows that the information traders have taken the 
accurate strategy but underreacted to the news arrival. The row of underreaction in 
Table 3.8 depicts that underreaction was observed on 18.40% of the information days 
over the period 2002-2010. We calculate the z-test to check if this proportion is 
statistically significantly greater than 5%. Similar to Ramiah and Davidson (2007), we 
choose 5% which represents the tail of a normal distribution where the point is to 
establish whether our observed proportions do not fall into the tail. The z-test statistic 
is well above the cut off rate indicating that the proportion of underreaction is 
18.40%. This proportion is disaggregated in positive and negative and we find 8.74% 
of U (+) and 9.67% of U (-). Such results imply that Chinese Shenzhen stock market 
has a lower percentage in terms of underreaction when compared to the 24.36% 
observed in the Australian equity market by Ramiah and Davidson (2007). 
Underreaction can be viewed as a less severe response by information traders in the 
sense that proper actions were adopted to eliminate noise traders but they happen to 
get the magnitude wrong. The sub period analyses show that underreaction was 
around 25% at the start of our sample (2002), decreases to 10.52% in 2008 and then 
increases to around 37% in 2010. We find that the highest percentage is 37.07% in 
2010, and the average percentage is around 17% for other years. In addition, 
Appendix 3.7 shows that only 4 firms (out of 180) are experienced underreaction 
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predominantly. Consequently, we conclude that underreaction is not the most 
pronounced effect on the Shenzhen stock market.  
   
3.3.10 OVERREACTION  
Overreaction indicates that information traders are opposing noise traders but they 
overshoot as they miscalculate the value of alpha. In order words, information traders 
cause noise trader risk by overreacting. Similar to underreaction, this is a less severe 
case in the sense that information traders react to the correct direction (that is 
opposing noise traders) but fail to eliminate noise traders due to overshooting of their 
forecast about what constitute noise trader risk. For the overall sample, the 
overreaction row of Table 3.8 shows that 40.22% of market inefficiency is 
overreaction in Shenzhen A-share market, which is higher than the Australian result 
of 5.12% observed by Ramiah and Davidson (2007). Overreaction can be divided into 
overreaction (+) and overreaction (-) and the proportion is around 17% and 24% 
respectively for period 2002-2010. The sub periods studied indicate that overreaction 
dominates the stock market in 2006, 2008 and 2010, and reaches the highest 
percentage (52.34%) in 2008. This may be attributed to the global financial crisis. All 
z-tests are significantly greater than 5% (except O (-) in 2002, O (+) in 2010). 
Moreover, Appendix 3.7 presents 78 firms (out of 180) with the highest proportion in 
terms of overreaction. Consequently, we conclude that Chinese information traders 
cause noise trader risk in terms of overreaction. Once again, this can be explained 
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through the lack of quantitative models to quantify noise trader risk in Chinese equity 
market. It may also imply that Chinese information traders are overconfident in terms 
of having a tendency to overrate their own beliefs resulting in excessive trading. 
 
3.3.11 INFORMATION PRICING ERROR (IPE) 
When information traders do not oppose noise traders but decide to join them by 
adding to the existing errors, this is regarded as an information pricing error (IPE). In 
other words, IPE implies that sophisticated users, like professional traders, behave as 
noise traders and increase noise trader risk. This is because they act on noise as if it 
was information. We consider this as a more serious type of pricing error. Similar to 
underreaction and overreaction, IPE can be positive and negative, i.e. IPE (+) and IPE 
(-). The results from Table 3.8 (see the row of IPE) illustrate that the most common 
violation of information efficiency is information pricing error with 41.35% over the 
period 2002-2010 and is statistically significant (see z-test statistics). The proportions 
of IPE (+) and IPE (-) are 14.95% and 26.40% respectively, and z-tests are 
statistically significantly greater than 5%. The sub period analyses show variations of 
IPE throughout the years. IPE reaches to the highest level of 50.18% in 2005 and 
drastically drops to around 12% (the lowest level) in 2010. It plays a major role in 
affecting stock pricing in all periods (except 2006, 2008 and 2010). Ramiah and 
Davidson (2007) also observe that IPE dominates the stock market in all periods 
(except 2002) in Australia. The high proportion of IPE implies that Chinese 
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sophisticated users are more likely to increase noise trader risk by taking the ‘wrong’ 
investment strategy, and they tend to react to information announcement by following 
noise traders. Our findings show that the proportion of IPE (41.35%) in China is 
higher than in Australia (33.50%), provided by Ramiah and Davidson (2007). 
Additionally, there are 94 companies (out of 180 companies) that are affected by 
IPE—making it the dominant effect when compared to overreaction and 
underreaction (see Appendix 3.7). One of the possible explanations is that most 
Chinese information traders do not have professional skills and academic knowledge 
to analyze the information released. Another possible explanation is that information 
in the stock market is not regarded as good, or the announcements from annual reports 
are not convincing enough due to potential window dressing strategies of accounting 
reports.  
 
3.3.12 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Summarizing the results of sections 3.3.9 to 3.3.11, we conclude that the two major 
problems in the Shenzhen market are IPE (41.35%) and overreaction (40.22%), 
implying that Chinese information traders contribute to noise trader risk. Our results 
are different from the findings of Ramiah and Davidson (2007) whereby they show 
that the Australian equity market is contaminated with underreaction (24.36%) and 
IPE (33.50%). In addition, our results show that there is a higher proportion of 
inefficiency in China in that 99.97% of the time mu is statistically different from zero, 
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suggesting that there is a high probability that Chinese stocks are either overpriced or 
underpriced. Such results suggest that information traders not properly equipped in 
China.  
 
Additionally, our findings imply that companies have different outcomes in 
underreation, overreaction and IPE, because each company has its own characteristics 
such as industry specifics, corporate governance mechanisms, business and finance. 
Furthermore, investors take action depending on what kind of information is 
announced in the market which tends to be very firm specific. The effects are 
different across companies as shown by the graphs of noise trader risk (see Appendix 
3.6), numbers of underreaction, overreaction and IPE. Such differences lead us to 
examine how fundamental factors are associated with noise trader risk in the Chapter 
Five and Chapter Six. 
 
3.3.13 UNDERREACTION, OVERREACTION AND IPE ACROSS INDUSTRIES  
This section aims to explore whether interaction between noise traders and 
information traders is different across industries. Out of 180 sample companies, four 
firms come from agriculture, construction, hotels and catering and conglomerates 
industries, three stocks belong to the mining industry, 106 enterprises are from the 
manufacturing industry, 25 firms come from the real estate industry, 14 companies are 
grouped into wholesale and retail, ten stocks are utilities, five firms are from 
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transportation, five companies belongs to the financial industry, three firms are from 
IT and another three firms fall into environmental protection (see Table 3.9). We 
follow the Shenzhen Stock Exchange classification to form these industries. 
 
Table 3.9: Number of Firms in Each Industry 
Industry Number of Firms Industry Number of Firms 
Agriculture 1 Transportation 5 
Mining 3 Hotels & Catering 1 
Manufacturing 106 IT 3 
Utilities 10 Finance 5 
Construction 1 Real Estate 25 
Wholesale & Retail 14 Environmental Protection 3 
Media 2 Conglomerates 1 
 
Tables 3.10 to 3.12 present t-statistics of difference across industries for 
underreaction, IPE, and overreaction, respectively. In this test we compare the results 
of one industry to the rest of the firms that are not in that industry. Table 3.10 shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the manufacturing industry 
when compared to the remaining stocks in 2002 and 2005. The proportions and 
t-values suggest that the manufacturing industry (labeled as ‘Yes’ in the table) has a 
higher percentage of underreaction than others (labeled as ‘No’ in the table) in 2002, 
and has the lower percentage of underreaction in 2005. The real estate industry has a 
statistically significant difference in 2009 only and the wholesale and retail industry in 
2006 only. Based on these findings, we conclude that there is weak evidence of 
industrial effects when it comes to underreaction. 
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Table 3.11 shows that all of the t-statistics of difference are insignificant. This 
evidence suggests that there is no difference on the IPE across industries. Table 3.12 
provides evidence that manufacturing has the lower percentage of overreaction in 
2002. The wholesale and retail industry has the lower percentage of overreaction in 
2008 and 2009, but a higher percentage than others in the whole period (2002-2010). 
Despite the weak evidence of industry effects, we conclude that noise trading 
activities is more at a firm level rather than at industry level.
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Table 3.10: T-Statistics of Difference on Underreaction across Industries for 180 Sample Companies from Period 2002 to 2010  
Firm Characteristics   2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
            Manufacturing Yes 0.18 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.29 0.37 
 
No 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.38 
 
Difference -0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.01 
 
t-Statistic -0.98 2.79*** -1.39 -0.41 -1.65* 0.20 -0.78 0.38 1.56 -0.17 
Real Estate Yes 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.40 
 
No 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.27 0.37 
 
Difference -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 
 
t-Statistic -0.83 -1.25 0.76 0.44 1.22 0.83 -0.09 -1.13 -2.16** 0.48 
Wholesale & Retail Yes 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.32 
 
No 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.26 0.38 
 
Difference 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
  t-Statistic 0.96 0.62 0.23 0.75 0.48 -2.73*** 1.45 0.76 -0.55 -0.62 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
 100 
 
 
Table 3.11: T-Statistics of Difference on IPE across Industries for 180 Sample Companies from Period 2002 to 2010 
Firm 
Characteristics 
  2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
            Manufacturing Yes 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.53 0.42 0.46 0.38 0.44 0.11 
 
No 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.5 0.41 0.48 0.38 0.47 0.13 
 
Difference -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
 
t-Statistic -0.57 0.25 0.73 0.29 0.59 0.39 -0.56 -0.16 -0.59 -0.65 
Real Estate Yes 0.40 0.39 0.45 0.40 0.52 0.35 0.54 0.34 0.43 0.09 
 
No 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.52 0.43 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.12 
 
Difference -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.08 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
 
t-Statistic -0.6 -0.78 0.12 -0.89 0.04 -1.24 1.08 -0.82 -0.36 -0.71 
Wholesale & 
Retail 
Yes 0.46 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.56 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.61 0.14 
 
No 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.52 0.41 0.47 0.37 0.44 0.11 
 
Difference 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0 0.11 0.17 0.02 
  t-Statistic 1.56 -0.64 -0.11 -0.28 0.51 0.59 0.02 1.39 1.61 0.37 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Table 3.12: T-Statistics of Difference on Overreaction across Industries for 180 Sample Companies from Period 2002 to 2010 
Firm 
Characteristics 
2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Manufacturing Yes 0.40 0.31 0.36 0.43 0.37 0.45 0.43 0.51 0.27 0.53 
No 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.43 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.51 0.30 0.50 
Difference 0.05 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.03 
t-Statistic 1.28 -2.51*** 0.10 -0.07 0.29 -0.53 1.08 0.07 -0.68 0.50 
Real Estate Yes 0.42 0.42 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.50 0.35 0.56 0.37 0.51 
No 0.40 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.46 0.42 0.50 0.27 0.51 
Difference 0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.10 -0.01 
t-Statistic 1.05 1.48 -0.60 0.64 -0.94 0.78 -1.12 0.98 1.55 -0.10 
Wholesale & 
Retail 
Yes 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.34 0.39 0.17 0.54 
No 0.41 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.36 0.46 0.42 0.52 0.30 0.51 
Difference -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 0.03 
t-Statistic 2.38** 0.05 -0.04 -0.16 -1.08 0.10 -1.29 -1.94* -1.65* 0.28 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
The first conclusion drawn from this chapter is that IANM can be applied in China 
and provides a measure of noise trader risk. The major problem of this model lies in 
the collection of the news arrival variable which is a labour intensive, time consuming 
and expensive exercise. The benefits of this chapter, however, are that it provides a 
quantitative explanation to the overreaction and underreaction phenomenon in that 
market. Furthermore, this chapter enables one to observe the behaviour information 
traders towards noise traders and in particular circumstances where the information 
traders commit mistakes. This study shows that there is evidence of noise trader risk, 
IPE, underreaction and overreaction in China. Such evidence challenges the notion of 
the EMH. The major problems in China are a high presence of noise traders, IPE and 
overreaction. In the next chapter, we examine whether noise trading is a profitable 
strategy.  
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Appendix 3.1: Average CAPM Beta and Average BAPM Beta of 180 firms for the period 2002-2010 
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Appendix 3.1: Average CAPM Beta and Average BAPM Beta of 180 firms for the period 2002-2010 (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.1: Average CAPM Beta and Average BAPM Beta of 180 firms for the period 2002-2010 (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.2: Average BAPM Beta and CAPM Beta of 734 companies for the period 2002-2010 
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Appendix 3.3: The Descriptive Statistics for the mean CAPM Beta, mean BAPM Beta and mean BE of 734 firms 
 
  2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CAPM Beta 1.0439 1.0474 1.0418 1.0593 1.0702 1.0619 0.9870 1.0119 1.0619 1.0150 
T-Stats for CAPM beta = 
0 
893.39*** 2314.82*** 2134.34*** 2115.39*** 3425.71*** 1559.05*** 2719.52*** 1211.58*** 1447.95*** 3950.27***  
T-Stats for CAPM beta = 
1 
37.55*** 104.80*** 85.66*** 118.48*** 224.82*** 90.88*** -35.92*** 14.30*** 84.35*** 58.46*** 
          BAPM Beta 0.5541  0.7762  0.5608  0.4754  0.5831  0.4480  0.4991  0.5459  0.7439  0.3341  
T-Stats for BAPM beta = 
0 
83.92*** 750.96*** 131.56*** 191.45*** 841.39*** 199.81*** 277.51*** 203.62*** 680.63*** 12.95*** 
T-Stats for BAPM beta = 
1 
-67.53*** -216.51*** -103.04*** -211.27*** -601.65*** -246.20*** -278.47*** -169.39*** -234.30*** -25.82*** 
          Behavioural Error (BE) 0.4898  0.2712  0.4810  0.5839  0.4872  0.6139  0.4878  0.4661  0.3179  0.6796  
T-Stats for BE = 0 81.18*** 265.76*** 125.10*** 269.14*** 618.46*** 310.08*** 260.04*** 242.28*** 467.76*** 27.46*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 3.4: Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for each Firm from 2002 to 2010  
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGXI GUITANG EMH + + + - + - + - + 
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL + + + + - + - + - + 
TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC + + + + - + - + - + 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH + + + + - + - - - + 
GUOXING RONGDA RLST + + + + - + - + - + 
HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  + + + + - - - + - + 
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. + - - - EMH + + + - + 
JIZHONG ENERGY RES. + - + - - + + - - + 
XUANHUA CON.MCH. + - + - + + - - + + 
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. + + + + + + - + - + 
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. + + + + - + - + - + 
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE + - + - + + - - - + 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  + + + + + - - EMH - + 
SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  + - - - - + + EMH - + 
SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. + - + - + + - EMH - + 
SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION + + + + - + + - - + 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  - + + + - + + + - - 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. + + + + - + - - - + 
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE + + + + - + + - - + 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. + + + + - + - + - + 
GUANGDONG GOWORLD  + + + + - + - - - + 
SOUND ENV.RESOURCES  + + + + + + - - - + 
DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) + + + + - + + - - + 
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  + - + - - + - + - + 
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Appendix 3.4: Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for each Firm from 2002 to 2010 (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. + + + + - + - + - + 
CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. + + + + - + - - - + 
WULIANGYE YIBIN   + EMH + EMH - + + + - + 
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS + + + + - + - + - + 
HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. + + + + - EMH - + + + 
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. + + + + - - + + - + 
ANGANG STEEL + - + - - + + - - + 
XIANDAI INVESTMENT + - + - - + + + - + 
TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  + + + + + + - - - + 
ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  + - + - - + + + - + 
HUNAN VALIN STEEL  + - + - - + + + - + 
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. + - + - - + - - - + 
CSG HOLDING  + + + + - + - EMH - + 
COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) + + + + - + - EMH - + 
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  + - + - - + - + + + 
SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. + + + + - - + - - + 
CHINA BAOAN GP. + + + + - + - - - + 
GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. + - + - + + - - - + 
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. + EMH + EMH - + + EMH - + 
GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. + + - + + + + - - + 
JIANGLING MOTORS + + + + + + - - - + 
HONG YUAN SECS. + + + + - - - - - + 
LUZHOU LAO JIAO + + + + - + - EMH - + 
NORTHEAST PHARM.  + + + + - + + + - + 
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Appendix 3.4: Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for each Firm from 2002 to 2010 (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  + - + - + + - + - + 
GREE ELECT.APP. + + + + - + + - - + 
TIANJIN TEDA + - + - + + - - - + 
SHANDONG JINLING MNG. + + + + - - + + - + 
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. + + + + - + - - - + 
SOFTTO + - + - - + + - - + 
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. + + + + - + - - - + 
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. + EMH + EMH - EMH - - - + 
QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  + + + + - + + - - + 
HUAWEN MDA.INV. + + + + - + + - - + 
FAW CAR  + + - + + + - + - + 
YUNNAN ALUM.  + - + - + + - + - + 
SHANDONG HAIHUA + - + - - + EMH + - + 
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. + - + - - + - - - + 
HEBEI IRON & STEEL  + EMH + EMH - + + - - + 
FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. + + + + - + - + - + 
GD MIDEA HOLDING  + + + + - + + + EMH + 
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  + + + + - - - + + + 
KONKA GROUP  + + + + - + - - - + 
SHN.FOUNTAIN  + + + + - + - - - + 
XI'AN AIR.INTL. + + + + - + - EMH - + 
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN + + + + - + EMH - - + 
ZTE  + + + + - + - - - + 
GUOYUAN SECURITIES + + + + - + - + - + 
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Appendix 3.4: Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for each Firm from 2002 to 2010 (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. + + + + - + + - - + 
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET + - + - - - + + - + 
XINXING DUCTILEIRON + - + - - + + + - + 
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. + + + + - + - + - + 
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. + + + + - + + + - + 
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  + - + - - + + + - + 
WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  + + + + - + + + - + 
SUNING UNIVERSAL  + + + + - - + EMH - + 
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. + + + + + + + - - + 
BEIJING SHOUGANG + - + - + + + - - + 
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. + - + - - + - + - + 
SGIS SONGSHAN  + + + + + + + + - + 
CHINA UNION HDG. + + + + - + EMH - - + 
CHANGJIANG SECURITIES + - + - + + - - + + 
TAIFU INDUSTRY  + - + - - + - - + + 
SHENYANG MACH.TOOL + + + + - + - + - + 
ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. + + + + - + - + - + 
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  + + + + - - - + - + 
MINSHENG INV.MAN. + + + + - + EMH - - + 
HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. + + + + - + EMH - - + 
WUXI LITTLE SWAN  + + + + + + - - - + 
KINGDREAM PUBLIC  + + + + - + - + - + 
TANGSHAN CERAMIC  + + + + - + - + - + 
HUAYI COMPR.  + + + + - + - - - + 
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Appendix 3.4: Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for each Firm from 2002 to 2010 (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHANDONG SHENGLI  + - + - + EMH + + - + 
YUYUAN HOLDING + + + + - - - - - + 
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  + + + + - + - EMH - + 
JILIN CHM.FIBRE + EMH + EMH + + - - - + 
NANJING ZHONGBEI + + + + - - - + - + 
CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  + + + + + + EMH - - + 
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. + + + + - + - - - + 
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. + - + - - + + - - + 
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. + + + + - + - - - + 
WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. + EMH + EMH - + + - - + 
LVJING REALESTATE + EMH + EMH + + - + - + 
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. EMH + + + - + - + - + 
HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  + + + + - + - - - + 
SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. + EMH + EMH + - - - - + 
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  + + + + - + EMH - - + 
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  + + + + - + - + - + 
CHINA CALXON GROUP  + + + + - - - - - + 
SOUTH HUITON + + + + - + - - EMH + 
JIANGSU HUAXICUN + + + + + + + - - + 
SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  + + + + - - - + - + 
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) + + + + - EMH - - EMH + 
SHENZHEN AIRPORT  + - + - - + + + - + 
BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. + - + - - + + - - + 
BENGANG STEEL PLATES  + - + - - + + EMH - + 
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Appendix 3.4: Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for each Firm from 2002 to 2010 (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  + EMH + EMH - + - + - + 
SUNDIRO HOLDING + + + + - + - + - + 
AN HUI WENERGY  + EMH + EMH + + - + - + 
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  + + - + + - - + - + 
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. + - + - - + - + - + 
SHENYANG CHM.IND.  + + + + - + - + - + 
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  + + + + - - + - - + 
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  + + + + + EMH EMH + - + 
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  + + + + - + EMH - - + 
SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN.    + + + + - + - - - + 
CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  + + + + - + - + - + 
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  + - + - + + - + + + 
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  + + + + - - + - - + 
TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. + + + + EMH + - + - + 
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  + EMH + EMH - + - + - + 
YANG GUANG  + + + + - + - + - + 
JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. + + + + + + - - - + 
JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. + + + + - + + + - + 
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. + + - + + + - - - + 
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  + + + + - + - - EMH + 
CHINA VANKE  + + + + - + - EMH + + 
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. + + + + - + + - + + 
LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU + + + + - + EMH - - + 
SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  + + + + - + - - - + 
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Appendix 3.4: Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for each Firm from 2002 to 2010 (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
RONGAN PROPERTY + + - + + - - - - + 
XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. + + + + - + EMH + - + 
SHN.TELLUS HLDG. + + + + - + - - - + 
SHN.FIYTA HDG. + + + + + + - + - + 
SHN.SHENBAO INDL. + + + + - + - + + + 
SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  + + + + - + - - - + 
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  + + + + - + - + - + 
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. + - + - - + - + - + 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. + + + + - + - - - + 
GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.)  + + + + - + - - - + 
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  + + + + - + - + - + 
HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. + - + - - + - + - + 
SHENZHEN SEG  + + + + - + - - - + 
DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE  + + + + - + - + - + 
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. + - + - - + - + - + 
SEARAINBOW HOLDING  + + + + - - EMH + - + 
BEIJING NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC  + + + + - + - + - + 
HUBEI FUXING SCTC. + + + + - + - + - + 
YELAND GROUP + - + - - + - - - + 
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  + + + + - + - EMH - + 
YUNNAN TIN  + - + - - + EMH + - + 
ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  + + + + - + - - - + 
SHANXI XISHAN  + - + - - + EMH - - + 
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT + + + + - + - - EMH + 
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Appendix 3.4: Pure Noise, Friedman Effect and EMH for each Firm from 2002 to 2010 (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. + + + + - + - - - + 
YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  + - + - - + EMH + - + 
CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. + + + + + + - - - + 
JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET  + + + + EMH + - + - + 
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  + + + + - + - EMH - + 
GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  + - + - + + - - - + 
JILIN PWR.SHARE + N/A N/A - + + - + - + 
ZHEJIANG NHU + N/A N/A N/A N/A + + - - + 
HAN'S LASER TECH. + N/A N/A N/A N/A + - EMH - + 
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. + N/A N/A N/A N/A + - - - + 
SUNING APPLIANCE  + N/A N/A N/A N/A + + + - + 
HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. + N/A N/A N/A N/A + - - - + 
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Appendix 3.5: The Mean Mu for 180 Companies from 2002 to 2010  
Companies 2002-2010 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
GUANGXI GUITANG -0.0001* -0.0018* 0.0005* 0.0009* -0.0006* 0.0006* -0.0014* 0.0010* -0.0008* 0.0015* 
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL 0.0000 -0.0016* 0.0011* 0.0014* -0.0013* 0.0000 -0.0006* 0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0018* 
TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC 0.0000 -0.0016* 0.0013* 0.0009* -0.0006* 0.0005* -0.0007* -0.0002* -0.0008* 0.0020* 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH 0.0001* -0.0004* 0.0008* 0.0005* -0.0005* 0.0009* -0.0002* -0.0006* -0.0006* 0.0017* 
GUOXING RONGDA RLST -0.0001* -0.0017* 0.0006* 0.0008* -0.0004* 0.0005* -0.0014* 0.0004* -0.0003* 0.0018* 
HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0010* 0.0005* -0.0008* -0.0007* 0.0000 0.0004* -0.0005* 0.0012* 
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. 0.0000 -0.0012* -0.0003* 0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0006* 0.0000 0.0001* -0.0008* 0.0018* 
JIZHONG ENERGY RES. 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0013* 0.0002* -0.0004* -0.0009* 0.0025* 
XUANHUA CON.MCH. 0.0000 -0.0014* 0.0010* -0.0005* 0.0006* 0.0008* -0.0018* -0.0002* 0.0003* 0.0016* 
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. 0.0000 -0.0007* 0.0002* 0.0004* 0.0002* 0.0007* -0.0004* 0.0002* -0.0010* 0.0010* 
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. 0.0000 -0.0014* 0.0009* 0.0003* -0.0005* 0.0005* -0.0001 0.0000* -0.0010* 0.0016* 
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE 0.0000* -0.0010* 0.0004* 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0003* 0.0000 -0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0019* 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0003* 0.0008* 0.0005* -0.0007* -0.0003* 0.0001 -0.0010* 0.0016* 
SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  0.0002* 0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0003* -0.0001* 0.0007* 0.0017* -0.0001 -0.0010* 0.0013* 
SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. -0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0006* -0.0008* 0.0005* 0.0005* -0.0008* -0.0001* -0.0001* 0.0010* 
SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0009* 0.0005* -0.0007* 0.0004* 0.0004* -0.0006* -0.0009* 0.0020* 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  -0.0001* -0.0005* 0.0010* 0.0004* -0.0009* 0.0002* 0.0003* 0.0000 -0.0011* -0.0011* 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. 0.0000* -0.0011* 0.0005* 0.0001* -0.0003* 0.0009* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0007* 0.0013* 
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE 0.0000* -0.0007* 0.0008* 0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0007* 0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0009* 0.0014* 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0003* 0.0005* -0.0002* 0.0010* -0.0013* 0.0001* -0.0004* 0.0014* 
GUANGDONG GOWORLD  0.0000 -0.0020* 0.0011* 0.0014* -0.0009* 0.0006* -0.0008* -0.0006* -0.0006* 0.0020* 
SOUND ENV.RESOURCES  0.0000 -0.0016* 0.0000 0.0010* 0.0012* 0.0003* -0.0006* -0.0005* -0.0008* 0.0016* 
DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) 0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0005* 0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0007* 0.0005* -0.0004* -0.0005* 0.0012* 
Note: The t-statistics are not reported for brevity purposes but statistically significant mu is represented by an asterisk (*). 
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Companies 2002-2010 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0007* -0.0002* -0.0006* 0.0011* 0.0000 0.0002* -0.0011* 0.0011* 
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0002* 0.0012* -0.0003* 0.0003* -0.0012* 0.0004* -0.0006* 0.0020* 
CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. 0.0000 -0.0021* 0.0009* 0.0012* -0.0010* 0.0008* -0.0006* -0.0002* -0.0004* 0.0017* 
WULIANGYE YIBIN   0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0007* -0.0002* -0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0000 0.0005* -0.0007* 0.0012* 
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS 0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0006* 0.0005* -0.0002* 0.0007* -0.0001* 0.0001 -0.0009* 0.0013* 
HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. 0.0000 -0.0006* 0.0000 0.0002* -0.0002* 0.0000 -0.0013* 0.0009* 0.0004* 0.0006* 
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. -0.0001* -0.0014* 0.0009* 0.0007* -0.0009* -0.0003* 0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0014* 
ANGANG STEEL 0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0009* -0.0003* -0.0001* 0.0005* 0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0020* 
XIANDAI INVESTMENT 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0011* -0.0004* -0.0006* 0.0007* 0.0003* 0.0001 -0.0009* 0.0012* 
TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0000* 0.0004* 0.0009* 0.0006* -0.0004* -0.0002* -0.0011* 0.0010* 
ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0012* -0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0003* 0.0002* 0.0003* -0.0008* 0.0016* 
HUNAN VALIN STEEL  0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0006* -0.0001* -0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0005* -0.0009* 0.0017* 
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. 0.0001* -0.0012* 0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0004* 0.0014* 0.0000 -0.0004* -0.0004* 0.0022* 
CSG HOLDING  0.0002* -0.0006* 0.0013* 0.0007* -0.0012* 0.0011* -0.0005* -0.0001* -0.0006* 0.0020* 
COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) -0.0001* -0.0020* 0.0010* 0.0007* -0.0008* 0.0005* -0.0012* -0.0002* -0.0006* 0.0021* 
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  -0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0008* -0.0005* -0.0005* 0.0007* -0.0010* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0017* 
SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. -0.0001* -0.0017* 0.0013* 0.0005* -0.0006* -0.0001* 0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0008* 0.0012* 
CHINA BAOAN GP. 0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0012* 0.0005* -0.0007* 0.0005* -0.0013* -0.0003* -0.0003* 0.0017* 
GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. -0.0001* -0.0013* 0.0001 -0.0004* 0.0007* 0.0009* -0.0005* -0.0004* -0.0006* 0.0015* 
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. -0.0002* -0.0017* 0.0005* -0.0001 -0.0005* 0.0006* 0.0004* -0.0001 -0.0007* 0.0004* 
GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0000 0.0003* 0.0005* 0.0002* 0.0004* -0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0013* 
JIANGLING MOTORS -0.0001* -0.0012* 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0004* -0.0005* -0.0003* -0.0006* 0.0010* 
HONG YUAN SECS. 0.0000 -0.0014* 0.0011* 0.0007* -0.0005* 0.0001* -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0007* 0.0015* 
LUZHOU LAO JIAO 0.0000* -0.0011* 0.0007* 0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0004* -0.0006* -0.0001* -0.0003* 0.0014* 
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Companies 2002-2010 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
NORTHEAST PHARM.  -0.0001* -0.0012* 0.0010* 0.0003* -0.0001* 0.0002* -0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0011* 0.0010* 
TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0007* -0.0005* 0.0001 0.0007* -0.0001* 0.0004* -0.0009* 0.0017* 
GREE ELECT.APP. 0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0005* 0.0001 -0.0007* 0.0009* 0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0007* 0.0014* 
TIANJIN TEDA 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0002* -0.0003* 0.0005* 0.0006* -0.0001* 0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0014* 
SHANDONG JINLING MNG. 0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0008* 0.0007* -0.0003* -0.0015* 0.0006* 0.0006* -0.0004* 0.0023* 
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0004* 0.0002* -0.0002* 0.0008* 0.0000 -0.0003* -0.0010* 0.0015* 
SOFTTO 0.0000 -0.0015* 0.0008* -0.0004* -0.0006* 0.0011* 0.0008* -0.0003* -0.0009* 0.0013* 
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 0.0000* -0.0006* 0.0009* 0.0003* -0.0002* 0.0006* -0.0002* -0.0005* -0.0009* 0.0014* 
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. -0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0008* 0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0002* -0.0009* 0.0008* 
QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  -0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0003* 0.0002* -0.0004* 0.0003* 0.0000 -0.0002* -0.0006* 0.0017* 
HUAWEN MDA.INV. 0.0000 -0.0014* 0.0003* 0.0004* -0.0005* 0.0004* 0.0008* 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0010* 
FAW CAR  0.0000 -0.0008* -0.0001* 0.0007* 0.0004* 0.0005* -0.0003* 0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0009* 
YUNNAN ALUM.  0.0001* -0.0013* 0.0008* -0.0003* 0.0004* 0.0007* -0.0001 0.0002* -0.0008* 0.0019* 
SHANDONG HAIHUA 0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0010* -0.0003* -0.0006* 0.0013* -0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0015* 
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. 0.0002* -0.0002* 0.0007* 0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0011* -0.0006* 0.0000 -0.0005* 0.0024* 
HEBEI IRON & STEEL  0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0005* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0003* 0.0004* 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0021* 
FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. 0.0000 -0.0007* 0.0005* 0.0005* -0.0009* 0.0005* -0.0003* 0.0001* -0.0005* 0.0016* 
GD MIDEA HOLDING  0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0009* 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0008* -0.0003* 0.0001 -0.0005* 0.0012* 
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  -0.0001* -0.0015* 0.0013* 0.0013* -0.0014* -0.0005* -0.0007* 0.0002* -0.0004* 0.0017* 
KONKA GROUP  0.0000* -0.0014* 0.0013* 0.0003* -0.0007* 0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0001* -0.0005* 0.0014* 
SHN.FOUNTAIN  0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0009* 0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0006* -0.0012* -0.0002* -0.0003* 0.0017* 
XI'AN AIR.INTL. 0.0000* -0.0011* 0.0008* 0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0011* -0.0008* -0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0010* 
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN 0.0001* -0.0004* 0.0001* 0.0002* -0.0008* 0.0009* -0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0001* 0.0017* 
ZTE  -0.0001* -0.0016* 0.0008* 0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0005* 0.0000 -0.0001* -0.0001* 0.0009* 
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Companies 2002-2010 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
GUOYUAN SECURITIES -0.0001* -0.0021* 0.0004* 0.0006* -0.0001* 0.0009* -0.0023* 0.0014* -0.0005* 0.0010* 
GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. 0.0002* -0.0001 0.0015* 0.0003* -0.0009* 0.0004* 0.0001* 0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0011* 
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 0.0001* -0.0005* 0.0007* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0001* 0.0005* 0.0002* -0.0006* 0.0020* 
XINXING DUCTILEIRON 0.0000 -0.0013* 0.0005* -0.0001* -0.0002* 0.0009* 0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0016* 
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0003* 0.0003* -0.0002* 0.0011* 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0017* 
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. 0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0004* 0.0021* -0.0004* 0.0001* -0.0002* 0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0010* 
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  0.0000 -0.0016* 0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0012* -0.0001 0.0001* -0.0006* 0.0019* 
WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0006* 0.0004* -0.0008* 0.0009* 0.0004* -0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0014* 
SUNING UNIVERSAL  0.0000 -0.0007* 0.0010* 0.0003* -0.0010* -0.0012* 0.0009* 0.0001* -0.0003* 0.0017* 
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. 0.0000* -0.0011* 0.0007* 0.0001* 0.0002* 0.0005* -0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0011* 0.0013* 
BEIJING SHOUGANG 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0009* -0.0004* 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0004* -0.0002* -0.0008* 0.0016* 
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0013* -0.0002* -0.0004* 0.0003* -0.0003* 0.0000 -0.0006* 0.0015* 
SGIS SONGSHAN  0.0000* -0.0007* 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0004* 0.0003* -0.0001 0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0019* 
CHINA UNION HDG. 0.0000 -0.0004* 0.0011* 0.0005* -0.0014* 0.0009* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0007* 0.0009* 
CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0010* -0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0000 -0.0018* -0.0023* 0.0034* 0.0018* 
TAIFU INDUSTRY  -0.0002* -0.0017* 0.0012* -0.0006* -0.0018* 0.0011* -0.0005* -0.0004* 0.0003* 0.0013* 
SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0008* 0.0002* -0.0006* 0.0004* -0.0003* 0.0001* -0.0006* 0.0012* 
ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. 0.0001* -0.0013* 0.0014* 0.0008* -0.0010* 0.0014* -0.0007* 0.0005* -0.0011* 0.0015* 
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0011* 0.0010* -0.0005* -0.0003* -0.0013* 0.0001* -0.0001* 0.0011* 
MINSHENG INV.MAN. 0.0000* -0.0016* 0.0004* 0.0011* -0.0004* 0.0013* 0.0002* -0.0003* -0.0013* 0.0014* 
HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. 0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0010* 0.0004* -0.0005* 0.0005* -0.0002* -0.0003* -0.0011* 0.0017* 
WUXI LITTLE SWAN  -0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0007* 0.0004* 0.0003* 0.0010* -0.0011* -0.0008* -0.0003* 0.0003* 
KINGDREAM PUBLIC  0.0000 -0.0013* 0.0008* 0.0005* -0.0005* 0.0010* -0.0015* 0.0009* -0.0007* 0.0013* 
TANGSHAN CERAMIC  -0.0001* -0.0012* 0.0012* 0.0004* -0.0005* 0.0001* -0.0008* 0.0004* -0.0010* 0.0010* 
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Companies 2002-2010 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
HUAYI COMPR.  0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0010* 0.0003* -0.0002* 0.0006* -0.0009* 0.0001 -0.0007* 0.0015* 
SHANDONG SHENGLI  0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0008* -0.0001* 0.0004* -0.0002* -0.0003* 0.0005* -0.0013* 0.0017* 
YUYUAN HOLDING -0.0001* -0.0018* 0.0016* 0.0006* -0.0007* -0.0002* -0.0005* -0.0009* -0.0002* 0.0013* 
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  0.0001* -0.0005* 0.0013* 0.0004* -0.0010* 0.0008* -0.0005* 0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0015* 
JILIN CHM.FIBRE 0.0000* -0.0008* 0.0008* 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0008* -0.0004* -0.0002* -0.0009* 0.0015* 
NANJING ZHONGBEI 0.0000 -0.0014* 0.0010* 0.0003* -0.0006* -0.0002* 0.0000 0.0002* -0.0007* 0.0017* 
CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0006* 0.0003* 0.0000 0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0005* -0.0003* 0.0015* 
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0007* 0.0005* -0.0001* 0.0010* -0.0008* -0.0004* -0.0007* 0.0017* 
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. 0.0000* -0.0005* 0.0008* -0.0001* -0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0001* -0.0003* -0.0006* 0.0013* 
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. -0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0006* -0.0004* 0.0009* -0.0020* -0.0002* -0.0001* 0.0007* 
WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. -0.0001* -0.0012* 0.0010* 0.0001* -0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0005* -0.0006* 0.0012* 
LVJING REALESTATE 0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0003* -0.0001* 0.0008* 0.0011* -0.0017* 0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0017* 
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0016* 0.0006* -0.0010* 0.0009* -0.0008* 0.0002* -0.0012* 0.0006* 
HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  -0.0001* -0.0014* 0.0013* 0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0002* -0.0010* -0.0003* -0.0001* 0.0014* 
SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. 0.0000 -0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0000 0.0017* -0.0001 -0.0018* -0.0005* -0.0001* 0.0016* 
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0008* 0.0009* -0.0003* 0.0005* 0.0000 -0.0002* -0.0008* 0.0015* 
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  -0.0001* -0.0012* 0.0004* 0.0004* -0.0007* 0.0005* -0.0003* 0.0003* -0.0009* 0.0007* 
CHINA CALXON GROUP  -0.0001* -0.0004* 0.0005* 0.0012* 0.0001 -0.0007* -0.0019* -0.0002* -0.0001* 0.0018* 
SOUTH HUITON 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0006* 0.0004* -0.0004* 0.0016* -0.0014* -0.0011* 0.0001 0.0020* 
JIANGSU HUAXICUN 0.0000* -0.0008* 0.0004* 0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0006* 0.0002* -0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0012* 
SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  0.0000 -0.0007* 0.0009* 0.0005* -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0007* 0.0008* -0.0009* 0.0015* 
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) 0.0000 -0.0015* 0.0015* 0.0009* -0.0012* 0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0000 0.0016* 
SHENZHEN AIRPORT  0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0008* -0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0008* 0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0010* 0.0013* 
BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 0.0001* -0.0004* 0.0011* 0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0003* 0.0004* -0.0002* -0.0012* 0.0017* 
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BENGANG STEEL PLATES  0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0004* -0.0002* 0.0000 0.0003* 0.0005* 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0017* 
SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  -0.0001* -0.0015* 0.0010* 0.0000 -0.0002* 0.0012* -0.0016* 0.0002* -0.0004* 0.0004* 
SUNDIRO HOLDING 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0007* 0.0006* -0.0002* 0.0004* -0.0009* 0.0004* -0.0009* 0.0015* 
AN HUI WENERGY  0.0000* -0.0013* 0.0006* 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0013* -0.0009* 0.0001* -0.0012* 0.0014* 
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  0.0000 -0.0010* -0.0002* 0.0006* 0.0000 0.0001* -0.0001* 0.0003* -0.0008* 0.0015* 
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0006* 0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0013* 
SHENYANG CHM.IND.  0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0008* 0.0003* -0.0003* 0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0001 -0.0006* 0.0014* 
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0010* 0.0002* -0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0007* -0.0002* -0.0008* 0.0016* 
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  0.0001* -0.0014* 0.0016* 0.0000 0.0004* 0.0001 -0.0003* 0.0002* -0.0010* 0.0017* 
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0000 0.0009* -0.0003* 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0004* 0.0018* 
SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN.    0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0005* 0.0003* -0.0004* 0.0014* -0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0008* 0.0005* 
CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  0.0001* -0.0015* 0.0003* 0.0009* -0.0003* 0.0014* -0.0008* 0.0004* -0.0009* 0.0013* 
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  0.0000 -0.0019* 0.0004* -0.0002* 0.0004* 0.0017* -0.0023* 0.0007* 0.0002* 0.0014* 
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  -0.0001* -0.0019* 0.0010* 0.0005* -0.0004* -0.0002* 0.0000 0.0002* -0.0009* 0.0011* 
TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0007* 0.0005* -0.0001* 0.0007* -0.0007* 0.0001 -0.0010* 0.0016* 
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  -0.0001* -0.0015* 0.0004* 0.0000 -0.0006* 0.0020* -0.0018* 0.0005* -0.0004* 0.0011* 
YANG GUANG  0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0009* 0.0007* -0.0011* 0.0006* -0.0006* 0.0001 -0.0005* 0.0018* 
JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. 0.0001* -0.0008* 0.0007* 0.0001* 0.0002* 0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0001 -0.0003* 0.0019* 
JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0004* 0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0002* -0.0001* 0.0007* -0.0009* 0.0018* 
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. 0.0000* -0.0007* -0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0006* 0.0009* -0.0004* 0.0000 -0.0014* 0.0022* 
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  -0.0001* -0.0012* 0.0007* 0.0009* -0.0004* 0.0003* -0.0014* -0.0003* 0.0000 0.0009* 
CHINA VANKE  -0.0001* -0.0015* 0.0008* 0.0001 -0.0009* 0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0002* 0.0000 0.0016* 
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. -0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0009* 0.0006* -0.0012* 0.0001* -0.0002* -0.0005* -0.0004* 0.0016* 
LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU -0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0010* 0.0003* -0.0005* 0.0005* -0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0009* 0.0008* 
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SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  0.0000 -0.0007* 0.0019* 0.0005* -0.0008* 0.0001* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0010* 0.0006* 
RONGAN PROPERTY -0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0000* 0.0012* 0.0009* -0.0012* -0.0017* 0.0000* -0.0002* 0.0014* 
XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. 0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0007* 0.0006* -0.0008* 0.0002* 0.0003* 0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0012* 
SHN.TELLUS HLDG. 0.0000 -0.0016* 0.0014* 0.0005* -0.0006* 0.0007* -0.0010* -0.0001 -0.0004* 0.0012* 
SHN.FIYTA HDG. 0.0000 -0.0015* 0.0003* 0.0006* 0.0008* 0.0010* -0.0020* 0.0000 -0.0002* 0.0012* 
SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0015* 0.0006* -0.0012* 0.0003* -0.0012* 0.0001 0.0000 0.0018* 
SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  0.0000 -0.0008* 0.0017* 0.0004* -0.0011* 0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0004* 0.0014* 
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0022* 0.0009* -0.0018* 0.0004* -0.0017* 0.0005* -0.0002* 0.0019* 
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. -0.0002* -0.0015* 0.0014* 0.0001 -0.0006* -0.0001 -0.0010* 0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0012* 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. -0.0001* -0.0015* 0.0010* 0.0007* -0.0005* 0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0013* 0.0006* 
GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.)  0.0000 -0.0017* 0.0016* 0.0010* -0.0009* 0.0006* -0.0005* -0.0009* -0.0004* 0.0017* 
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0009* 0.0005* -0.0002* 0.0005* -0.0001* 0.0003* -0.0011* 0.0013* 
HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. 0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0007* -0.0002* -0.0003* 0.0013* -0.0002* -0.0004* -0.0007* 0.0012* 
SHENZHEN SEG  -0.0001* -0.0013* 0.0016* 0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0004* -0.0011* -0.0005* -0.0002* 0.0017* 
DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE  0.0000 -0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0000 -0.0002* 0.0002* -0.0002* 0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0014* 
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. 0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0010* -0.0004* -0.0002* 0.0009* -0.0003* 0.0004* -0.0006* 0.0013* 
SEARAINBOW HOLDING  0.0001* -0.0008* 0.0008* 0.0014* -0.0010* -0.0003* 0.0001* 0.0002* -0.0008* 0.0015* 
BEIJING NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC  0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0010* 0.0004* -0.0003* 0.0006* -0.0004* 0.0002* -0.0009* 0.0012* 
HUBEI FUXING SCTC. 0.0000 -0.0007* 0.0013* 0.0001* -0.0014* 0.0007* -0.0002* 0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0018* 
YELAND GROUP 0.0001* -0.0002* 0.0010* -0.0004* -0.0001* 0.0012* -0.0011* -0.0004* -0.0004* 0.0018* 
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  -0.0001* -0.0015* 0.0013* 0.0013* -0.0013* 0.0006* -0.0011* 0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0013* 
YUNNAN TIN  0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0009* -0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0008* -0.0002* 0.0000 -0.0003* 0.0020* 
ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  0.0001* -0.0009* 0.0011* 0.0004* -0.0006* 0.0015* -0.0010* -0.0003* -0.0008* 0.0014* 
SHANXI XISHAN  0.0002* -0.0004* 0.0009* -0.0004* -0.0008* 0.0011* 0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0006* 0.0023* 
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Appendix 3.5: The Mean Mu for 180 Companies from 2002 to 2010 (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT 0.0001* -0.0006* 0.0009* 0.0008* -0.0002* 0.0005* -0.0009* -0.0011* 0.0000 0.0012* 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. -0.0001* -0.0010* 0.0009* 0.0002* -0.0003* 0.0008* -0.0014* -0.0003* -0.0008* 0.0011* 
YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  0.0000 -0.0006* 0.0004* -0.0002* -0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004* 0.0006* 
CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. 0.0002* -0.0001* 0.0008* -0.0002* 0.0001* 0.0007* -0.0005* -0.0003* -0.0002* 0.0016* 
JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET  0.0001* -0.0005* 0.0008* 0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0008* 0.0005* -0.0004* 0.0015* 
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  0.0001* -0.0004* 0.0008* 0.0007* -0.0004* 0.0003* -0.0003* 0.0001* -0.0011* 0.0016* 
GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  0.0001* -0.0007* 0.0008* -0.0002* 0.0004* 0.0011* -0.0010* -0.0003* -0.0008* 0.0016* 
JILIN PWR.SHARE 0.0000* N/A N/A -0.0007* 0.0000 0.0003* -0.0005* 0.0002* -0.0007* 0.0010* 
ZHEJIANG NHU 0.0000 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0012* 0.0004* -0.0005* -0.0009* 0.0007* 
HAN'S LASER TECH. 0.0001* N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0011* -0.0007* -0.0002* -0.0003* 0.0018* 
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. -0.0001* N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0017* -0.0009* -0.0005* -0.0005* 0.0013* 
SUNING APPLIANCE  0.0003* N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0017* 0.0000 0.0001* -0.0005* 0.0013* 
HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. -0.0002* N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0015* -0.0012* -0.0007* -0.0004* 0.0007* 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms  
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
SHANDONG SHENGLI
Noise Trader Risk
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
JINGU YUAN HOLDING
Noise Trader Risk
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.
Noise Trader Risk
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
JILIN CHM.FIBRE
Noise Trader Risk
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
NANJING ZHONGBEI
Noise Trader Risk
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
INNER MOI.XINGYE MNG.
Noise Trader Risk
 126 
 
Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The graph of daily noise trader risk for 180 firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.6: The Graph of Daily Noise Trader Risk for 180 Firms (Continued) 
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Appendix 3.7: The number of Underreaction, IPE and Overreaction for 180 Companies for the Period of 2002-2010 
COMPANIES U+ U- IPE+ IPE- O+ O- INFO EMH COMPANIES U+ U- IPE+ IPE- O+ O- INFO EMH 
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. 2 3 11 46 37 109 208 0 HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. 9 1 10 29 39 17 106 1 
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. 13 3 12 35 52 93 208 0 HUBEI FUXING SCTC. 9 12 1 68 10 89 189 0 
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  2 55 13 16 85 67 238 0 AN HUI WENERGY  3 15 20 35 29 51 153 0 
BENGANG STEEL PLATES  8 13 10 5 32 22 90 0 SHENZHEN AIRPORT  14 23 27 23 43 52 182 0 
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 18 9 17 21 62 35 162 0 JIANGSU HUAXICUN 4 2 10 9 8 19 52 0 
GD MIDEA HOLDING  8 1 31 47 19 109 215 0 JILIN PWR.SHARE 5 16 20 22 24 44 131 0 
TAIFU INDUSTRY  13 6 39 25 76 44 204 1 JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. 22 7 21 23 42 36 151 0 
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  3 17 17 20 18 63 138 0 GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. 4 20 30 13 55 15 137 0 
CHINA UNION HDG. 12 1 5 32 41 29 120 0 HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. 12 13 12 20 38 21 116 0 
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. 5 15 16 31 25 68 160 0 DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL 11 2 6 34 20 34 107 0 
HONG YUAN SECS. 4 14 18 50 57 58 201 0 SGIS SONGSHAN  8 4 14 49 6 70 151 0 
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. 30 17 10 24 18 90 189 0 ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  11 14 23 31 25 54 158 0 
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. 12 18 33 12 55 45 175 0 SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG. 14 11 34 14 54 20 148 1 
SHN.FOUNTAIN  4 16 16 30 34 51 151 0 GUANGXI GUITANG 15 14 8 16 14 39 106 0 
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  12 8 13 15 39 21 108 0 WULIANGYE YIBIN   15 7 14 28 16 47 127 0 
JILIN CHM.FIBRE 3 10 16 25 35 31 120 0 BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. 26 5 29 27 48 36 171 0 
SUNING UNIVERSAL  15 6 29 32 52 48 182 0 JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MKT  20 3 8 48 18 58 155 0 
DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) 12 19 27 18 42 49 167 0 SHANDONG JINLING MNG. 31 5 16 13 34 28 127 0 
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. 7 13 35 48 46 74 223 0 HUAYI COMPR.  9 8 22 54 54 33 180 0 
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. 16 21 22 32 50 56 197 0 QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  12 8 12 43 5 65 145 0 
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  13 8 13 83 90 46 253 0 FAW CAR  8 19 18 13 22 32 112 0 
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE 6 15 14 42 33 56 166 0 TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  15 24 23 24 36 42 164 0 
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. 11 26 30 22 59 42 190 0 ANGANG STEEL 24 29 12 30 38 46 179 0 
JIANGLING MOTORS 12 13 15 32 33 48 153 0 TIANJIN TEDA 16 14 34 26 55 24 169 0 
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Appendix 3.7: The number of Underreaction, IPE and Overreaction for 180 Companies for the period of 2002-2010 (Continued) 
COMPANIES U+ U- IPE+ IPE- O+ O- INFO EMH COMPANIES U+ U- IPE+ IPE- O+ O- INFO EMH 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. 9 44 27 21 51 37 189 0 ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  19 45 49 23 32 67 235 0 
YANG GUANG  20 16 5 57 9 76 183 0 TANGSHAN CERAMIC  4 13 25 38 20 38 138 0 
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  21 6 27 58 59 37 208 0 CHINA VANKE  23 10 71 41 61 44 250 0 
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. 2 17 15 28 23 30 115 0 XIANDAI INVESTMENT 12 18 17 18 21 26 112 0 
JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. 6 34 10 18 17 41 126 0 SHENYANG CHM.IND.  14 16 21 45 18 51 165 0 
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. 4 3 28 19 18 28 100 0 HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. 5 2 23 72 6 67 175 0 
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. 16 37 46 50 74 50 273 0 GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. 15 27 37 16 34 33 162 0 
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  1 28 20 16 26 28 119 0 TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. 21 17 8 87 19 72 224 0 
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  10 17 14 29 23 34 127 0 CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. 28 30 19 44 34 48 203 0 
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. 13 28 28 9 33 30 141 0 YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  6 5 25 19 24 13 92 0 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 14 13 2 52 12 53 146 0 SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  8 16 3 86 3 73 189 0 
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  22 37 21 26 27 58 191 0 JIZHONG ENERGY RES. 23 8 13 50 39 24 157 0 
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 7 5 0 48 6 42 108 0 HEBEI IRON & STEEL  42 14 26 51 60 29 222 0 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. 17 34 18 40 50 37 196 0 JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION 20 12 13 36 24 30 135 0 
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  7 16 30 15 26 28 122 0 SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 2 6 29 46 23 32 138 0 
NANJING ZHONGBEI 7 15 18 36 23 37 136 0 CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 41 4 15 13 28 20 121 0 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH 14 9 24 29 43 17 136 0 GUOYUAN SECURITIES 23 35 27 32 53 23 193 0 
RONGAN PROPERTY 32 6 11 25 29 30 134 1 DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  14 15 11 17 4 33 94 0 
HAN'S LASER TECH. 16 14 5 39 2 56 132 0 FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. 24 24 38 57 57 35 235 0 
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS 19 7 14 50 23 46 159 0 CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. 17 12 38 70 11 77 225 0 
BEIJING SHOUGANG 5 1 25 46 6 53 136 0 BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 8 5 31 53 22 40 159 0 
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN 7 15 10 78 11 73 194 0 SHN.FIYTA HDG. 13 2 22 51 17 39 144 0 
YUNNAN TIN  11 14 23 39 16 49 152 0 NORTHEAST PHARM.  8 11 28 38 13 41 139 0 
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  9 17 17 65 28 51 187 0 WUXI LITTLE SWAN  14 17 48 22 49 15 165 0 
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Appendix 3.7: The number of Underreaction, IPE and Overreaction for 180 Companies for the period of 2002-2010 (Continued) 
COMPANIES U+ U- IPE+ IPE- O+ O- INFO EMH COMPANIES U+ U- IPE+ IPE- O+ O- INFO EMH 
JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. 9 7 28 53 12 49 158 0 ZHEJIANG NHU 3 0 9 40 0 28 80 0 
LUZHOU LAO JIAO 5 10 17 51 11 41 135 0 SUNDIRO HOLDING 1 14 43 37 29 21 145 0 
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  14 17 10 41 17 34 133 0 LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU 5 1 22 47 13 26 114 0 
NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC  18 15 13 41 16 38 141 0 HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  3 3 34 28 23 12 103 0 
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  12 5 15 23 19 15 89 0 CHINA CALXON GROUP  21 9 42 32 49 5 159 1 
MINSHENG INV.MAN. 1 30 36 35 22 41 165 0 TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC 24 26 18 76 21 53 218 0 
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. 14 13 14 41 19 31 132 0 WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  27 2 22 31 20 22 124 0 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. 8 19 30 32 26 28 143 0 LVJING REALESTATE 19 13 43 52 14 51 192 0 
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  24 26 15 53 3 68 189 0 LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  7 56 12 43 8 52 178 0 
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 18 19 13 45 16 40 151 0 CSG HOLDING  11 7 47 57 27 34 183 0 
ZTE  26 4 55 66 50 38 239 0 XINXING DUCTILEIRON 27 18 22 33 18 32 150 0 
CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  12 10 25 75 33 38 194 1 SHANDONG SHENGLI  12 19 19 19 10 25 105 1 
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. 7 4 23 48 24 23 129 0 SHENZHEN SEG  20 31 11 118 54 35 269 0 
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT 6 4 29 47 14 35 135 0 COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) 24 12 12 60 23 30 161 0 
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  24 12 20 29 19 29 133 0 SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. 22 34 16 36 31 22 161 0 
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  4 42 30 71 45 38 230 0 GREE ELECT.APP. 6 14 30 49 17 31 147 0 
XI'AN AIR.INTL. 14 27 21 55 11 55 183 0 TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  14 21 20 40 4 42 141 0 
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE 5 4 19 61 9 41 139 0 WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. 4 7 13 57 6 33 120 0 
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  6 9 39 92 11 71 228 0 YUNNAN ALUM.  15 10 31 48 28 21 153 0 
FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.)  4 6 20 63 5 47 145 0 YELAND GROUP 25 25 18 96 36 41 241 0 
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  21 37 17 23 37 17 152 0 SOUND ENV.RESOURCES  7 22 21 66 17 37 170 0 
SHANDONG HAIHUA 21 14 26 38 19 35 153 0 SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 11 23 38 47 10 45 174 0 
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  1 14 20 52 17 30 134 0 ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  10 24 38 17 29 11 129 0 
GUOXING RONGDA RLST 6 1 36 46 23 25 137 0 KINGDREAM PUBLIC  5 2 3 19 2 11 42 0 
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Appendix 3.7: The number of Underreaction, IPE and Overreaction for 180 Companies for the period of 2002-2010 (Continued) 
COMPANIES U+ U- IPE+ IPE- O+ O- INFO EMH COMPANIES U+ U- IPE+ IPE- O+ O- INFO EMH 
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. 8 6 21 59 14 28 136 0 SHN.TELLUS HLDG. 27 53 25 39 23 28 195 0 
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 12 5 31 50 23 20 141 0 SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  22 28 15 85 20 33 203 0 
KONKA GROUP  15 15 14 54 26 17 141 0 JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  17 3 29 52 9 26 136 0 
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. 24 52 79 8 51 20 234 0 CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  26 9 37 47 6 35 160 0 
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. 7 2 33 52 13 27 134 0 TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  5 9 26 39 17 10 106 0 
SOFTTO 26 39 46 43 55 10 219 0 SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  4 16 15 65 9 23 132 0 
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 11 15 47 20 26 13 132 0 HUAWEN MDA.INV. 24 8 70 41 21 23 187 0 
CHINA BAOAN GP. 17 16 10 75 16 32 166 0 ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. 15 13 35 58 14 22 157 0 
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 18 21 43 25 32 11 150 0 XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. 7 42 39 40 17 21 166 0 
SEARAINBOW HOLDING  21 7 48 28 13 28 145 0 GUANGDONG GOWORLD  12 30 10 46 10 18 126 0 
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. 11 18 45 35 22 20 151 0 SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  5 10 5 18 7 4 50 1 
XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN.    1 2 32 69 9 31 144 0 HUNAN VALIN STEEL  34 31 40 71 20 26 222 0 
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. 20 11 30 56 16 28 161 0 XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  40 18 50 48 21 14 191 0 
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) 16 10 29 17 13 14 99 0 XUANHUA CON.MCH. 17 9 42 89 13 19 189 0 
YUYUAN HOLDING 32 13 10 67 25 20 167 0 HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  18 21 39 46 14 11 149 0 
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. 24 12 15 91 5 47 194 0 SOUTH HUITON 24 12 28 56 7 17 144 0 
SHANXI XISHAN  18 10 21 36 21 10 116 0 SUNING APPLIANCE  24 14 33 31 7 13 122 0 
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL 25 17 32 102 8 56 240 0 HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 7 14 17 78 10 5 131 0 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND 
RETURN 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Three, we examined noise trader risk, underreaction, overreaction and 
information pricing error by applying the information-adjusted noise model to the 
Shenzhen stock market. Our findings suggest a strong presence of noise trader risk in 
that 99.98% of information days are inefficient. In this chapter, we test if there is a 
relationship between return and noise trader risk—in other words, we are assessing 
whether noise trading is a profitable strategy. DSSW (1990), Blume and Easley 
(1994), Osler (1998), Fama and French (1988), Poterba and Summers (1988), Sias, 
Starks and Tinic (2000) and Davidson and Ramiah (2010) provide sufficient evidence 
to support the hypothesis that noise trading activities affect stock return. It should also 
be noted that other academic papers illustrate the same point using alternative 
concepts such as Kang, Liu and Ni (2002), Otchere and Chan (2003), Leung and Li 
(1998), Fung (1999) and Ramiah et al. (2011) who argue that there are statistically 
significant contrarian profits in China/Hong Kong. However, there is no empirical 
study that has used this superior measure of noise trader risk (IANM) to test if there is 
a relationship with return in China. Davidson and Ramiah (2010) answer this question 
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in the Australian context when they test whether there is a relationship between 
lagged noise trader risk (lagged mu) and stock return. Their findings suggest that 
information traders are able to profit from the existence of noise trader risk from 2000 
to 2002. In this chapter, we follow the methodology of Davidson and Ramiah (2010) 
to test if noise trading strategy is profitable in the Shenzhen stock market by using 
two measures of noise trader risk namely behavioural error—which is a naïve form of 
noise trading activities, and mu (actual measure of noise trader risk) which are 
calculated in Chapter Three. Another objective of this chapter is to explain how noise 
trader risk affects stock returns in terms of Systematic Noise Effect (increase stock 
return) or Cash Noise Effect (decrease stock return). It is important to recognize the 
market situation in which one (Systematic Noise Effect or Cash Noise Effect) is 
working, as investors have to adopt correct and optimal strategies (noisy investment 
strategy or contrarian investment strategy) in order to maximize their profitability. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence of this chapter can be regarded as a direct test of 
the practical potentials of the IANM.  
 
Section 4.2 discusses the three relationships between return and noise trader risk in 
terms of no relationship, a positive relationship (Systematic Noise Effect) and a 
negative relationship (Cash Noise Effect). Section 4.3 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical evidence on the profitability of 
noise trader risk while section 4.5 concludes this chapter.  
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4.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND RETURN  
Davidson and Ramiah (2010) argue that there are three possible relationships between 
noise trader risk and return. The first relationship is that noise trader risk and stock 
return are unrelated. Note that in Chapter Three we used two proxies for noise trader 
risk, namely, behavioural error and mu. In this first case, it means that even though 
behavioural errors and mu exist in the stock market, it is not possible to earn abnormal 
returns. A second possibility is that there is a positive relationship between stock 
returns and the noise trader risk, where this is referred to Systematic Noise Effect 
(SNE). The positive relationship indicates that as noise trader risk increases 
(decreases) stock market return increases (decreases). De Long et al. (1990) provide 
evidence in support of such a positive relationship. One implication of SNE is that 
equity traders are able to increase their return by increasing noise trader risk—in other 
words, by adopting the behaviour of noise traders. Such an investment technique is 
called as noise investment strategy whereby informed investors adopt the principles of 
a naïve investor in order to be profitable. The contrary is also true. If noise trading is 
not rewarding, traders will be willing to pay a higher price to get access to 
information and thus can turn into sophisticated investors. The third possibility is that 
there is a negative relationship between noise trader risk and stock returns. The 
implication of a negative relationship suggests that by reducing noise trader risk it is 
possible to increase stock return where this effect is called as Cash Noise Effect 
(CNE). It implies that information traders can earn abnormal profits by adopting a 
contrarian investment strategy as opposed to the noise traders. As noise trading has 
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three possible outcomes, it is therefore important to recognize the market situation 
that is prevailing. In summary, in a SNE scenario, the correct strategy will be to adopt 
a Noisy Investment Strategy while under a Cash Noise Effect, the best strategy will be 
a contrarian investment strategy.  
 
4.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
4.3.1 DATA 
In this chapter, we use behavioural errors, noise trader risk (mu) and returns of 180 
companies on daily based from 1 January 2002 to 24 August 2010. Behavioural errors 
and mu are obtained from Chapter Three. Daily returns are calculated as the log price 
relatives, 	rit=ln	( PitPit-1 ) where Pit presents the daily price for every single firm which 
is collected from the DataStream.  
 
4.3.2 METHODOLOGY 
Davidson and Ramiah (2010) argue that identifying inefficient markets is a real 
challenge but the most important question is whether arbitrageurs can profit from 
these inefficiencies. We thus follow their methodology to test if noise trading strategy 
is profitable in China and this can be regarded as a direct test of the practical 
potentials of the IAMN. So far, we have discussed two measures of noise trading 
activities, namely, behavioural error as a naïve form of noise trading activities and mu 
as a more accurate measure of noise trader risk. By linking any of these two measures 
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with an asset return, we will be able to determine whether noise trading is a rewarding 
exercise. The following model is estimated for that purpose. 
 
ittiiitr εµλλ ~~ 1,2,1 ++= −                                  Equation 4.1 
 
In Equation 4.1, the dependent variable is the return of an equity asset listed on the 
SZSE and the independent variable is the lagged value of change in noise trader risk. 
The lagged value of change in mu is used, because it assumes that the trader identifies 
noise traders in one period and then opposes them in the subsequent period. λ1 and λ2 
are the intercept and slope of the model respectively. λ2 captures the relationship 
between noise trading and return and can take three values namely λ2 = 0, λ2 > 0, or λ2 
< 0. In the first case, it implies that noise traders do not affect the return of assets. The 
second possibility, λ2 > 0, shows a positive relationship between stock returns and the 
change in mu and is known as a Systematic Noise Effect. Such an occurrence 
indicates that noise traders add systematic risk to the market and supports DSSW 
(1990) in those noise traders earn more than information traders by increasing their 
risk exposure. The last outcome, λ2 < 0, depicts a negative relationship between stock 
returns and changes in noise trader risk and is known as the Cash Noise Effect. This 
would suggest that information traders can earn profits by undertaking a contrarian 
investment strategy relative to the noise traders. Similar to Equation 4.2, we can 
develop another test using the naïve proxy for noise trader risk, namely, behavioural 
error giving rise to the following Equation 4.2. 
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ittiiit BEr εpipi ~~ 1,2,1 +∆+= −                               Equation 4.2 
 
Standard residual diagnostics tests like normality, autocorrelation and auto regressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) are conducted on all the regression models. 
Problems like autocorrelations were corrected by including the appropriate 
autoregressive and moving average terms and a generalised auto regressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity, GARCH (1,1) is applied to correct for the ARCH 
effects.   
 
4.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.4.1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: NOISE TRADER RISK (MU) AND RETURNS  
Table 4.1 presents the number of companies and the respective percentages where we 
detect statistically significant relationship between return and noise trader risk when 
measured by mu. More specifically, Table 4.1 summarizes the results of Systematic 
Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect at various levels of significance and Appendix 4.1 
shows the coefficients (λ2) which is the slope of Equation 4.1 for 180 companies 
across different periods.  
 
Out of 180 companies, there are 13 (7.22%) companies which exhibit statistically 
significant relationship between returns and lagged mu for the period 2002-2010 at 10% 
level of significance (see Table 4.1). It implies that there is a probability of 7.22% that 
 164 
 
traders are able to profit from noise trading activities in the long run. At a 5% level of 
significance, there are seven (3.89%) companies showing that equity traders are able 
to earn profits in the existence of noise trader risk. Table 4.1 shows that there are four 
companies which are statistically significant at 1% level of significance and these 
companies are Northeast Electric Development Company Limited, Faw Car Company 
Limited, Shenzhen Huafa Electronics Company Limited and Tianjin Guangyu 
Development Company Limited (see Appendix 4.1). In addition to these companies, 
three other firms come up when we look at 5% level of significance and these 
companies are Shandong Shengli Company Limited, Jiangsu Huaxicun Company 
Limited and Shenyang Chemical Industry Company Limited (see Appendix 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Number and Percentage of Significant, Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect Estimated by Lagged Mu  
 
2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of Significant 4 15 8 5 6 15 11 9 1 5 
SNE 1 2 2 4 2 8 6 6 1 3 
CNE 3 13 6 1 4 6 5 3 0 2 
Percentage of Significant 2.22% 8.62% 4.60% 2.86% 3.43% 8.38% 6.18% 5.06% 0.56% 2.78% 
SNE 0.56% 1.15% 1.15% 2.29% 1.14% 4.47% 3.37% 3.37% 0.56% 1.67% 
CNE 1.67% 7.47% 3.45% 0.57% 2.29% 3.35% 2.81% 1.69% 0.00% 1.11% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 7 32 15 11 8 19 25 13 8 11 
SNE 2 3 3 10 2 11 16 7 4 7 
CNE 5 29 12 1 6 7 9 6 4 4 
Percentage of Significant 3.89% 17.78% 8.33% 6.11% 4.44% 10.56% 13.89% 7.22% 4.44% 6.11% 
SNE 1.11% 1.67% 1.67% 5.56% 1.11% 6.11% 8.89% 3.89% 2.22% 3.89% 
CNE 2.78% 16.11% 6.67% 0.56% 3.33% 3.89% 5.00% 3.33% 2.22% 2.22% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of Significant 13 50 20 31 17 25 42 17 28 14 
SNE 5 5 3 29 8 13 30 9 10 9 
CNE 8 45 17 2 9 11 12 8 18 5 
Percentage of Significant 7.22% 28.74% 11.49% 17.71% 9.71% 13.97% 23.60% 9.55% 15.56% 7.78% 
SNE 2.78% 2.87% 1.72% 16.57% 4.57% 7.26% 16.85% 5.06% 5.56% 5.00% 
CNE 4.44% 25.86% 9.77% 1.14% 5.14% 6.15% 6.74% 4.49% 10.00% 2.78% 
Observations 180 174 174 175 175 180 178 178 180 180 
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When the significance level is increased to 10% level, another six firms are identified, 
namely, Anhui Ankai Automobile Company Limited, Jiangsu Jianghuai Engine 
Company Limited, Tianjin Faw Xiali Automobile Company Limited, Qinghai Salt 
Lake Potash Company Limited, Guangdong Midea Electric Appliances Company 
Limited and Sichuan Shuangma Cement Company Limited. The observed result 
indicates that a profitable opportunity of noise trader risk exists within these 13 
companies—in order words, equity investors are able to earn abnormal profit based 
on identifying the past noise trader risk over the period 2002-2010 (the long run). Our 
result is consistent with Davidson and Ramiah (2010) who provide evidence that eight 
companies (out of 46 sample companies) show statistically significant relationship 
between lagged noise trader risk (lagged mu) and stock returns in the long run. 
Interestingly, we find that there is a higher probability of profiting from noise traders 
in the Australian stock market than in Shenzhen stock market. This leads us to 
conclude that there is relatively weaker evidence that traders are able to profit from 
noise traders in Shenzhen stock market over the long run. 
 
In addition, Table 4.1 shows that there are higher proportions of statistically 
significant firms in the short run (that is across each individual year). For instance, we 
observe 28.74% (50 firms) in 2002, 11.49% (20 firms) in 2003, 17.71% (31 firms) in 
2004, 9.71% (17 firms) in 2005, 13.97% (25 firms) in 2006, 23.60% (42 firms) in 
2007, 9.55% (17 firms) in 2008, 15.56% (28 firms) in 2009 and 7.78% (14 firms) in 
2010 respectively at 10% level of significance. Such empirical results imply that 
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investors have higher probabilities to profit from noise traders in the short run than in 
the long run. It should be noted that the results in 2007 which show the second highest 
level of percentage coincides with the Chinese economic boom. Similar observations 
are made when we work at 5% and 1% level of significance in terms of noise trading 
which is more profitable in the short run.  
 
It should be noted that we are not able to conduct our analysis for two firms (China 
Calxon Group Company and Rongan Property Company Limited) in 2007 and two 
firms (ShanDong ZhongRun Investment Holding Group Company Limited and 
Rongan Property Company Limited) in 2008 as these firms either fall into the period 
of non-tradable shares reform24 or are undergoing major restructuring. These firms 
were deleted from our sample for 2007 and 2008 respectively, leaving the sample size 
at 178. Appendix 4.1 provides detailed results across the companies. 
 
Out results imply that equity traders have a lower probability to profit from noise 
trader risk in the long run but higher probability in the short run.  
 
4.4.2 SYSTEMATIC NOISE EFFECT AND CASH NOISE EFFECT WHEN 
MEASURED USING LAGGED MU 
Recall that Systematic Noise Effect occurs when the slope (λ2) is positive and 
statistically significant, implying that investors are able to increase their returns by 
                                                 
24
 The Chinese government started the non-tradable shares reform on 29 April 2005. 
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mimicking noise traders—in order words, equity traders adopt a noisy investment 
strategy in order to maximize their profits. Cash Noise Effect is observed when lagged 
noise trader risk and return are negatively related, indicating that the optimal strategy 
is to undertake a contrarian investment strategy as opposed to joining noise traders.  
 
As shown in Table 4.1, there are five firms (2.78%), two companies (1.11%) and one 
firm (0.56%) with Systematic Noise Effect in the long run at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
of significance respectively. The names of these companies are reported in Appendix 
4.1 and Appendix 4.2 where the first appendix shows the coefficient and the second 
appendix classifies the results into no effect, SNE and CNE. For instance, we find 
positive statistical significance in Northeast Electric Development Company Limited 
at 1% level of significance, in Shenyang Chemical Industry Company Limited and 
Northeast Electric Development Company Limited at 5% level of significance, and 
three additional companies namely Anhui Ankai Automobile Company Limited, 
Qinghai Salt Lake Potash Company Limited and Guangdong Midea Electric 
Appliances Company Limited at 10% level of significance. These results are shown 
for each company in the second column of Appendices 4.1 and 4.2. Such evidence 
suggests that noisy investment strategy is profitable within these five firms in the long 
run.  
 
When we examine Systematic Noise Effect across the individual years, we find five 
firms (2.87%) in 2002, three firms (1.72%) in 2003, 29 firms (16.57%) in 2004, eight 
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firms (4.57%) in 2005, 13 firms (7.26%) in 2006, 30 firms (16.85%) in 2007, nine 
firms (5.06%) in 2008, ten firms (5.56%) in 2009 and nine (5.00%) firms in 2010 at 
10% level of significance (see Table 4.1). The percentage reaches its highest level of 
16.85% in 2007. The observed results suggest that there is a relatively higher 
probability to earn more by undertaking noisy investment strategy in the short run 
than in the long run (except for 2003). The estimated results at 5% and 1% level of 
significance show similar findings. Table 4.1 reports the results in aggregate and 
Appendices 4.1 and 4.2 show the systematic noise effect for each company in every 
individual period. For example, we can see from Appendix 4.2 that South Huiton 
Company Limited and China Cifco Industry Company Limited exhibit SNE in the 
short run period. Moreover, we detect SNE in another 41 companies. Additionally, 
Anhui Ankai Automobile Company Limited and Qinghai Salt Lake Potash Company 
Limited exhibit SNE both in the short run and in the long run (see Appendix 4.2). It 
implies that investors of these two companies are able to profit from noise traders by 
adopting noisy investment strategy rather than contrarian investment strategy both in 
the long run and in the short run.  
 
As for long run Cash Noise Effect we find evidence of eight (4.44%) companies at 10% 
level of significance, five (2.78%) firms at 5% level of significance and three (1.67%) 
companies at 1% level of confidence (see Table 4.1). The three companies that we 
observe for long run CNE at 1% level of confidence are Faw Car Company Limited, 
Shenzhen Huafa Electronics Company Limited and Tianjin Guangyu Development 
 170 
 
Company Limited and the results are detailed in Appendices 4.1 and 4.2. In addition 
there are Shandong Shengli Company Limited and Jiangsu Huaxicun Company 
Limited where we find statistically significant results at 5% level of significance and 
Jiangsu Jianghuai Engine Company Limited, Tianjin Faw Xiali Automobile Company 
Limited and Sichuan Shuangma Cement Company Limited at 10% level of 
significance (see Appendix 4.1 and Appendix 4.2). Such findings suggest that traders 
have the opportunity to profit by taking contrarian investment strategy. 
 
In terms of short run CNE, we find 25.86% (45 firms) in 2002, 9.77% (17 firms) in 
2003, 1.14% (two firms) in 2004, 5.14% (nine firms) in 2005, 6.15% (eleven firms) in 
2006, 6.74% (twelve firms) in 2007, 4.49% (eight firms) in 2008, 10.00% (18 firms) 
in 2009 and 2.78% (five firms) in 2010 at 10% level of significance respectively. The 
results of short run CNE suggest that equity traders on the Shenzhen stock market 
have a higher probability of making positive return when adopting contrarian 
investment strategy (that is by opposing noise traders) when compared to the long run 
(except for 2004 and 2010). We find similar observations are made at 5% and 1% 
level of significance in some of the sub periods. As shown in Appendix 4.2, we 
recorded CNE in Sound Environmental Resources Company Limited for the period of 
2002, 2003 and 2006. Similarly, we find that another 41 companies exhibit CNE in 
the short run (see Appendices 4.1 and 4.2).  
 
There are companies that display both short run and long run CNE and examples of 
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these companies are Faw Car Company Limited, Tianjin Faw Xiali Automobile 
Company Limited, Shandong Shengli Company Limited, Tianjin Guangyu 
Development Company Limited and Jiangsu Jianghuai Engine Company Limited 
which are reported in Appendices 4.1 and 4.2. More specifically, Tianjin Guangyu 
Development Company Limited exhibits a statistically significant CNE in the period 
2002-2010 and sub periods 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2009.  
 
It is also possible to observe companies that have SNE in one period and CNE in 
another (and vice versa). For instance Beijing New Building Materials Public 
Company Limited displays SNE in 2005 and 2007 and CNE in 2002, 2008 and 2009. 
There are an additional 40 companies that exhibit both SNE and CNE.  
 
In comparison, Davidson and Ramiah (2010) provide evidence that six companies 
have CNE (13.04%) and two companies (4.35%) have SNE in the Australian stock 
market. 
 
Additionally, the findings imply that investors should take difference strategies on 
different companies in order to make profit, because each company has its own 
characteristics on in terms of operating, corporate governance, business and finance, 
resulting in different performance on fundamental factors and leading traders to have 
different expectation on investing in stock. 
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4.4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: BEHAVIOURAL ERROR AND RETURN 
Table 4.2 presents the number of companies and their respective percentages where 
we detect statistically significant relationship between lagged change in behavioural 
error (a naïve measurement of noise trader risk) and stock return. Additionally, Table 
4.2 summarizes the results of Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect at 
various levels of significance when measured by behavioural error and the elaborate 
results for the 180 companies are shown in Appendices 4.3 and 4.4. Appendix 4.3 
shows the coefficients (
2
pi ) of the slope of Equation 4.2 and Appendix 4.4 shows 
SNE and CNE in the periods that they occur. 
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Table 4.2: Number and Percentage of Significant, Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect Estimated by Lagged Change in BE 
 
2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of Significant 2 13 6 5 3 9 4 3 3 3 
SNE 1 5 3 3 3 3 2 0 0 2 
CNE 1 8 3 2 0 6 2 3 3 1 
Percentage of Significant 1.11% 7.47% 3.43% 2.86% 1.67% 5.00% 2.25% 1.69% 1.67% 1.67% 
SNE 0.56% 2.87% 1.71% 1.71% 1.67% 1.67% 1.12% 0.00% 0.00% 1.11% 
CNE 0.56% 4.60% 1.71% 1.14% 0.00% 3.33% 1.12% 1.69% 1.67% 0.56% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 3 18 11 15 10 18 7 4 8 3 
SNE 1 8 5 11 9 4 3 1 1 2 
CNE 2 10 6 4 1 14 4 3 7 1 
Percentage of Significant 1.67% 10.34% 6.29% 8.57% 5.56% 10.00% 3.93% 2.25% 4.44% 1.67% 
SNE 0.56% 4.60% 2.86% 6.29% 5.00% 2.22% 1.69% 0.56% 0.56% 1.11% 
CNE 1.11% 5.75% 3.43% 2.29% 0.56% 7.78% 2.25% 1.69% 3.89% 0.56% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of Significant 3 27 20 23 22 24 9 10 17 3 
SNE 1 11 10 13 19 6 4 5 6 2 
CNE 2 16 10 10 3 18 5 5 11 1 
Percentage of Significant 1.67% 15.52% 11.43% 13.14% 12.22% 13.33% 5.06% 5.62% 9.44% 1.67% 
SNE 0.56% 6.32% 5.71% 7.43% 10.56% 3.33% 2.25% 2.81% 3.33% 1.11% 
CNE 1.11% 9.20% 5.71% 5.71% 1.67% 10.00% 2.81% 2.81% 6.11% 0.56% 
Observations 180 174 175 175 180 180 178 178 180 180 
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As shown in Table 4.2, there are three (1.67%) companies that exhibit statistically 
significant relationship between returns and lagged change in behavioural error for the 
period 2002-2010 both at 10% level of significance and 5% level of significance. It 
implies that there is a low (arguably negligible) probability of 1.67% that traders are 
able to profit from noise trading activities in the long run. Northeast Electric 
Development Company Limited, Sound Environmental Resources Company Limited 
and Xiandai Investment Company Limited are the three companies where we observe 
statistically significant results and more details about these companies are shown in 
Appendices 4.3 and 4.4. At 1% level of significance, there are two (1.11%) companies 
show that equity traders are able to make profit in the existence of noise trader risk. 
When we compare the results to the results that we obtain from mu, we find that 
behavioural error provides fewer opportunities to profit from noise traders. 
Furthermore, if we compare our results with Davidson and Ramiah (2010) who show 
that there are six (out of a sample of 46) companies, we find that behavioural error in 
China provides fewer opportunities to profit than in Australia.  
 
As expected we find that the short run periods produce more opportunities to profit 
than the long run. For instance, there are 27 (15.52%) companies that exhibit a 
relationship between BE and return in 2002 at 10% level of confidence compared to 
only three companies over the long run (see period 2002-2010). Within the same level 
of confidence, we find that the sub periods between 2003 and 2009 contain a larger 
number of firms than the long run period. The same observation is made across the 
 175 
 
other levels of confidence. In that sense, the results are similar to what is observed in 
the mu analysis. The implication is that noise trading across smaller period of time is 
more profitable. 
 
4.4.4 SYSTEMATIC NOISE EFFECT AND CASH NOISE EFFECT WHEN USING 
LAGGED CHANGE IN BEHAVIOURAL ERROR 
As can be seen in Table 4.2 there is only one (0.56%) firm with Systematic Noise 
Effect in the long run at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively, and it is 
observed in Northeast Electric Development Company Limited (see Appendix 4.3). It 
implies that noisy investment strategy is profitable only within this company in the 
long run.  
 
The observed results of SNE in the individual years suggest that equity traders have 
higher probability to earn abnormal profit by increasing their risk exposure in the 
short run than in the long run at 10% level of significance (see Table 4.2). Moreover, 
we find similar observations at 5% and 1% level of significance in some of the sub 
periods. Appendix 4.4 shows that there are 42 companies which exhibit the short run 
SNE. For example, in Northeast Securities Company Limited profitable noisy 
investment strategies are observed in 2002, 2004 and 2006.  
 
As for the long run Cash Noise Effect, we find evidence in two (1.11%) companies at 
10% level of significance, two (1.11%) firms at 5% level of significance and one 
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(0.56%) companies at 1% level of confidence (refer to Table 4.1). The details about 
these companies are reported in Appendices 4.3 and 4.4 and examples of these 
companies are Sound Environmental Resources Company Limited and Xiandai 
Investment Company Limited.  
 
The observations about short run CNE (see Table 4.2) suggest that there is relatively 
higher probability of making positive return when adopting contrarian investment 
strategy (that is by opposing noise traders) when compared to the long run (except for 
2010). Similar observations are made at 5% and 1% level of significance in some of 
the sub periods. Appendix 4.4 shows that there are 48 companies which exhibit short 
run CNE. For example, Luxi Chemical Group Company Limited has CNE in 2006 
and 2009. In addition, there are 19 companies with combination of SNE and CNE (see 
Appendix 4.4) and one example is Henan Shen Huo Coal Industry and Electricity 
Power Company Limited which experienced SNE in 2008 and CNE in 2005, 2006 
and 2007.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
While Chapter Three shows that there is a large proportion of the noise traders on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, this chapter reports that there is relatively lower 
proportion of companies where noise trader risk affects returns. Another lesson for 
investors is that investors have higher probabilities to profit from noise traders in the 
short run than in the long run. Therefore the estimation period is a crucial element 
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when trading on noise. The third important lesson is that investors should be careful 
when choosing the measure of noise trader risk as the probabilities to profit from 
noise traders can be different. There is relatively stronger evidence that there is 
relationship between noise trader risk and return when measured by mu. In this thesis 
we show that there are more opportunities when noise trader risk is proxied by mu 
instead of behavioural error indicating that information effect should not be ignored. 
Hence, the next chapter explores what kind of information is important to assess. The 
fourth lesson is that the presence of CNE and SNE suggests that investors should be 
aware of which noisy investment strategy they should adopt. The final conclusion is 
that there are opportunities to profit from noise traders in China but arbitrageurs must 
choose the right tools to do so. 
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Appendix 4.1: Relationship between Lagged Mu and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.1, '() 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGXI GUITANG 0.09 0.90 0.23 2.13 4.45 1.28* -3.27*** -4.38 4.28 1.02 
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL -0.18 1.68 -1.86 1.21 1.87 -0.43 -2.42 3.53 -1.60 -0.25 
TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC -0.55 -2.79* -2.13 3.93* -2.48 -0.91 -5.99 -1.02 -7.47* 0.61 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH 0.52 -1.84 -2.89 2.40 4.21 0.17 2.51 0.17 1.41 1.60 
GUOXING RONGDA RLST -0.50 -0.55 -1.15 -0.21 2.73 4.67 -6.03*** -0.86 -2.62 2.08 
HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  -0.48 -5.45*** 0.29 1.68 1.86 0.45 -2.11 -0.96 3.17 -0.76 
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. 0.56 0.50 2.57*** -1.16 3.14 -1.24 -1.11 -3.42 2.21 1.82 
JIZHONG ENERGY RES. -0.08 -2.94** 1.05 4.34 -1.41 -0.50 0.23 7.42 -2.85* 0.01 
XUANHUA CON.MCH. 0.30 -2.10** 2.03 1.02 1.65 1.14 5.99* -0.93 1.51 0.39 
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. -0.31 -0.15 -1.48 -1.80 4.52 -1.53 -5.81 10.33 3.43 2.97 
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. 0.17 -2.52** -2.58 1.39 2.25 0.63 1.74 -17.32** -0.83 1.14 
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE 1.01* 0.88 3.87 4.46* 3.46 18.04*** 0.87 4.44 -6.31 0.08 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  0.12 0.63 -5.94* -3.20 -2.73 6.71** -5.55 4.93 0.95 3.19 
SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  0.06 -1.60 0.41 0.66 4.30* 6.04** -0.71 3.33 -4.76 -2.00 
SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. 0.29 -4.38** 3.48*** 3.94 -2.61 4.18 -8.36*** 0.29 0.72 7.11** 
SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION 0.03 -4.53 2.58 4.63 -0.15 1.42 5.01* 4.72 -1.07 -0.24 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  -0.82 -4.72 2.06 0.70 2.55 -9.28*** -8.54** 7.14 0.01*** -8.48*** 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. 0.93 -0.83 -1.64 2.33 -0.90 -0.22 3.19 1.86 -3.13 1.01 
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE -0.88* -2.42 -2.32 0.21 -0.59 -2.98 3.37 2.92 -9.05* -2.79** 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 0.64 -2.25** -0.15 0.08 -1.52 2.33 1.31 1.90 -4.28 1.70 
GUANGDONG GOWORLD  -0.04 -1.45* -3.17 -0.90 0.87 -4.17 2.87 -13.03** -3.37 1.84 
SOUND ENV.RESOURCES  -0.29 -2.23*** -2.73*** -1.35 -4.46* 1.43 1.40 -1.76 0.48 -0.89 
DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) 0.60 0.26 -8.07*** 0.71 2.06 2.34 2.27 4.58 -3.21 -0.21 
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  0.43 1.31 -5.79 2.06 1.59 -2.38 2.14 -4.51 4.17 -0.68 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 4.1: Relationship between Lagged Mu and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.1, '() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 0.03 -1.48 -5.52 -2.13 -1.61 0.73 0.97 -0.44 -2.07 0.97 
CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. 0.00 0.89 -0.01 -0.37 1.63 4.97 0.35 -3.34 -8.34 -0.44 
WULIANGYE YIBIN   0.41 2.07 1.93 0.78 -1.51 0.30 0.57 4.86 1.97 1.37 
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS -0.50 -1.04 -4.30 3.68 2.04 0.88 1.37 0.93 -2.46 0.78 
HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. 0.07 -0.80 0.56 1.19 -1.89 2.62*** 1.52** 1.26 -1.34 -0.31*** 
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. -0.08 -1.49 -2.11 1.06 0.76 -2.61 0.73 -1.24 3.41 1.53 
ANGANG STEEL -0.17 -1.63 -6.10*** 0.47 -2.00 -1.69 3.05 0.78 -0.04 1.84 
XIANDAI INVESTMENT -0.13 -2.05* -1.24 0.55 1.60 4.18*** 2.17 2.53 3.02 0.39 
TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  -1.29* -4.00* 7.45 -6.42 -4.54 4.01 0.99 3.21 2.87 2.72 
ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  -0.07 0.49 -1.41 1.65 -1.97 1.34 0.91 2.34 1.03 -1.91 
HUNAN VALIN STEEL  -0.24 -1.23 -0.26 2.00 -2.86* -0.01 2.32 -1.99 -1.92 1.59 
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. 0.52 -1.57 3.33 1.82 1.56 1.32 2.90 -2.38 -4.10 2.08 
CSG HOLDING  0.01 -5.28*** -2.40 0.91 1.48 0.45 -0.32 -10.16* -4.25 -0.60 
COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) -0.61 -2.42 -0.60 2.76 5.02 1.10 -1.72 4.02 -6.66 0.82 
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  0.55 -2.64 0.56 2.72 5.74 0.11 -0.87 -1.51 2.75* 0.60 
SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. 0.32 -2.13 -1.01 1.48 1.66 1.76 -10.55** 3.39 -16.20* 3.89 
CHINA BAOAN GP. 0.27 0.99 0.57 0.75 -1.07 2.28 2.41 19.86** -7.66* 1.40 
GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. 0.06 -2.48* 2.19 -3.72* -4.20 2.05 -1.98 1.98 -0.42 1.19 
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. -0.18 -1.21 -0.54 0.00 -5.06* -0.91 0.52 -1.83 -6.40 2.61 
GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. -0.37 2.13*** -0.83 -0.34 0.77 3.49 4.14 4.97 -1.38 -1.96 
JIANGLING MOTORS 0.46 1.35 1.62 1.17 -0.04 -2.47 1.97 3.17 -3.78 0.79 
HONG YUAN SECS. -0.11 -6.95*** -0.69 1.10 -3.32 8.60*** -2.00 1.61 0.56 0.99 
LUZHOU LAO JIAO -0.40 0.85 0.75 0.74 -1.20 1.73 -2.35* -2.14 -3.41 0.49 
NORTHEAST PHARM.  -0.48 -1.44 0.35 -0.47 -2.75 0.00 1.41 -6.80*** 0.82 -0.67 
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Appendix 4.1: Relationship between Lagged Mu and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.1, '() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  -0.19 -1.39 -3.47 0.96 0.47 -2.10 -4.56 0.54 -1.01 -0.06 
GREE ELECT.APP. 0.20 3.70*** 0.16 2.09 -1.12 0.73 1.88 -5.83 -0.87 2.20 
TIANJIN TEDA 0.10 -3.80* -6.60** 1.01 -2.90 -3.31 4.90 -1.07 3.08 2.89 
SHANDONG JINLING MNG. -0.58 1.09 -4.66 5.97 1.26 -0.40 -3.72 4.23 -0.08 -0.80 
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 0.24 -4.53*** -4.68 4.45* 1.70 2.55 6.44** -12.34 -0.67 -0.37 
SOFTTO 0.42 -3.65** -0.72 -0.21 -2.90 2.74 0.85 0.07 -2.51 -0.66 
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 0.35 -1.96 0.25 2.02 5.52* -0.82 8.95** -0.12 -4.30 1.90 
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. -0.06 -1.70 1.26 1.58 2.61 -0.50 -2.39 1.63 -0.62 4.72 
QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  0.81* 0.88 0.76 -2.29 2.20 3.04 0.23 10.03*** 0.90 1.44 
HUAWEN MDA.INV. -0.27 -0.70 1.99 1.20 -2.39*** 5.34*** 3.79 2.27 -2.20 -2.32 
FAW CAR  -1.69*** -3.36** 1.80 -1.56 -2.04 2.51 4.89 -3.08 -0.63 0.66 
YUNNAN ALUM.  0.39 0.77 -0.48 2.59*** -2.22 10.08 3.77* 6.81 0.02 -0.08 
SHANDONG HAIHUA 0.03 -1.91 -2.01 1.43 0.74 -1.57 3.17 -2.48 -7.44** 1.49 
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. 0.46 -2.45 0.34 0.69 3.69 0.64 3.97** -5.69 -0.16 1.00 
HEBEI IRON & STEEL  -0.05 -1.04 -6.83** 3.19 -1.20 1.51 3.72 8.35*** -3.33 0.29 
FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. -0.21 -0.70 1.51 -0.11 1.92 2.56 -0.88 7.13 3.44 1.82 
GD MIDEA HOLDING  0.57* 0.84 -1.40 2.49** 1.32 -2.42* 0.26 -3.22** 2.94 0.72 
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  -0.31 -0.54 -0.36 1.31 -1.10 0.23 -0.12 -0.54 -1.41 2.20 
KONKA GROUP  -0.03 -1.55 -2.63 1.78* 0.35 2.16 2.53 2.37 -5.87 -3.51 
SHN.FOUNTAIN  -0.11 1.49 -0.34 1.66* 3.12 -2.97 3.21** -0.71 4.40 -0.40 
XI'AN AIR.INTL. 0.07 -1.94 -1.10 2.40 5.23 0.07 1.95 0.84 13.24** 1.65 
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN -0.60 -1.54 5.11 1.24 3.76 2.05 1.39 -1.78 1.95 -1.18 
ZTE  0.45 -2.20 -0.36 1.11 0.51 1.45 -0.03 -8.49 5.21 -3.15 
GUOYUAN SECURITIES -0.21 -1.80* 1.59 1.03 -0.38 2.31*** 11.98 0.67 -2.45 -0.17 
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Appendix 4.1: Relationship between Lagged Mu and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.1, '() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. -0.17 -0.04 -5.24** 1.75 1.19 0.58 1.01 -2.05 2.26 -4.01 
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 0.39 -3.03 0.77 0.34 4.84*** 0.44 3.24* -3.51 1.05 0.16 
XINXING DUCTILEIRON 0.21 0.01 4.60 -0.59 0.78 1.02 9.52* 0.79 -3.07 -2.06 
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 0.15 -3.22* -10.83*** 2.53 1.07 -0.84 3.82 -2.91 -2.29 -0.36 
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. -0.34 -0.98 0.91 1.85 0.57 -0.70 0.99 6.02 1.10 -4.08** 
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  0.38 1.07 -0.04 0.67 1.74 0.60 0.22 1.02 -2.04 -0.92 
WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  0.70 -1.22 -6.34** 1.55 -4.48*** 0.43 6.38* 0.12 1.08 5.87*** 
SUNING UNIVERSAL  -0.37 -3.53** -4.85 10.86** -2.98 1.10 6.50*** -7.70 1.80 0.53 
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. -0.31 -0.45 -6.76 4.55 -8.82*** 1.31 0.20 4.15 0.22 1.08 
BEIJING SHOUGANG -0.30 -3.47** -0.99 0.52 -1.99 4.86 -0.33 3.65 -0.74 0.20 
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. -0.19 -2.60 -2.62 2.31 -1.14 0.02 -3.95 -3.00 -1.23 0.46 
SGIS SONGSHAN  -0.23 -2.14* 5.06 4.70 0.25 -0.46 0.79 -1.78 2.10 1.57 
CHINA UNION HDG. 0.09 0.69 -2.97 0.59 1.75 1.37 1.58 8.18 -2.97 2.96 
CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 0.79 -2.36 -3.39 3.62 -3.45 0.75 4.58 3.91*** 1.00 -1.34 
TAIFU INDUSTRY  0.25 -3.68* -1.22 0.50*** 0.77 0.80 2.37* -2.03 -4.21 0.67 
SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 0.01 -2.57 -2.10 4.87* -1.87 0.71 1.88 -3.22 -8.88 -1.80 
ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. -0.45 -2.22 -1.61 0.95 3.73 -0.05 0.48 3.63 0.54 -3.83** 
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  -0.09 -1.37* -1.57 3.73* -1.84 -0.66 2.72 0.89 2.56 4.84 
MINSHENG INV.MAN. 0.66 0.07 -0.73 2.02 -0.94 N/A 4.24* -8.92 -3.00 -0.34 
HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. 0.27 -1.24 -3.67* 4.44* 2.24 2.38 2.38 -2.61 1.92 -0.45 
WUXI LITTLE SWAN  -0.56 2.64* 1.36 -1.63 -0.47 -4.61 0.62 -3.15 -9.42 3.37 
KINGDREAM PUBLIC  0.15 -2.15 -1.06 3.26 0.79 1.94 0.18 -4.73 15.85* 0.35 
TANGSHAN CERAMIC  -0.17 -3.63** -0.16 1.88 2.57 -1.41 -5.67 0.86 2.83 3.80* 
HUAYI COMPR.  0.21 -0.16 1.16 6.57*** 4.87 -2.36 9.19*** -0.15 1.61 1.33 
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Appendix 4.1: Relationship between Lagged Mu and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.1, '() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHANDONG SHENGLI  -0.91** -1.21 -0.57 1.63 2.58 -1.95* -0.18 5.30 -9.42* 0.52 
YUYUAN HOLDING -0.29 -2.64* -1.41 2.28** 1.76 0.92 -7.17* -2.88*** -2.09 4.15 
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  0.09 -0.23 1.27 1.60 -0.14 -1.38 3.03 -2.27 -1.21 -3.12 
JILIN CHM.FIBRE -0.33 -5.13** -1.76 2.94 0.45 -1.28 7.67** 6.76 -1.14 -0.80 
NANJING ZHONGBEI -0.40 -3.02*** -2.08 2.07 -8.14** -10.98*** -0.83 -0.10 -0.74 -0.20 
CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  -0.03 -0.41 1.49 4.40** -0.27 -1.42 -1.75 5.89 -2.20 3.95** 
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. -0.51 -0.88 0.65 0.88 2.34 -1.10 7.08*** -0.30 -7.63* -3.60 
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. 0.02 -0.21 -3.90 1.05 -4.43** 2.63 9.02** 3.76 -3.21* -1.29 
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. -0.30 -1.04 -4.90** 4.53* -0.01 -3.38 -1.22 -1.43 6.72 1.09 
WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. -0.57 -2.86*** -2.72* 0.48 5.60 -0.64 1.70 15.58* -8.40* 0.77 
LVJING REALESTATE -0.36 -0.73 1.59 2.95 -1.45 -0.21 -0.90 -3.15 -4.56 -1.48 
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. -0.70 -2.07 -3.29*** 0.55 3.83 -1.29 -0.87 3.78 4.36 0.76 
HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  -0.38 -2.32* 2.51 2.95* 6.49 -0.40 6.25* -3.19 -4.28 -2.11 
SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. -0.75 -4.86 -3.85* -1.45 -1.47 0.94 -1.92*** N/A 16.74 -0.32 
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  0.31 2.22** -0.08 3.61** -0.77 1.04 5.37 3.33 0.31 3.11 
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  -0.32 -0.50 -1.76 0.86 -2.60 2.34*** 6.09 -4.14 2.54 -2.31 
CHINA CALXON GROUP  -0.14 -3.03** 6.11 -0.45 1.83 -1.19 N/A -0.50 3.54 3.62 
SOUTH HUITON 0.55 -1.32 0.41 8.41* 2.72 -0.94 5.52** 6.68*** -1.44 0.68 
JIANGSU HUAXICUN -0.89** -1.83 -0.72 1.55 6.44 -0.18 3.16 -1.12 -2.67 2.02 
SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  -1.25* -5.34** -4.82** 4.43 -3.15 0.53 -5.52** -3.62 7.12** 1.29 
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) -0.24 -2.49 -0.92 0.60 1.16 -3.98*** 7.66*** 7.85*** -2.29 0.83 
SHENZHEN AIRPORT  -0.02 -1.40 -1.45 2.04* -1.76 -0.98 0.04 0.76 -2.08 -0.87 
BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 0.09 -4.53** -1.40* 0.54 0.97 0.44 0.53 5.45 -2.59 2.26 
BENGANG STEEL PLATES  0.02 -2.39 0.24 2.25 -1.38 2.41 11.35** 0.15 -5.01 1.00 
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Appendix 4.1: Relationship between Lagged Mu and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.1, '() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  0.38 -1.58 0.47 2.68* 0.12 0.01 2.61* 4.97 0.97 3.64 
SUNDIRO HOLDING -0.52 -1.07 -0.83 0.00 3.30* -2.77** -3.26 2.04 -2.08 -1.02 
AN HUI WENERGY  -0.02 -1.39 2.52 1.66 2.60 4.02 3.39 0.41 -0.75 -2.01 
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  -0.48 -2.74 -3.33 2.93 -1.67 2.79 3.35 -8.09 3.28 1.00 
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. -0.11 -2.70 -1.55 -0.28 2.65 0.11 -6.84 2.71 0.94 0.19 
SHENYANG CHM.IND.  1.11** -4.38** -1.02 3.11** 2.88 1.22 3.50*** 1.93 -0.37 3.88*** 
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  -0.20 -0.45 -4.25 3.05 2.22 -2.30 -0.08 7.30 -8.28 0.34 
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  0.19 -2.69 -0.20 3.78 0.33 2.39 -1.38 -2.70 -6.06 0.51 
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  -0.49 -0.88 -0.50 1.14 2.56 -0.16 -2.51*** -0.10 8.27 -1.49 
SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN.    -0.28 -1.71 -1.14 0.47 -2.17 0.84 2.05 0.30 5.80* 0.21 
CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  0.57 0.54 -2.24 5.01 2.61 4.61 2.99** -0.94 5.64 2.05 
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  0.07 -0.44 2.92 -1.43 5.11* -0.02*** 1.39 0.92 4.19** 0.24 
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  0.26*** -0.18*** -0.82 1.01 0.48 -2.92* 0.01 1.96 -1.54 1.44 
TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. -0.21 -1.13 -1.57 0.33 3.26 6.77 -0.10 0.94 -0.61 -0.24 
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  -0.23 -2.16*** 5.97 1.55 -2.83 0.11 -0.55 -2.26 5.42 0.85 
YANG GUANG  0.07 -1.25 -1.09 2.86 -2.95 1.78 3.21 2.54 -5.25 -0.59 
JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. -0.72 -3.97* -0.60 -1.24 -0.82 -0.89 -4.68 0.28 -8.62 1.56 
JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. -0.25 -0.86 0.87 2.12 0.70 4.48*** 4.75 -0.80 -7.87 0.78 
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. -0.37 1.26 4.76** -2.00 1.15 4.19 -0.01 0.00*** 2.02 1.33 
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  -0.17 -0.64 -0.22 0.90 1.10 -0.07 -0.75 -1.14 -6.39** -0.84 
CHINA VANKE  0.07 -0.22 0.60 0.31 3.64 -1.72 0.54 1.56 -1.20 -0.13 
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. -0.26 -0.05 -2.24 2.52* -0.92 2.61 2.08 3.74 -2.03 0.44 
LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU 0.45 0.86 -3.46 3.04 2.60 0.76 2.20 4.71** 1.86 0.22 
SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  -0.47 -2.44 -2.61 2.70* 2.77 2.29 -3.57 0.20 -1.40 -0.51 
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Appendix 4.1: Relationship between Lagged Mu and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.1, '() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
RONGAN PROPERTY -0.16 1.69* -2.22 3.72* -0.46 0.00*** N/A N/A 13.30 -0.73 
XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. -0.36 -0.83 0.72 2.03 0.02 -1.78 1.55 -1.28 -13.00** -1.15 
SHN.TELLUS HLDG. 0.53 -2.13 -1.85 1.74 -6.36*** 0.83 2.34 -0.53 6.48* 2.56 
SHN.FIYTA HDG. 0.46 0.82 -5.15 1.07 -2.72 3.42* 4.26 -1.05 9.95 3.34 
SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 0.01 -0.94 -0.41 0.07 0.73 0.00 -0.59 3.66 1.31 3.71** 
SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  -0.09 -2.53 -2.46 1.60 0.09 -2.07 7.90*** -0.38 -7.91 2.97 
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  -1.08*** -1.22 -1.02 1.84 0.01 2.49 -3.43 3.13 4.95 3.15 
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. -0.38 -0.37 -1.02 1.88 -5.01 -0.83 -0.04 2.39 -9.65* 3.06 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. -0.41 -3.90*** 3.90 0.12 1.19 4.81 1.42 -2.28 -12.75 0.44 
GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.)  0.15 -1.03 -0.87 1.90 2.06 -5.55 7.26* 3.96 -4.12** 1.57 
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  -0.34 0.17 -1.49 -0.14 -0.28 -1.96 -0.93 3.12 -1.50 1.19 
HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. 0.43 0.85 1.27 -0.41 -1.32 0.63 6.90 0.25 1.88 0.41 
SHENZHEN SEG  0.67 -2.64 -1.76 2.57*** 2.26 1.60 -0.79 1.98 -0.56 5.21** 
DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE  -0.53 -1.46 -1.96 3.00 0.95 4.77** -6.90 5.43 -4.60 0.16 
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. -1.76*** -6.99*** -7.92*** 0.96 1.78 -17.14* -3.21 1.37 -2.34* -0.50 
SEARAINBOW HOLDING  0.09 -0.47 -5.94 0.47 5.44*** 3.05 -4.93** 0.50 -7.02 0.06 
BEIJING NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC  -0.79 -3.95* -2.01 3.86 7.41* -2.94 4.93* -7.69* -5.03* -2.60 
HUBEI FUXING SCTC. 0.19 -0.02 -2.19 1.67* -0.84 1.87 0.07 0.71 -7.60 -0.48 
YELAND GROUP -0.51 -0.57 -2.38 -1.47 3.85 -2.20 1.44 -7.57 -6.92 0.57 
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  -0.19 -1.62 -1.74 2.77* -2.64 3.91 -0.63 4.03 -0.73 0.23 
YUNNAN TIN  0.11 -2.31 -2.71 -0.58 -0.42 1.33 2.43 1.90 -12.99* 1.42 
ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  -0.24 -0.17 -2.23 0.58 -0.68 -2.00 1.36 -2.30 -5.04 0.97 
SHANXI XISHAN  0.29 -8.46*** -1.94 -0.72 0.92 -2.08 -1.49 -1.27 -4.55 1.24 
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT 0.16 -4.56 0.74 5.37* 4.77* -1.66 1.41 5.83 -0.69 4.92** 
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Appendix 4.1: Relationship between Lagged Mu and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.1, '() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. -0.17 -2.47* 0.29 -0.19 -2.60 -6.86*** 1.36 6.05*** 4.04* -1.30 
YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  -0.38 -11.79 -1.35 0.76 -3.24 0.05 -1.65 -4.26 -1.82 5.08 
CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. -0.33 -1.03 -2.57 -2.15 2.17 -2.44 2.83 5.65 -7.50 -1.05 
JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET  -0.54 -8.41*** -2.81 2.05 -0.38 -0.05 7.12 0.67 2.97 2.44 
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  -0.06 -2.93 0.64 1.51 -0.20 -3.66 3.40 -4.83 1.58 -0.53 
GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  0.44 -4.10** 0.95 2.96 2.68 1.45 1.99* -4.68 -6.13 1.09 
JILIN PWR.SHARE -0.05 N/A N/A -20.46*** -2.83 -0.43 2.99 -3.25 -2.89 6.66*** 
ZHEJIANG NHU -0.38 N/A N/A N/A N/A -2.42 -2.06 1.12 1.00 -0.41 
HAN'S LASER TECH. -0.07 N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.95 0.32 -3.17 -0.12 -2.06 
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 0.49 N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.25 0.75 0.44 5.99** 3.18 
SUNING APPLIANCE  0.45 N/A N/A N/A N/A 13.99*** 2.72* -2.40 1.03 1.92 
HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 0.53 N/A N/A N/A N/A -1.72 0.77 0.92 -9.72* -1.83 
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Appendix 4.2: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Mu 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGXI GUITANG 
     
SNE CNE 
   
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL 
          
TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC 
 
CNE 
 
SNE 
    
CNE 
 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH 
          
GUOXING RONGDA RLST 
      
CNE 
   
HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  
 
CNE 
    
CNE 
   
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. 
  
SNE 
       
JIZHONG ENERGY RES. 
 
CNE 
      
CNE 
 
XUANHUA CON.MCH. 
 
CNE 
    
SNE 
   
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. 
          
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. 
 
CNE 
     
CNE 
  
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE SNE 
  
SNE 
 
SNE 
    
XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  
  
CNE 
  
SNE 
    
SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  
    
SNE SNE 
    
SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. 
 
CNE SNE 
   
CNE 
  
SNE 
SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION 
      
SNE 
   
XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  
     
CNE CNE 
 
SNE CNE 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. 
          
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE CNE 
       
CNE CNE 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 
 
CNE 
        
GUANGDONG GOWORLD  
 
CNE 
     
CNE 
  
SOUND ENV.RESOURCES  
 
CNE CNE 
 
CNE 
     
DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) 
  
CNE 
       
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  
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Appendix 4.2: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Mu (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 
          
CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. 
          
WULIANGYE YIBIN   
          
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS 
          
HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. 
     
SNE SNE 
  
CNE 
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. 
          
ANGANG STEEL 
  
CNE 
       
XIANDAI INVESTMENT 
 
CNE 
   
SNE 
    
TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  CNE CNE 
        
ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  
          
HUNAN VALIN STEEL  
    
CNE 
     
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. 
          
CSG HOLDING  
 
CNE 
     
CNE 
  
COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) 
          
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  
        
SNE 
 
SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. 
      
CNE 
 
CNE 
 
CHINA BAOAN GP. 
       
SNE CNE 
 
GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. 
 
CNE 
 
CNE 
      
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. 
    
CNE 
     
GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. 
 
SNE 
        
JIANGLING MOTORS 
          
HONG YUAN SECS. 
 
CNE 
   
SNE 
    
LUZHOU LAO JIAO 
      
CNE 
   
NORTHEAST PHARM.  
              CNE     
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Appendix 4.2: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Mu (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  
          
GREE ELECT.APP. 
 
SNE 
        
TIANJIN TEDA 
 
CNE CNE 
       
SHANDONG JINLING MNG. 
          
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 
 
CNE 
 
SNE 
  
SNE 
   
SOFTTO 
 
CNE 
        
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 
    
SNE 
 
SNE 
   
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. 
          
QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  SNE 
      
SNE 
  
HUAWEN MDA.INV. 
    
CNE SNE 
    
FAW CAR  CNE CNE 
        
YUNNAN ALUM.  
   
SNE 
  
SNE 
   
SHANDONG HAIHUA 
        
CNE 
 
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. 
      
SNE 
   
HEBEI IRON & STEEL  
  
CNE 
    
SNE 
  
FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. 
          
GD MIDEA HOLDING  SNE 
  
SNE 
 
CNE 
 
CNE 
  
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  
          
KONKA GROUP  
   
SNE 
      
SHN.FOUNTAIN  
   
SNE 
  
SNE 
   
XI'AN AIR.INTL. 
        
SNE 
 
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN 
          
ZTE  
          
GUOYUAN SECURITIES 
  CNE       SNE         
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Appendix 4.2: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Mu (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. 
  
CNE 
       
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 
    
SNE 
 
SNE 
   
XINXING DUCTILEIRON 
      
SNE 
   
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 
 
CNE CNE 
       
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. 
         
CNE 
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  
          
WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  
  
CNE 
 
CNE 
 
SNE 
  
SNE 
SUNING UNIVERSAL  
 
CNE 
 
SNE 
  
SNE 
   
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. 
    
CNE 
     
BEIJING SHOUGANG 
 
CNE 
        
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. 
          
SGIS SONGSHAN  
 
CNE 
        
CHINA UNION HDG. 
          
CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 
       
SNE 
  
TAIFU INDUSTRY  
 
CNE 
 
SNE 
  
SNE 
   
SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 
   
SNE 
      
ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. 
         
CNE 
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  
 
CNE 
 
SNE 
      
MINSHENG INV.MAN. 
      
SNE 
   
HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. 
  
CNE SNE 
      
WUXI LITTLE SWAN  
 
SNE 
        
KINGDREAM PUBLIC  
        
SNE 
 
TANGSHAN CERAMIC  
 
CNE 
       
SNE 
HUAYI COMPR.  
      SNE     SNE       
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Appendix 4.2: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Mu (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHANDONG SHENGLI  CNE 
    
CNE 
  
CNE 
 
YUYUAN HOLDING 
 
CNE 
 
SNE 
  
CNE CNE 
  
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  
          
JILIN CHM.FIBRE 
 
CNE 
    
SNE 
   
NANJING ZHONGBEI 
 
CNE 
  
CNE CNE 
    
CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  
   
SNE 
     
SNE 
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. 
      
SNE 
 
CNE 
 
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. 
    
CNE 
 
SNE 
 
CNE 
 
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. 
  
CNE SNE 
      
WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. 
 
CNE CNE 
    
SNE CNE 
 
LVJING REALESTATE 
          
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. 
  
CNE 
       
HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  
 
CNE 
 
SNE 
  
SNE 
   
SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. 
  
CNE 
   
CNE 
   
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  
 
SNE 
 
SNE 
      
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  
     
SNE 
    
CHINA CALXON GROUP  
 
CNE 
        
SOUTH HUITON 
   
SNE 
  
SNE SNE 
  
JIANGSU HUAXICUN CNE 
         
SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  CNE CNE CNE 
   
CNE 
 
SNE 
 
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) 
     
CNE SNE SNE 
  
SHENZHEN AIRPORT  
   
SNE 
      
BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 
 
CNE CNE 
       
BENGANG STEEL PLATES  
            SNE       
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Appendix 4.2: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Mu (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  SNE SNE 
SUNDIRO HOLDING SNE CNE 
AN HUI WENERGY  
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. 
SHENYANG CHM.IND.  SNE CNE SNE SNE SNE 
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  CNE 
SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN. SNE 
CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  SNE 
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  SNE CNE SNE 
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  SNE CNE CNE 
TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. 
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  CNE 
YANG GUANG  
JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. CNE 
JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. SNE 
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. SNE CNE 
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  CNE 
CHINA VANKE  
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. SNE 
LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU SNE 
SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  SNE 
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Appendix 4.2: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Mu (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
RONGAN PROPERTY 
 
SNE 
 
SNE 
 
CNE 
    
XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. 
        
CNE 
 
SHN.TELLUS HLDG. 
    
CNE 
   
SNE 
 
SHN.FIYTA HDG. 
     
SNE 
    
SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 
         
SNE 
SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  
      
SNE 
   
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  CNE 
         
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. 
        
CNE 
 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. 
 
CNE 
        
GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.)  
      
SNE 
 
CNE 
 
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  
          
HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. 
          
SHENZHEN SEG  
   
SNE 
     
SNE 
DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE  
     
SNE 
    
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. CNE CNE CNE 
  
CNE 
  
CNE 
 
SEARAINBOW HOLDING  
    
SNE 
 
CNE 
   
BEIJING NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC  
 
CNE 
  
SNE 
 
SNE CNE CNE 
 
HUBEI FUXING SCTC. 
   
SNE 
      
YELAND GROUP 
          
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  
   
SNE 
      
YUNNAN TIN  
        
CNE 
 
ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  
          
SHANXI XISHAN  
 
CNE 
        
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT 
      SNE SNE         SNE 
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Appendix 4.2: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Mu (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. 
 
CNE 
   
CNE 
 
SNE SNE 
 
YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  
          
CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. 
          
JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET  
 
CNE 
        
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  
          
GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  
 
CNE 
    
SNE 
   
JILIN PWR.SHARE 
   
CNE 
     
SNE 
ZHEJIANG NHU 
          
HAN'S LASER TECH. 
          
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 
        
SNE 
 
SUNING APPLIANCE  
     
SNE SNE 
   
HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 
                CNE   
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Appendix 4.3: Relationship between Lagged BE and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.2, )() 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGXI GUITANG 0.00 0.00 0.19 -0.29*** 0.39 0.13 0.03 0.19 0.55 0.01 
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL 0.01 0.29 -0.16 -0.17 0.05 0.29 -0.03 -0.13 0.35 0.01 
TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.15 -0.02 -0.64 0.00 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.13 -0.34 0.12*** 
GUOXING RONGDA RLST 0.02 0.40* 0.11 0.39 0.35 -0.13 0.05 0.19 0.34 0.01 
HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  -0.01 -0.21 -0.04 -0.05 0.17 0.04 -0.47** 0.08 0.48 -0.02 
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. 0.04 -0.23 0.14 0.25 0.08 0.07 -0.02 -0.29 -0.79* 0.01 
JIZHONG ENERGY RES. -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.39 -0.22 -0.11 -0.05 0.37 -0.19 0.01 
XUANHUA CON.MCH. -0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.46* -0.17 0.31 -0.17 -0.48 0.00 
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. 0.03 -0.19 0.09 0.05 -0.46** -0.01 0.08 0.21 -0.20 0.01 
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. 0.01 0.10 -0.13 0.07 0.36** -0.26 0.07 0.05 -0.30 0.00 
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE 0.00 -0.11 -0.18 0.01 0.59** -0.06 0.07 0.13 -1.46*** 0.00 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  0.01 0.39** 0.29 -0.04 0.06 -0.23 -0.14 -0.01 -0.15 0.01 
SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  0.05 0.06 -0.07 0.24 0.22 -0.02 -0.03 0.48 0.34 0.02 
SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. 0.01 -0.22 -0.05 -0.11 0.51** 0.04 0.04 1.07** 0.29 0.04 
SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION 0.02 -0.23 -0.10 0.20 0.24 -0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.57 0.00 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  -0.01 -0.28 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.18 0.23 0.00*** 0.01*** 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 0.10 0.41 -0.27 -0.03 0.11 -0.39 -0.01 
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE 0.01 -0.26 -0.11 0.36** -0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.38 0.06 0.00 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 0.01 0.22 0.14 -0.21 0.49 0.11 -0.06 -0.48 0.31 0.00 
GUANGDONG GOWORLD  0.00 -0.17 -0.02 -0.39* 0.29 -0.09 -0.08 0.06 -0.13 0.00 
SOUND ENV.RESOURCES  -0.09*** -0.09 -0.18*** -0.02 0.21 -0.18 -0.14 -0.14 -0.22 -0.01 
DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) 0.01 0.32** 0.00 -0.06 0.94*** -0.18 -0.09 0.15 -0.33 0.01 
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  -0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.07 -0.37 -0.33** -0.16 -0.07 -0.82* 0.01 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 4.3: Relationship between Lagged BE and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.2, )() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 0.03 -0.15 0.02 -0.07 0.38 0.11 -0.15 0.17 0.01 -0.04 
CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. 0.04 0.14 0.18*** 0.03 0.38 0.18 0.05 0.47 -0.41 0.00 
WULIANGYE YIBIN   0.01 0.53* 0.06 -0.14 0.09 -0.16 0.19 0.22 0.56 -0.01 
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.26 -0.75** 0.23 0.11 -0.51 -0.01 
HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. -0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.33 -0.01 0.21 -0.12 0.89** 0.00*** 
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.12 -1.03* 0.02 
ANGANG STEEL -0.04 -0.02 -0.34 0.00 -0.11 -0.24 -0.35 -0.26 -0.34 0.02 
XIANDAI INVESTMENT -0.09** 0.00 -0.10 -0.26 -0.43 -0.25 -0.32 -0.28 1.07* 0.02 
TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  -0.04 -0.03 -0.33* -0.18 0.11 -0.24 0.00 0.06 -0.29 0.00 
ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  -0.02 -0.51** 0.02 -0.01 -0.38 0.00 -0.23 0.01 -0.14 0.01 
HUNAN VALIN STEEL  0.02 0.37 0.01 0.24 0.42* -0.25** 0.05 -0.08 0.82* 0.01 
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. -0.05 -0.23 -0.06 -0.03 -0.73** -0.45* -0.41** 0.47* 0.23 0.00 
CSG HOLDING  0.02 0.37 0.03 0.02 -0.37 0.41*** -0.13 0.16 -0.20 0.03 
COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) 0.00 -0.01 -0.21 0.26*** -0.22 -0.06 -0.13 -0.17 0.09 0.01 
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  -0.01 -0.25 -0.10 0.09 0.15 -0.17 -0.02 -0.39 0.29 0.01 
SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. 0.05 -0.15 0.11 0.07 0.22 0.22 -0.08 0.13 0.79* 0.00 
CHINA BAOAN GP. 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 0.06 0.30 -0.15 0.20 -0.38 -0.31 0.02 
GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. 0.01 0.01 -0.20 0.16 -0.09 -0.26 0.32** 0.00 0.19 0.00 
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. 0.03 0.09 0.33* -0.24 0.06 -0.40** 0.22 0.49* 0.24 -0.01 
GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. -0.02 -0.20 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.19 -0.31 -0.37 0.00 
JIANGLING MOTORS -0.01 -0.56 -0.12 -0.22 0.08 -0.47** 0.09 0.30 0.62 0.01 
HONG YUAN SECS. -0.01 -0.26 -0.09 0.25 -0.24 -0.09 -0.22 -0.29 0.58 0.01 
LUZHOU LAO JIAO 0.02 -0.07 0.09 0.35* 0.32 -0.15 -0.03 -0.11 0.27 -0.01 
NORTHEAST PHARM.  0.06 0.02 0.22* 0.03 0.38** 0.38 0.17 0.21 0.24 -0.01 
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Appendix 4.3: Relationship between Lagged BE and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.2, )() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  0.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.17 -0.22 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.00 
GREE ELECT.APP. 0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.09 -0.09 -0.32 0.03 -0.18 0.71 0.00 
TIANJIN TEDA -0.01 -0.11 -0.26* -0.21 0.26 0.39 -0.24 0.08 -0.50 0.01 
SHANDONG JINLING MNG. -0.02 -0.31 -0.38** -0.23 -0.32 0.05 0.11 0.08 -0.48 0.01 
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 0.00 0.16 0.27* 0.08 -0.03 -0.28 -0.18 0.01 -0.66 0.02 
SOFTTO 0.02 -0.33 0.19 0.33* 0.14 -0.51* 0.18 -0.06 -0.44 0.00 
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 0.03 -0.29 0.23 -0.13 0.26 -0.05 0.24 -0.02 -0.43 -0.01 
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. 0.02 -0.18 -0.08 0.04 0.48 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.36 0.04 
QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  0.02 -0.28*** 0.06 0.14 -0.32 0.21 -0.01 -0.11 0.45 0.04 
HUAWEN MDA.INV. 0.03 -0.15 0.44** -0.04 -0.16 -0.02 -0.23 0.07 0.24 -0.02 
FAW CAR  -0.02 -0.25 -0.23 0.11 -0.15 0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.18 -0.01 
YUNNAN ALUM.  -0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.11 -0.07 -0.59*** -0.08 -0.22 0.01 0.02 
SHANDONG HAIHUA -0.01 -0.22 -0.06 -0.10 -0.35 0.09 0.27 0.12 -0.09 0.02 
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. -0.01 0.82*** -0.12 -0.09 -0.50* -0.26 -0.03 0.40 0.35 0.01 
HEBEI IRON & STEEL  -0.02 -0.55*** -0.14 -0.26 -0.04 -0.22 -0.27 -0.08*** -0.08 0.01 
FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. 0.00 -0.34* 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.26 -0.23 -0.15 0.52 0.01 
GD MIDEA HOLDING  -0.05 -0.13 0.11 -0.40** 0.15 -0.16 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.00 
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  -0.03 -0.19 -0.11 -0.29* -0.19 -0.14 -0.04 -0.15 -0.70 0.00 
KONKA GROUP  0.02 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.46 -0.14 -0.35 0.08 0.15 0.03 
SHN.FOUNTAIN  -0.04 -0.29 -0.08 -0.33* 0.03 -0.05 0.07 -0.22 -0.40 0.00 
XI'AN AIR.INTL. 0.05 -0.27 0.23 0.17 0.26 -0.48 0.13 0.11 0.53 -0.01 
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN 0.00 0.21 -0.06 0.04 -0.12 0.16 -0.40** -0.42 0.32 0.01 
ZTE  0.00 0.20 -0.28* 0.24 0.01 -0.11 0.29 -0.08 0.43 0.00 
GUOYUAN SECURITIES -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.25 -0.03 0.35 -0.02 
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Appendix 4.3: Relationship between Lagged BE and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.2, )() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. -0.03 -1.26*** 0.13 -0.20 0.00 -0.34 -0.26 -0.07 -0.25 0.01 
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.26 0.20 -0.12 0.17 0.02 0.01 
XINXING DUCTILEIRON 0.00 -0.19 -0.29* -0.07 -0.24 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.32 0.00 
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.62*** 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.01 
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. 0.04 0.66*** 0.78*** 0.06 0.35 -0.07 0.08 -0.07 -0.26 -0.01 
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  -0.03 -0.19 -0.33** -0.20 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 0.11 0.57 0.00 
WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.17 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.42 -0.01 
SUNING UNIVERSAL  0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 0.08 0.17 0.04 -0.43 0.01 
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.19 0.08 -0.30 -0.36 -0.01 
BEIJING SHOUGANG 0.02 -0.15 0.05 0.24 0.46 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.07 0.00 
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.79** 0.26 0.18 -0.45 -0.11 -0.41 0.01 
SGIS SONGSHAN  -0.01 -0.72*** -0.24 -0.20 -0.34 0.02 0.07 0.02 -0.35 0.01 
CHINA UNION HDG. 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.32 0.03 0.45 -0.08 0.00 
CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 0.01 0.03 -0.32*** 0.00 0.21 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.68 0.01 
TAIFU INDUSTRY  0.03 0.18 0.16 0.00*** 0.33 0.22 -0.05 0.00 -0.62 -0.01 
SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.24 -0.02 0.34 0.02 0.40 -0.14 0.00 
ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. 0.00 -0.42 0.01 -0.01 -0.15 0.20* 0.00 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.07 0.20 -0.16 -0.13 0.02 
MINSHENG INV.MAN. 0.04 0.43*** 0.04 -0.30 0.83*** 0.07 -0.08 0.12 0.20 -0.01 
HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. 0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.42 0.01 -0.06 -1.18** -0.01 
WUXI LITTLE SWAN  -0.06 0.51* 0.02 -0.23 -0.25 -0.22 0.09 -0.04 0.42 0.01 
KINGDREAM PUBLIC  0.04 -0.06 -0.08 0.39** -0.21 -0.08 0.07 0.10 -0.15 0.01 
TANGSHAN CERAMIC  0.01 -0.28 0.04 -0.34* 0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.02 
HUAYI COMPR.  0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.33 -0.13 0.13 0.08 -0.24 0.00 
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Appendix 4.3: Relationship between Lagged BE and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.2, )() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHANDONG SHENGLI  0.02 0.24 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.02 -0.13 0.23 0.00 
YUYUAN HOLDING -0.03 -0.55 -0.09 -0.03 0.40*** 0.29 0.09 0.00 -0.36 0.03 
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.18 0.28 -0.33 0.17 0.26 -0.23 0.03 
JILIN CHM.FIBRE -0.01 -0.39 0.06 0.33 -0.12 -0.13 -0.30 -0.03 -0.59 0.01 
NANJING ZHONGBEI 0.01 0.14 0.02 -0.06 0.49** 0.26 -0.24 0.11 -0.42 0.00 
CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  0.00 -0.21 0.12 0.01 0.27 -0.18 0.16 -0.01 -0.47 0.01 
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. 0.01 -0.10 -0.28 0.03 0.18 -0.10 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.02 
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. -0.03 -0.33 -0.25 0.14 -0.05 0.18 -0.14 -0.02 -0.27 0.00 
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. 0.04 -0.34 0.24 0.08 0.35 0.02 -0.17*** 0.31 -2.30*** -0.03 
WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. 0.00 -0.19 -0.06 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.07 -0.64 -0.01 
LVJING REALESTATE -0.01 0.13 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.19 -0.30 -0.14 0.01 
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. 0.00 0.46*** -0.09 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.13 -0.08 -0.35 0.01 
HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  -0.02 -0.25 -0.01 -0.12 0.32 0.13 -0.52*** -0.67*** -0.28 0.01 
SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.31 0.07 -0.19 0.00*** NA 0.57 0.12 
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  0.00 0.08 0.20 -0.14 0.10 -0.15 -0.02 -0.16 -0.99 0.00 
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  0.01 0.14 -0.10 0.47** -0.25 0.02 0.28 -0.08 -0.34 -0.02 
CHINA CALXON GROUP  0.02 0.14 -0.19 -0.15 0.43* -0.11 NA 2.74 -0.85 0.03 
SOUTH HUITON 0.03 -0.22 0.30 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.27 0.01 0.13 0.00 
JIANGSU HUAXICUN -0.04 0.28 -0.05 -0.46** -0.14 -0.37* 0.00 0.16 -0.22 -0.01 
SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  0.03 -0.06 0.14 0.35** 0.51** 0.40 0.08 0.10 -0.46 0.00 
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) -0.02 -0.26 -0.03 -0.15 0.53** -0.12*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.17 0.00 
SHENZHEN AIRPORT  -0.03 -0.25 -0.12 0.09 -0.23 -0.51** -0.07 -0.19 0.08 0.01 
BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 0.00 -0.23 -0.07 0.12 0.21 0.07 -0.17 -0.07 0.10 0.01 
BENGANG STEEL PLATES  0.00 0.17 -0.07 -0.31 0.19 -0.33 0.08 0.03 -0.15 0.01 
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Appendix 4.3: Relationship between Lagged BE and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.2, )() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  0.04 -0.23 -0.20 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.13 0.41 0.82* 0.00 
SUNDIRO HOLDING -0.04 -0.31 -0.03 -0.20 0.22 -0.14 0.11 -0.12 -0.42 0.00 
AN HUI WENERGY  -0.05 -0.35 -0.21 -0.24 -0.28 -0.27 0.18 -0.17 -0.99** 0.03 
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  0.01 -0.20 0.25** 0.06 0.49 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.52 -0.01 
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. -0.05 -0.34* -0.41*** -0.37 -0.06 -0.38 0.06 -0.07 -0.37 0.01 
SHENYANG CHM.IND.  -0.01 -0.27 0.02 0.06 -0.23 -0.09 0.14 -0.12 0.08 0.01 
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  -0.02 -0.15 -0.06 -0.11 0.07 0.14 0.03 -0.09 0.14 0.00 
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  0.02 0.26 0.00 -0.13 0.32 -0.01 -0.12 0.24 0.32 0.01 
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.30 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.40* -0.80 0.01 
SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN.    -0.02 0.40 -0.23 0.22 0.08 0.15 -0.31 -0.12 0.12 0.01 
CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  0.00 -0.03 0.24*** 0.06 -0.06 -0.17 0.19 -0.03 0.72 -0.01 
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  0.02 0.30*** -0.02 0.32*** 0.10 0.02*** -0.07 0.26 0.43 0.01 
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04 -0.23 0.04 0.31* 0.04 -0.09 0.66 0.00 
TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. -0.01 -0.57*** -0.05 0.25 0.06 -0.08 -0.26 -0.10 -0.51 0.03 
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.33* -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 0.11 0.21 0.00 
YANG GUANG  -0.01 -0.28 0.11 -0.29** 0.22 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 0.07 0.00 
JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. -0.01 0.35 -0.11 0.20 0.35 0.32** -0.13 -0.17 0.21 0.02 
JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. 0.03 -0.18 0.36* 0.04 0.26 -0.04 0.14 0.23 0.09 0.01 
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.11 0.24 -0.08 0.05 0.00*** 1.10* 0.01 
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  0.01 0.17 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.57*** 0.21 0.05 0.50 0.02 
CHINA VANKE  -0.01 0.09 -0.51** 0.59*** -0.15 -0.26 -0.19 -0.46* 0.16 0.01 
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 -0.32 0.08 -0.10 0.10 -0.13 0.01 
LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU -0.05 -0.32 0.02 -0.15 0.39 -0.29 -0.08 0.00 0.16 0.05 
SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  0.03 -0.22 0.00 0.03 0.15 -0.02 0.18 0.32 -0.04 -0.09 
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Appendix 4.3: Relationship between Lagged BE and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.2, )() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
RONGAN PROPERTY 0.03 -0.52*** 0.27* -0.14 -0.01 0.00*** NA NA 0.28 0.01 
XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. 0.06 0.38 0.01 -0.10 0.35* 0.00 0.15 -0.26 0.10 0.01 
SHN.TELLUS HLDG. -0.02 -0.42 -0.14 -0.10 0.18 -0.40* 0.20 0.19 -0.05 0.00 
SHN.FIYTA HDG. 0.01 -0.93*** 0.08 -0.17 0.37* -0.23 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.00 
SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 0.00 0.26 -0.03 -0.09 0.12 -0.55*** 0.05 0.83* -0.52 -0.01 
SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  0.00 -0.34 0.02 0.04 0.31 0.18 0.00 0.06 -0.79 0.01 
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  -0.03 -0.11 0.18 -0.27* 0.39 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 -0.15 0.00 
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. -0.03 -0.60* -0.03 -0.21 -0.35 -0.01 0.43* 0.05 -1.26** -0.01 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. -0.01 -0.68** -0.04 -0.06 0.37* -0.09 0.01 0.11 0.43 -0.02 
GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.)  0.01 -0.17 -0.09 -0.03 0.26 -0.08 0.20 -0.07 -0.23 0.00 
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  -0.02 -0.13 -0.08 0.01 0.24 0.15 -0.14 0.02 -0.47 0.01 
HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. -0.02 -0.16 0.09 -0.04 -0.41 0.18 -0.09 0.06 -0.67* -0.01 
SHENZHEN SEG  0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.21 -0.16 0.11 0.26 0.13 -0.28 0.00 
DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE  -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.13 0.15 0.19 -0.06 -0.08 -1.32** 0.00 
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. -0.01 -0.40*** 0.01 0.17 0.66* -0.34 0.40*** 0.04 -0.16 0.01 
SEARAINBOW HOLDING  -0.01 -0.31 -0.25 0.38** -0.17 -0.28 0.04 0.26 -0.25 0.01 
BEIJING NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC  -0.01 -0.37 0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.23 -0.41 0.12 0.01 
HUBEI FUXING SCTC. -0.04 0.14 -0.16 -0.22 -0.19 0.09 -0.04 -0.16 -0.48 0.01 
YELAND GROUP 0.02 -0.37* 0.10 -0.30 0.32 0.11 0.04 -0.23 -0.54 0.02 
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  -0.01 -0.15 -0.05 -0.24 -0.21 -0.04 -0.06 0.18 -0.48 0.01 
YUNNAN TIN  -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.24 -0.19 0.08 -0.05 0.14 -0.26 0.02 
ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.16 0.37 0.08 -0.07 -0.34 -0.12 -0.01 
SHANXI XISHAN  -0.03 -0.02 -0.20 -0.34 0.20 -0.20 -0.20 0.41 0.52 0.01 
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Appendix 4.3: Relationship between Lagged BE and Return for 180 Companies across different Periods (Slope of Equation 4.2, )() (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT 0.04 0.26 0.03 -0.04 0.19 0.41 0.08 -0.01 -0.13 0.01 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. -0.02 -0.16 0.10 0.50** 0.41** -0.38*** 0.05 -0.10 0.73 -0.10 
YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  -0.08 -0.45** -0.15 -0.25 -0.16 -0.34** 0.03 -0.13 0.19 -0.01 
CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. -0.01 0.48** -0.22 -0.10 -0.02 0.27 0.12 -0.60* 0.10 0.00 
JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.14 -0.26 0.06 0.12 -0.15 0.61 0.01 
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.16 0.23 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.05 
GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  0.00 -0.14 -0.18 -0.03 0.64** 0.02 -0.03 -0.23 -0.23 0.01 
JILIN PWR.SHARE 0.02 N/A -0.12 0.33** 0.07 -0.14 0.33 0.10 0.13 0.00 
ZHEJIANG NHU -0.04 N/A N/A N/A -0.48 -0.38** -0.31 0.51 -0.07 0.01 
HAN'S LASER TECH. 0.04 N/A N/A N/A -0.16 0.23 0.01 -0.13 0.27 0.00 
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 0.01 N/A N/A N/A 0.57 -0.16 -0.08 -0.14 0.74 0.05 
SUNING APPLIANCE  -0.01 N/A N/A N/A 0.90 -0.21 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 
HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 0.02 N/A N/A N/A 0.51* -0.11 0.27 0.06 -0.45 0.00 
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Appendix 4.4: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Change in BE 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGXI GUITANG CNE 
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL 
TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH SNE 
GUOXING RONGDA RLST SNE 
HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  CNE 
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. CNE 
JIZHONG ENERGY RES. 
XUANHUA CON.MCH. SNE 
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. CNE 
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. SNE 
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE SNE CNE 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  SNE 
SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  
SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. SNE SNE 
SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  CNE SNE 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. 
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE SNE 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 
GUANGDONG GOWORLD  CNE 
SOUND ENV.RESOURCES  CNE CNE 
DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) SNE SNE 
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  CNE CNE 
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Appendix 4.4: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Change in BE (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 
CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. SNE 
WULIANGYE YIBIN   SNE 
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS CNE 
HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. SNE CNE 
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. CNE 
ANGANG STEEL 
XIANDAI INVESTMENT CNE SNE 
TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  CNE 
ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  CNE 
HUNAN VALIN STEEL  SNE CNE SNE 
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. CNE CNE CNE SNE 
CSG HOLDING  SNE 
COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) SNE 
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  
SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. SNE 
CHINA BAOAN GP. 
GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. SNE 
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. SNE CNE SNE 
GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. 
JIANGLING MOTORS CNE 
HONG YUAN SECS. 
LUZHOU LAO JIAO SNE 
NORTHEAST PHARM.  SNE SNE 
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Appendix 4.4: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Change in BE (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  
          
GREE ELECT.APP. 
          
TIANJIN TEDA 
  
CNE 
       
SHANDONG JINLING MNG. 
  
CNE 
       
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 
  
SNE 
       
SOFTTO 
   
SNE 
 
CNE 
    
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 
          
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. 
          
QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  
 
CNE 
        
HUAWEN MDA.INV. 
  
SNE 
       
FAW CAR  
          
YUNNAN ALUM.  
     
CNE 
    
SHANDONG HAIHUA 
          
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. 
 
SNE 
  
CNE 
     
HEBEI IRON & STEEL  
 
CNE 
     
CNE 
  
FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. 
 
CNE 
        
GD MIDEA HOLDING  
   
CNE 
      
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  
   
CNE 
      
KONKA GROUP  
          
SHN.FOUNTAIN  
   
CNE 
      
XI'AN AIR.INTL. 
          
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN 
      
CNE 
   
ZTE  
  
CNE 
       
GUOYUAN SECURITIES 
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Appendix 4.4: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Change in BE (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. 
 
CNE 
        
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 
          
XINXING DUCTILEIRON 
  
CNE 
       
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 
     
CNE 
    
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. 
 
SNE SNE 
       
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  
  
CNE 
       
WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  
          
SUNING UNIVERSAL  
          
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. 
          
BEIJING SHOUGANG 
          
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. 
   
SNE 
      
SGIS SONGSHAN  
 
CNE 
        
CHINA UNION HDG. 
          
CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 
  
CNE 
       
TAIFU INDUSTRY  
   
CNE 
      
SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 
          
ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. 
     
SNE 
    
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  
          
MINSHENG INV.MAN. 
 
SNE 
  
SNE 
     
HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. 
        
CNE 
 
WUXI LITTLE SWAN  
 
SNE 
        
KINGDREAM PUBLIC  
   
SNE 
      
TANGSHAN CERAMIC  
   
CNE 
      
HUAYI COMPR.  
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Appendix 4.4: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Change in BE (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHANDONG SHENGLI  
YUYUAN HOLDING SNE 
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  
JILIN CHM.FIBRE 
NANJING ZHONGBEI SNE 
CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. 
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. 
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. CNE CNE 
WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. 
LVJING REALESTATE 
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. SNE 
HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  CNE CNE 
SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. SNE 
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  SNE 
CHINA CALXON GROUP  SNE 
SOUTH HUITON 
JIANGSU HUAXICUN CNE CNE 
SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  SNE SNE 
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) SNE CNE 
SHENZHEN AIRPORT  CNE 
BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 
BENGANG STEEL PLATES  
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Appendix 4.4: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Change in BE (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  
        
SNE 
 
SUNDIRO HOLDING 
          
AN HUI WENERGY  
        
CNE 
 
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  
  
SNE 
       
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. 
 
CNE CNE 
       
SHENYANG CHM.IND.  
          
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  
          
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  
          
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  
       
SNE 
  
SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN.    
          
CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  
  
SNE 
       
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  
 
SNE 
 
SNE 
 
SNE 
    
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  SNE CNE 
   
SNE 
    
TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. 
 
CNE 
        
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  
   
CNE 
      
YANG GUANG  
   
CNE 
      
JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. 
     
SNE 
    
JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. 
  
SNE 
       
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. 
       
CNE SNE 
 
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  
     
CNE 
    
CHINA VANKE  
  
CNE SNE 
   
CNE 
  
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. 
          
LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU 
          
SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  
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Appendix 4.4: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Change in BE (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
RONGAN PROPERTY 
 
CNE SNE 
  
SNE 
    
XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. 
    
SNE 
     
SHN.TELLUS HLDG. 
     
CNE 
    
SHN.FIYTA HDG. 
 
CNE 
  
SNE 
     
SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 
     
CNE 
 
SNE 
  
SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  
          
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  
   
CNE 
      
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. 
 
CNE 
    
SNE 
 
CNE 
 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. 
 
CNE 
  
SNE 
     
GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.)  
          
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  
          
HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. 
        
CNE 
 
SHENZHEN SEG  
          
DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE  
        
CNE 
 
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. 
 
CNE 
  
SNE 
 
SNE 
   
SEARAINBOW HOLDING  
   
SNE 
      
BEIJING NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC  
          
HUBEI FUXING SCTC. 
          
YELAND GROUP 
 
CNE 
        
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  
          
YUNNAN TIN  
          
ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  
          
SHANXI XISHAN  
          
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT 
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Appendix 4.4: Systematic Noise Effect and Cash Noise Effect when using Lagged Change in BE (Continued) 
Companies 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. 
   
SNE SNE CNE 
    
YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  
 
CNE 
   
CNE 
    
CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. 
 
SNE 
     
CNE 
  
JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET  
          
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  
          
GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  
    
SNE 
     
JILIN PWR.SHARE 
   
SNE 
      
ZHEJIANG NHU 
     
CNE 
    
HAN'S LASER TECH. 
          
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 
          
SUNING APPLIANCE  
          
HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 
                    
 
 210 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS, SEASONALITY AND 
MARKET SENTIMENT ON NOISE TRADER RISK 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
There is a rich literature around financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment 
which suggests that they play important roles in the stock market and stock traders’ 
behaviour. Breuss (2011) examines that stock price overshoots during the period of 
global financial crisis (GFC) 2008/2009 in the USA and this triggers a question as to 
whether investors are more irrational during crises including the period of GFC. 
Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) show that contrarian profits tend to be 
higher in certain months, advocating for the need to control for seasonality. However, 
seasonality has never been tested when it comes to explaining noise trader risk. 
Hence, it is important to examine whether investors behave irrationally in certain 
days, months, and holidays. Griffin et al. (2003) find contradictory evidence in 
different international markets, with momentum portfolios generating strong returns 
in weak and strong markets. For these reasons, it is important to check the market 
sentiment effect on the behaviour of noise traders. However, their effects on noise 
traders are currently unexplored. Therefore, the major objective and unique 
contribution of this chapter is to study the behaviour of noise traders in different 
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market conditions like financial crises (such as GFC), seasonality (such as day of the 
week effect, monthly effect and holiday effect) and in bullish/bearish markets.  
 
Section 5.2 describes the data and methodology. Section 5.3 discusses the empirical 
evidence on how global financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment affect the 
noise trader risk while section 5.4 concludes this chapter.  
 
5.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.2.1 DATA  
We use daily noise trader risk (behavioural error and mu) that we calculated in 
Chapter Three. The sample period is from 1 January 2002 to 24 August 2010. It 
should be noted that dummy variables are created to capture financial crises, 
seasonality and market sentiment. In addition, daily turnover ratio, debt to equity 
ratio, sales per share, earnings per share, price to book ratio and capital expenditure 
per share were collected from the DataStream.  
5.2.2 METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we control for the effects financial crisis, seasonality and market 
sentiment on noise trader risk and to that end Equation 5.1 is estimated. Dummy 
variables are used to represent global financial crisis, seasonality and market 
sentiment.  
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NTRi,t=ϕ0+ϕ1FCi,t+∑ ϕ2,pSeasonp,t
3
p=1 +ϕ3BMi,t+εi,t	                   
                                                          Equation 5.1  
 
NTRi,t is noise trader risk on day t for stock i, FCi,t denotes financial crisis on day t 
for stock i , Seasonp,t represents that ,- is day of the week, p2 is monthly effect 
and p3 is holiday effect, and ./0,2	represents the bullish market effect (representing 
market sentiment). Statistically significant coefficients imply that financial crisis, 
seasonality and market sentiment affects noise trader risk.  
 
Within our sample period of 1 January 2002 to 24 August 2010, we are only able to 
control for one crisis as the Chinese stock market was only exposed to the global 
financial crisis (GFC). According to Bartram and Bodnar (2009), the GFC era is 
defined as spanning from October 2007 to February 2009. Therefore, we construct our 
financial crisis dummy variable (FCi,t) as one within the GFC era, and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient (ϕ2) represents the presence of noise trader risk during the GFC era 
and a statistically significant positive (negative) slope implies that noise trader risk is 
higher (lower) during the GFC period.   
 
Seasonality includes the day of the week effect, monthly effect and holiday effect. We 
use dummy variables for Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday to test 
for day of the week effect on noise trader risk. Each of them takes the value of one on 
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the respective day of the week and zero otherwise. For example, the dummy variable 
of Monday is one if it is a Monday, and zero otherwise. In order to avoid the dummy 
variable trap, the day with the lowest average noise trader risk is excluded from 
Equation 5.1. The statistically significant coefficient implies that there is a day of the 
week effect on noise trader risk. A positive (negative) coefficient implies that there is 
higher (lower) noise trader risk on the respective day. 
Similarly, we test for monthly effect by adopting dummy variables for January, 
February, March, April, May, June, July, August, September, October and December, 
and each of them takes one on the respective month. For example, a dummy variable 
of January is valued as one if it is in January, and zero otherwise. To control for the 
dummy variable trap, we need to drop the month with the lowest value of noise trader 
risk from Equation 5.1. A statistically significant coefficient implies that there is 
monthly effect on noise trader risk. The positive (negative) coefficient implies that 
there is higher (lower) noise trader risk in the corresponding month. 
Generally, a holiday is defined as a weekday when trading is supposed to have 
normally occurred but it did not. Before May 2008, there were four national public 
holidays in China: New Year’s Day, Chinese New Year, Labour Day Holiday and 
National Day Holiday. However, in China there are six additional days of holidays 
associated with Chinese New Year, Labour Day Holiday and National Day Holiday 
(including the weekend), and these additional days are referred as the ‘Golden Week 
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Holiday’ where the stock market is suspended. After May 2008, the Chinese 
government canceled Labour Day Golden Week Holiday and separated it into three 
short holidays (namely Qingming Festival Holiday, Duanwu Festival holiday and 
Mid-Autumn Festival Holiday). Therefore, this gives us two long holidays (Chinese 
New Year and National Day Holiday) and four short holidays (New Year’s Day, 
Qingming Festival Holiday, Duanwu Festival Holiday and Mid-Autumn Festival 
Holiday). According to the holiday literature (see Yakob, Beal and Delpachitra 2005), 
we can construct two dummy variables which will take a value of one just before the 
holiday (pre-holiday) and one after the holiday period (post-holiday). This gives rise 
to four dummy variables in terms of two variables for the short holidays and two 
variables for the long holidays. More specifically, the pre-short-holiday dummy 
variable takes the value of one before the short holiday and zero otherwise; the 
post-short-holiday dummy variable takes the value of one, one day after short holiday 
and zero otherwise; the pre-long-holiday dummy variable is one just one day before 
the Golden Week Holiday and zero otherwise; and the post-long-holiday dummy 
variable is one after Golden Week Holiday. Statistically significant coefficients of 
these dummy variables indicate that there is a holiday effect.  
 
Gu and Jin (2013)25 classify the period of 7 June 2005 to 16 October 2007 and period of 
28 October 2008 to 10 June 2011 as the period of bullish market, and period of 15 June 
2001 to 6 June 2005 and period of 17 October 2007 to 28 October 2008 as period of 
                                                 
25
 Gu and Jin (2013) is an academic paper published in a Chinese journal.  
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bearish market in China. Therefore we follow Gu and Jin (2013)’s classification on 
bullish market and bearish market, and use dummy variable BMi,t	(which is one if it is 
in the period of bullish market and zero otherwise) to test whether market sentiment 
affects noise trader risk. A statistically significant coefficient implies that noise trader 
risk is different in the bullish market. Moreover, positive (negative) coefficient suggests 
that there is higher (lower) noise trader risk during the period of bullish market.  
 
In addition, standard residual diagnostics tests like normality, autocorrelation and auto 
regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) are conducted on all the regression 
models. Problems like autocorrelations were corrected by including the appropriate 
autoregressive and moving average terms and a generalized auto regressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity, GARCH (1,1), was applied to correct for the ARCH 
effects. 
5.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.3.1 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND NOISE TRADER RISK (MEASURED 
BY MU)  
Table 5.1.A to Table 5.1.C present the observed results by estimating Equation 5.1. 
As shown in Table 5.1.A, observations of the GFC column shows that there are 142 
companies (78.89%) which exhibit statistically significant coefficients for GFC at 
10% level of confidence. Moreover, there are 139 companies (77.22%) and 131 firms 
(72.78%) where GFC has an impact at 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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The result implies that GFC influences noise trader risk in Shenzhen stock market.  
 
The positive GFC effect implies that GFC cause more noise trader risk. Observations 
of positive GFC effect in Table 5.1.A show that there are 61 companies (33.89%) 
with statistically significant GFC effect on noise trader risk at 10% level of 
confidence. In addition, there are 60 companies (33.33%) and 56 firms (31.11%) with 
positive GFC effect at 5% and 1% level of confidence.  
 
Our results of negative GFC effect show that there are 81 companies (45.00%) which 
exhibit statistically significant negative GFC effect on noise trader risk at 10% level 
of confidence. A negative effect implies that there noise trader risk is lower during the 
period of GFC. In addition, there are 79 companies (43.89%) and 75 firms (41.67%) 
with negative GFC effect at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. The higher 
probability of positive GFC effect than negative GFC effect implies that investors 
become more irrational in financial crises. Note that we do not report the appendices 
about the effects of GFC for brevity purposes. 
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Table 5.1.A: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment effects on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 
Global Financial Crisis Monday Tuesday Thursday Friday 
At 1% level of significance 
Number of Significant 131 10 5 5 16 
POSITIVE 56 2 1 2 6 
NEGATIVE 75 8 4 3 10 
Percentage of Significant 72.78% 5.56% 2.78% 2.78% 8.89% 
POSITIVE 31.11% 1.11% 0.56% 1.11% 3.33% 
NEGATIVE 41.67% 4.44% 2.22% 1.67% 5.56% 
At 5% level of significance 
Number of Significant 139 19 17 14 21 
POSITIVE 60 7 6 5 9 
NEGATIVE 79 12 11 9 12 
Percentage of Significant 77.22% 10.56% 9.44% 7.78% 11.67% 
POSITIVE 33.33% 3.89% 3.33% 2.78% 5.00% 
NEGATIVE 43.89% 6.67% 6.11% 5.00% 6.67% 
At 10% level of significance 
Number of Significant 142 31 27 23 29 
POSITIVE 61 10 9 10 12 
NEGATIVE 81 21 18 13 17 
Percentage of Significant 78.89% 17.22% 15.00% 12.78% 16.11% 
POSITIVE 33.89% 5.56% 5.00% 5.56% 6.67% 
NEGATIVE 45.00% 11.67% 10.00% 7.22% 9.44% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 
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Table 5.1.B: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment effects on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 
  January March April May June July August September October November December 
At 1% level of significance 
Number of Significant 72 77 85 78 83 83 88 81 98 78 78 
POSITIVE 38 41 33 34 36 34 35 31 39 38 39 
NEGATIVE 34 36 52 44 47 49 53 50 59 40 39 
Percentage of Significant 40.00% 42.78% 47.22% 43.33% 46.11% 46.11% 48.89% 45.00% 54.44% 43.33% 43.33% 
POSITIVE 21.11% 22.78% 18.33% 18.89% 20.00% 18.89% 19.44% 17.22% 21.67% 21.11% 21.67% 
NEGATIVE 18.89% 20.00% 28.89% 24.44% 26.11% 27.22% 29.44% 27.78% 32.78% 22.22% 21.67% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 79 83 100 90 92 94 108 91 105 87 93 
POSITIVE 41 43 43 37 38 39 43 37 44 41 45 
NEGATIVE 38 40 57 53 54 55 65 54 61 46 48 
Percentage of Significant 43.89% 46.11% 55.56% 50.00% 51.11% 52.22% 60.00% 50.56% 58.33% 48.33% 51.67% 
POSITIVE 22.78% 23.89% 23.89% 20.56% 21.11% 21.67% 23.89% 20.56% 24.44% 22.78% 25.00% 
NEGATIVE 21.11% 22.22% 31.67% 29.44% 30.00% 30.56% 36.11% 30.00% 33.89% 25.56% 26.67% 
At 10% level of significance 
Number of Significant 87 91 112 98 107 109 110 98 111 96 99 
POSITIVE 45 47 47 40 44 44 44 43 47 43 50 
NEGATIVE 42 44 65 58 63 65 66 55 64 53 49 
Percentage of Significant 48.33% 50.56% 62.22% 54.44% 59.44% 60.56% 61.11% 54.44% 61.67% 53.33% 55.00% 
POSITIVE 25.00% 26.11% 26.11% 22.22% 24.44% 24.44% 24.44% 23.89% 26.11% 23.89% 27.78% 
NEGATIVE 23.33% 24.44% 36.11% 32.22% 35.00% 36.11% 36.67% 30.56% 35.56% 29.44% 27.22% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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Table 5.1.C: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment effects on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 
  Pre-long-holiday Pre-short-holiday Post-long-holiday Post-short-holiday Bullish Market 
At 1% level of significance 
Number of Significant 35 28 29 20 146 
POSITIVE 15 11 20 11 70 
NEGATIVE 20 17 9 9 76 
Percentage of Significant 19.44% 15.56% 16.11% 11.11% 81.11% 
POSITIVE 8.33% 6.11% 11.11% 6.11% 38.89% 
NEGATIVE 11.11% 9.44% 5.00% 5.00% 42.22% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 42 37 41 23 152 
POSITIVE 16 16 28 12 72 
NEGATIVE 26 21 13 11 80 
Percentage of Significant 23.33% 20.56% 22.78% 12.78% 84.44% 
POSITIVE 8.89% 8.89% 15.56% 6.67% 40.00% 
NEGATIVE 14.44% 11.67% 7.22% 6.11% 44.44% 
At 10% level of significance 
Number of Significant 49 44 43 25 154 
POSITIVE 21 19 29 14 73 
NEGATIVE 28 25 14 11 81 
Percentage of Significant 27.22% 24.44% 23.89% 13.89% 85.56% 
POSITIVE 11.67% 10.56% 16.11% 7.78% 40.56% 
NEGATIVE 15.56% 13.89% 7.78% 6.11% 45.00% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 
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5.3.2 SEASONAL ASPECTS OF NOISE TRADER RISK (MEASURED BY MU) 
5.3.2.1 DAY OF WEEK EFFECT  
In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, the dummy variable of Wednesday with 
the lowest average noise trader risk is excluded from Equation 5.1. Table 5.1.A 
presents the number and percentage of statistically significant day of week effect on 
noise trader risk across 180 companies for period 2002-2010. Moreover, Table 5.1 
summarizes the results of positive effect and negative effect at various levels of 
significance.  
 
Observations of positive effect suggest that there is a relatively higher probability 
(6.67%) of positive Friday effect at 10% level of confidence (see Table 5.1.A). A 
positive Friday effect implies that there is more noise trader risk on Friday when 
compared to Wednesday. Similar results are found at 5% and 1% level of confidence.  
 
As for negative day of week effect, there is a relatively higher probability of 11.67% 
(21 companies) that there is negative Monday effect which implies that there is lower 
noise trader risk on Monday when compared to Wednesday. Similar results are found 
at 5% and 1% level of confidence. The result implies that day of week effect exists in 
Shenzhen stock market. 
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5.3.2.2 MONTHLY EFFECT  
In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, the dummy variable of February with the 
lowest average noise trader risk is excluded from Equation 5.1. Table 5.1.B presents 
the number and percentage of statistically significant monthly effect on noise trader 
risk across 180 companies for the period 2002-2010. Moreover, Table 5.1.B 
summarizes the results of positive effect and negative effect at various levels of 
significance.  
 
As shown in Table 5.1.B, observations of positive monthly effect show that there is a 
relatively higher probability of positive December effect (27.78%) at 10% level of 
confidence. The positive December effect implies that there is higher noise trader risk 
in December when compared to February. Similar results are found at 5% and 1% 
level of confidence. As for negative monthly effect, there is a relatively higher 
probability (36.67%) of negative August effect at 10% level of confidence which 
implies that there is lower noise trader risk on August. The results are robust at 5% 
and 1% level of confidence. The finding implies that monthly effect exists in 
Shenzhen stock market. 
 
5.3.3 HOLIDAY EFFECT OF NOISE TRADER RISK  
5.3.3.1 PRE-LONG-HOLIDAY EFFECT  
Table 5.1.C shows that there are 49 stocks (27.22%), 42 companies (23.33%) and 35 
 222 
 
(19.44%) firms with statistically significant pre-long-holiday effect (such as Chinese 
New Year Holiday Effect and National Day Holiday) on noise trader risk at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level of confidence respectively. The finding implies that pre-long-holiday 
effect influences the Shenzhen stock market. 
 
Observations of positive effect show that there are 21 companies (11.67%) at 10% 
level of confidence. A positive pre-long-holiday effect implies that noise trader risk 
will be higher on a day before long public holiday. In addition, there are 16 stocks 
(8.89%) and 15 firms (8.33%) with statistically significant positive effect at 5% and 
1% level of confidence respectively.  
 
As for negative effect, there are 28 companies (15.56%) at 10% level of confidence 
(see Table 5.1.C). A negative effect implies that noise trader risk will be lower on a 
day before long public holiday. In addition, there are 26 stocks (14.44%) and 20 firms 
(11.11%) which shows negative effect at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. 
The relatively higher probability of negative pre-long-holiday effect than positive 
effect implies that there is less noise trader risk on a trading day before long holidy.  
 
5.3.3.2 PRE-SHORT-HOLIDAY EFFECT  
Table 5.1.C shows that there are 44 stocks (24.44%), 37 companies (20.56%) and 28 
firms (15.56%) with statistically significant pre-short-holiday effect (such as New 
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Year Holiday, Qingming Festival Holiday, Duanwu Festival Holiday and 
Mid-Autumn Festival Holiday) on noise trader risk at 10%, 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively. The finding implies that pre-short-holiday effect influences 
the Shenzhen stock market. 
 
Observations of positive effect suggest that there are 19 companies (10.56%) at 10% 
level of confidence. A positive effect implies that there is more noise trader risk on a 
day before a short public holiday. In addition, there are 16 stocks (8.89%) and 11 
firms (6.11%) with statistically significant positive effect at 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively.  
 
As for negative effect, there are 25 companies (13.89%) at 10% level of confidence 
(see Table 5.1.C). A negative effect implies that there noise trader risk will be lower 
on a day before a short public holiday. In addition, there are 21 stocks (11.67%) and 
17 firms (9.44%) which shows negative effect at 5% and 1% level of confidence 
respectively. The relatively higher probability of negative pre-short-holiday effect 
than positive effect implies that there is lower noise trader risk on a trading day before 
short holiday. 
 
5.3.3.3 POST-LONG-HOLIDAY EFFECT  
As can be seen in Table 5.1.C, there are 43 stocks (23.89%), 41 companies (22.78%) 
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and 29 firms (16.11%) with statistically significant post-long-holiday effect on noise 
trader risk at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. From the positive 
effect we find that there are 29 companies (16.11%) at 10% level of confidence. A 
positive post-long-holiday effect implying that noise trader risk will be higher on the 
first trading day after a long public holiday. In addition, there are 28 stocks (15.56%) 
and 20 firms (11.11%) with statistically significant positive effect at 5% and 1% level 
of confidence respectively. The results imply that post-long-holiday effect exists in 
the Shenzhen stock market. 
 
As for negative effect, there are 14 companies (7.78%) at 10% level of confidence 
(see Table 5.1.C). A negative effect implies that noise trader risk will be lower on the 
first trading day after a long public holiday. In addition, there are 13 stocks (7.22%) 
and 9 firms (5.00%) which shows negative effect at 5% and 1% level of confidence 
respectively. The relatively higher probability of positive post-long-holiday effect 
than positive effect implies that noise trader risk is relatively higher on a trading day 
after long holiday.  
 
5.3.3.4 POST-SHORT-HOLIDAY EFFECT  
Table 5.1.C shows that there are 25 stocks (13.89%), 23 companies (12.78%) and 20 
(11.11%) firms with statistically significant post-short-holiday effect on noise trader 
risk at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. The results imply that 
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post-short-holiday effect exists in the Shenzhen stock market.With regards to the 
positive effect we find evidence of positive effect in 14 companies (7.78%). A 
positive effect implies that noise trader risk will be higher on the first trading day after 
a short public holiday at 10% level of confidence. In addition, there are 12 firms 
(6.67%) and 11 companies (6.11%) which show positive effect at 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively.  
 
As for negative effect, there are 11 companies (6.11%) at 10% level of confidence 
(see Table 5.1.C). A negative effect implies that noise trader risk will be lower on the 
first trading day after a short public holiday. In addition, there are 11 stocks (6.11%) 
and nine companies (5.00%) which show negative effect at 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively. The relatively higher probability of positive 
post-long-holiday effect than negative effect implies that noise trader risk is relatively 
higher on the first trading day after long holiday.  
 
In summary, our findings suggest that holidays affect noise trader risk in Shenzhen 
stock market. The relatively higher probability of post-holiday effect than pre-holiday 
effect implies that noise trader risk is affected on the first trading day after holiday. 
Additionally, the higher probability of positive post-long-holiday effect compared to 
post-short-holiday effect implies that post-long-holiday effect causes more noise 
trader risk.  
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5.3.4 MARKET SENTIMENT EFFECT AND NOISE TRADER RISK   
Recall that in addressing the market sentiment effect, a dummy variable for the bullish 
market period has been employed. If the coefficient of this dummy variable is 
statistically significant, we can conclude that noise trader risk of that firm is affected 
by market sentiment. Observations of the bullish market column in Table 5.1.C shows 
that there are 154 stocks (85.56%), 152 companies (84.44%) and 146 firms (81.11%)  
with statistically significant bullish market effect on noise trader risk at 10%, 5% and 
1% level of confidence respectively. It implies that market sentiment affects noise 
trader risk in the Shenzhen stock market.  
 
Observations of positive effect show that there are 73 companies (40.56%) at 10% 
level of confidence. A positive bullish market effect implying that noise trader risk 
will be higher in the bullish market. In addition, there are 72 stocks (40.00%) and 70 
firms (38.89%) with statistically significant positive effect at 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively.  
 
As for negative effect, there are 81 companies (45.00%) at 10% level of confidence 
(see Table 5.1). A negative effect implies that noise trader risk will be lower in the 
bullish market. In addition, there are 80 stocks (44.44%) and 76 firms (42.22%) that 
show negative effect at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively.  
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5.3.5 ROBUSTNESS TEST USING BEHAVIOURAL ERROR AS A MEASURED 
OF NOISE TRADER RISK 
So far we have tested whether global financial crisis, seasonality and market 
sentiment affect noise trader risk (measured by mu). The empirical results show that 
they are key factors influencing noise trader risk. We repeat these procedures using 
behavioural error as another proxy for noise trader risk as a robustness test. Table 5.2 
A to Table 5.2 C provide details of our results which reinforce our general findings 
that global financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment are important factors. 
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Table 5.2.A: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Behavioural Error) for 2002-2010 
 
Global Financial Crisis Monday Tuesday Thursday Friday 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of Significant 106 74 70 92 80 
Positive 57 53 56 25 69 
Negative 49 21 14 67 11 
Percentage of Significant 58.89% 41.11% 38.89% 51.11% 44.44% 
Positive 31.67% 29.44% 31.11% 13.89% 38.33% 
Negative 27.22% 11.67% 7.78% 37.22% 6.11% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 118 95 87 112 102 
Positive 63 66 67 27 84 
Negative 55 29 20 85 18 
Percentage of Significant 65.56% 52.78% 48.33% 62.22% 56.67% 
Positive 35.00% 36.67% 37.22% 15.00% 46.67% 
Negative 30.56% 16.11% 11.11% 47.22% 10.00% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of Significant 126 99 96 122 116 
Positive 67 69 74 31 94 
Negative 59 30 22 91 22 
Percentage of Significant 70.00% 55.00% 53.33% 67.78% 64.44% 
Positive 37.22% 38.33% 41.11% 17.22% 52.22% 
Negative 32.78% 16.67% 12.22% 50.56% 12.22% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 
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Table 5.2.B: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Behavioural Error) for 2002-2010 
 
January March April May June July August September October November December 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of Significant 134 111 140 125 159 125 105 152 116 112 170 
Positive 7 15 4 8 22 4 5 2 8 6 19 
Negative 127 96 136 117 137 121 100 150 108 106 151 
Percentage of Significant 74.44% 61.67% 77.78% 69.44% 88.33% 69.44% 58.33% 84.44% 64.44% 62.22% 94.44% 
Positive 3.89% 8.33% 2.22% 4.44% 12.22% 2.22% 2.78% 1.11% 4.44% 3.33% 10.56% 
Negative 70.56% 53.33% 75.56% 65.00% 76.11% 67.22% 55.56% 83.33% 60.00% 58.89% 83.89% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of significant 148 123 152 144 162 138 117 165 135 132 172 
Positive 8 17 6 11 23 5 6 4 10 9 20 
Negative 140 106 146 133 139 133 111 161 125 123 152 
Percentage of Significant 82.22% 68.33% 84.44% 80.00% 90.00% 76.67% 65.00% 91.67% 75.00% 73.33% 95.56% 
Positive 4.44% 9.44% 3.33% 6.11% 12.78% 2.78% 3.33% 2.22% 5.56% 5.00% 11.11% 
Negative 77.78% 58.89% 81.11% 73.89% 77.22% 73.89% 61.67% 89.44% 69.44% 68.33% 84.44% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of significant 158 129 157 149 164 147 126 169 145 136 173 
Positive 12 17 7 11 23 7 7 5 11 9 20 
Negative 146 112 150 138 141 140 119 164 134 127 153 
Percentage of Significant 87.78% 71.67% 87.22% 82.78% 91.11% 81.67% 70.00% 93.89% 80.56% 75.56% 96.11% 
Positive 6.67% 9.44% 3.89% 6.11% 12.78% 3.89% 3.89% 2.78% 6.11% 5.00% 11.11% 
Negative 81.11% 62.22% 83.33% 76.67% 78.33% 77.78% 66.11% 91.11% 74.44% 70.56% 85.00% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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Table 5.2.C: Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Behavioural Error) for 2002-2010 
 
Pre-long-holiday Pre-short-holiday Post-long-holiday Post-short-holiday Bullish Market 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of significant 180 8 133 4 128 
Positive 175 7 46 4 84 
Negative 5 1 87 0 44 
Percentage of Significant 100.00% 4.44% 73.89% 2.22% 71.11% 
Positive 97.22% 3.89% 25.56% 2.22% 46.67% 
Negative 2.78% 0.56% 48.33% 0.00% 24.44% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of significant 180 20 140 16 139 
Positive 175 19 49 12 88 
Negative 5 1 91 4 51 
Percentage of Significant 100.00% 11.11% 77.78% 8.89% 77.22% 
Positive 97.22% 10.56% 27.22% 6.67% 48.89% 
Negative 2.78% 0.56% 50.56% 2.22% 28.33% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of significant 180 35 143 21 147 
Positive 175 33 49 17 94 
Negative 5 2 94 4 53 
Percentage of Significant 100.00% 19.44% 79.44% 11.67% 81.67% 
Positive 97.22% 18.33% 27.22% 9.44% 52.22% 
Negative 2.78% 1.11% 52.22% 2.22% 29.44% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 
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5.4 CONCLUSION 
A major contribution of this thesis is that we document how global financial crisis, 
seasonality and market sentiment affect noise trader risk (mu and behavioural error) 
given that the literature is silent in this field. Our findings provide evidence that noise 
traders and information traders operate differently under different market conditions. 
The higher probability of positive GFC effect than negative GFC effect implies that 
investors become more irrational in financial crises and we observe certain seasonal 
aspects around noise trading behaviour. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ARE SOME FINANCE FUNDAMENTALS ASSOCIATED 
WITH NOISE TRADER RISK? 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
While noise traders do not trade on fundamental factors, it is likely that some finance 
fundamentals are associated with the potential for noise trading. To the extent that 
some finance fundamentals are associated with higher levels of asymmetric 
information and likely to drive differences of opinion those fundamentals may 
“explain” the incidence of noise trader risk. It is therefore important to investigate 
which information (or fundamental) affects noise trading. To best of our knowledge, 
there is no previous study that has explained noise trader risk (proxied by either 
behavioural error or mu) using finance fundamentals.  
 
What we have learnt from Chapter Two is that there is significant number of papers 
that have examined whether noise traders exist in stock markets. For instance, Chau, 
Dosmukhambetova and Kallinterakis (2013) suggest that the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IRFS) has promoted information based trading which 
in turn leads to the reduction of noise traders in the financial system. The implicit 
implication is that fundamentals play an important role in a noise trader’s world. 
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While the accounting literature establishes a link between noise trading and 
information, such link is not established in the finance literature. At best, we find that 
the finance literature is limited, as only volume traded has been used to explain the 
behaviour of noise traders. For example, Odean (1998) provides evidence that 
overconfidence and trading volume are positively related—leading to underreaction. 
Within the volume traded literature, we find that it is silent when it comes to noise 
trading in the Chinese stock market and consequently the first objective of this 
chapter is to test how finance fundamentals such as liquidity, leverage, price to book 
ratio, profitability, size and capital expenditure affect noise trader risk in the Shenzhen 
stock market. More specifically, the current literature fails to adequately address the 
issue of how fundamentals affect overreaction, underreaction and IPE derived from 
IANM. This leads us to another objective of this chapter which is to examine how 
finance fundamentals affect overreaction, underreaction and IPE in the Shenzhen 
stock market.  
 
 
Section 6.2 and section 6.3 describe the data and methodology respectively. Section 
6.4 discusses the empirical evidence on how finance fundamentals are associated with 
the potential for noise trading, underreaction, IPE and overreaction while section 6.5 
concludes this chapter.  
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6.2 DATA  
Based on discussion in section 2.6 of Chapter Two (literature review), we select six 
fundamental factors (i.e. liquidity, leverage, price to book ratio, profitability, size and 
capital expenditure) to examine whether fundamentals are associated with noise trader 
risk. We apply turnover ratio, debt to equity ratio, sales per share, earnings per share, 
price to book ratio and capital expenditure per share to measure these six fundamental 
factors respectively. Daily turnover ratio, debt to equity ratio, sales per share, earnings 
per share, price to book ratio and capital expenditure per share collected over the 
period 1 January 2002 to 24 August 2010. We use daily noise trader risk (behaviroual 
error and mu), overreaction, underreaction, and IPE that we calculated in Chapter 
Three. It should be noted that dummy variables are used to represent overreaction, 
underreaction, and IPE.  
 
6.3 METHODOLOGY  
6.3.1 EXPLAINING NOISE TRADER RISK WITH FINANCE FUNDAMENTALS 
In this section, we test whether finance fundamentals are associated with the potential 
for noise trading where the factors are turnover ratio, earnings per share, sales per 
share, debt to equity ratio, book to price value and capital expenditure per share.  
 
6.3.1.1 SINGLE FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Noise trader risk as measured by mu is categorised into three portfolios, namely, high 
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volume (H), medium volume (M) and low volume (L). The high volume portfolio 
consists of the top 60 most liquid stocks, the low volume portfolio consists of the 
bottom 60 stocks and the rest is allocated to the medium portfolios. Our definition of 
trading volume and the criteria used to classify high and low trading volume stocks 
are based on stock turnover ratios. We then test if there is a difference in noise trader 
risk in the high and low portfolios (H-L). When the H-L difference is positive, we 
conclude that, high-volume stocks generally have more noise trader risk than 
low-volume stocks. It follows that when the difference is negative, low-volume stocks 
has higher noise trader risk than their high-volume counterparts. In a similar manner, 
we test for the remaining fundamentals. This method allows us to see the effect of one 
fundamental factor without considering the effects of the remaining factors. In 
addition, we adopt the same methodology to test single fundamental factor effect on 
noise trader risk when measured by change in behavioural error. To test for the joint 
effects, we use a multiple regression analysis. 
 
6.3.1.2 MULTIPLE FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Before doing multiple factors analysis, we firstly run each fundamental factor on 
noise trader risk respectively and these equations are shown in the below.  
 
NTRi,t=δ0+δ1TRi,t+εi,t    																																																					               Equation 6.1 
NTRi,t=30+31DEBTi,t+εi,t    																																																			              Equation 6.2 
NTRi,t=60+61CAPEXi,t+εi,t    																																																						           Equation 6.3 
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NTRi,t=;0+;1EARNINGSi,t+εi,t    																																																								       Equation 6.4 
NTRi,t=<0+<1P/B	i,t+εi,t    																																																																																					Equation 6.5 
NTRi,t=>0+>1SIZE	i,t+εi,t    																																							                   Equation 6.6 
 
where NTRi,t represents the noise trader risk at day t for stock i, TRi,t is turnover 
ratio (representing liquidity) at day t for stock i, DEBTi,t is debt to equity ratio 
(representing leverage) at day t for stock i, CAPEXi,t is capital expenditure per share 
(CAPEX) at day t for stock i, EARNINGSi,t  earnings per share (representing 
profitability) at day t for stock i,  P/Bi,t is price to book ratioat day t for stock i and 
 SIZEi,t is sales per share (representing firm size 26) at day t for stock i. Statistically 
significant coefficients imply that there is a relationship between noise trader risk and 
each fundamental factor, suggesting that finance fundamentals are associated with the 
potential for noise trading.  
 
We follow Equation 6.7 to test for the joint effects of fundamental factors on noise 
trader risk.  
 
NTRi,t=ω0+∑ ω1,nFundamentalsn,t6n=1 +εi,t                                    Equation 6.7	
 
where, NTRi,t	is noise trader risk at day t for stock i. Fundamentalsn,t represents the 
daily values of accounting and finance variables where n1	is turnover ratio, n2 is 
                                                 
26
 See Al-Khazali and Zoubi (2005) and Shehata (1991) 
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debt to equity ratio, n3 is capital expenditure per share, n4 is earnings per share, n5 
is price to book ratio and n6 is sales per share at day t. Statistically significant 
coefficients imply that there is relationship between noise trader risk and the 
corresponding fundamental factor.  
 
According to the accounting literature (see Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 1970, Ahmed, 
Schnabel and Stevens 2003 and Dennis and Mayhew 2002), accounting ratios tend to 
be correlated and there is a relationship between volume traded, firm size and 
earnings. It implies that the finance fundamental, as explanatory variables that we 
have chosen may be correlated with each other giving rise to the multicollinearity 
problem. There are two ways to test for multicollinearity. One is to estimate the 
correlation matrix for each firm. The rule of thumb suggests that there is severe 
multicollinearity among independent variables if sample correlation is either near to 
or greater than 0.8. However, it is not the best way if the collinear relationship 
involves more than two independent variables. The other one is to test for 
multicollinearity using variance inflation factor (VIF). To calculate VIF, we firstly run 
regression of each independent variable on all the other independent variables, and 
then collect the R2 of this regression. In the end, VIF is calculated as, VIF=1/(1-R2). 
The rule of thumb suggests that there is evidence of severe multicollinearity when 
VIF is greater than ten. In our case, there are six independent variables, and thus the 
best way to test multicollinearity is to calculate VIF. According to the econometric 
theory, multicollinearity (unless perfect multicollinearity) does not violate Ordinary 
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Least Squares (OLS) assumptions as the OLS estimates are still unbiased and BLUE 
(Best Linear Unbiased Estimators), but it will lead the OLS estimates to have large 
standard errors and causing t-statistics to be smaller. In other words, coefficients will 
have to be significantly large in order to be statistically significant—making it harder 
to reject the null hypothesis. Hence, OLS estimates will be underestimated. When we 
combine the accounting literature and the econometric theory, it leads us to believe 
that if we were to observe a relationship between the fundamental factors, our results 
will be underestimated. 
 
In addition, we test fundamental effects on noise trader risk combining with 
seasonality, financial crisis and market sentiment by running Equation 6.8. Effects of 
seasonality, financial crisis and it should be noted that the effect of market sentiment 
on noise trader risk has been examined in Chapter Five.  
 
NTRi,t=ϕ0+∑ ϕ1,kFundamentalsk,t
6
k=1 +ϕ2FCi,t+∑ ϕ3,sSeasons,t
3
s=1 +ϕ4BMi,t+εi,t	                   
                                                          Equation 6.8  
 
where NTRi,t is noise trader risk on day t for stock i, Fundamentalsn,t represents the 
daily values of fundamental factors where k1 is turnover ratio, k2 is debt to equity 
ratio, k3 is capital expenditure per share, k4 is earnings per share, k5 is book to 
price value and k6 is sales per share at day t, FCi,t denotes financial crisis on day t 
for stock i , Seasonl,t presents that A- is day of the week, s2 is monthly effect and 
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s3 is holiday effect, and ./0,2	presents bullish market effect (representing market 
sentiment). Statistically significant coefficients imply that financial crisis, seasonality 
and market sentiment affects noise trader risk. Moreover, variables of seasonality, 
financial crisis and market sentiment have been explained in Chapter Five.  
 
In the end, standard residual diagnostics tests like normality, autocorrelation and auto 
regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) are conducted on all the regression 
models. Problems like autocorrelations were corrected by including the appropriate 
autoregressive and moving average terms and a generalized auto regressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity, GARCH (1,1), was applied to correct for the ARCH 
effects. 
 
6.3.2 TESTING WHETHER FINANCE FUNDAMENTALS CONTRIBUTE TO 
OVERREACTION, IPE AND UNDERREACTION  
In this section we describe the methodology that we use to test if finance 
fundamentals affect overreaction, IPE and underreaction. We treat overreaction as 
binary dependent variable, ORi,t , that is one when there is overreaction on 
information days, otherwise, it is zero. Equation 6.9 below is estimated using the 
binary choice method (more specifically the Probit model) to test whether 
fundamental factors have explanatory power in terms of explaining overreaction.  
 
ORi,t=ρ0+∑ ρ1,mFundamentalsm,t
6
m=1 +εi,t																																															     Equation 6.9  
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Where ORi,t  represents the overreaction on the information day t for stock i, 
Fundamentalsm,t  represents the daily accounting and finance variables for each 
variable and m1  is turnover ratio, m2  is debt to equity ratio, m3  is capital 
expenditure per share, m4 is earnings per share, m5 is price to book ratio and m6 is 
sales per share at day t. Statistically significant coefficients imply that there is 
relationship between overreaction and corresponding fundamental factor. The same 
methodology is applied to test how fundamental factors explain IPE and 
underreaction by replacing ORi,t with IPEi,t and URi,t respectively in Equation 6.9, 
giving rise to the following Equation 6.10 and Equation 6.11.  
	
IPEi,t=υ0+∑ υ1,rFundamentalsr,t6r=1 +εi,t                                        Equation 6.10	
URi,t=χ0+∑ χ1,qFundamentalsq,t
6
q=1 +εi,t                                         Equation 6.11	
 
where IPEi,t denotes IPE on the information day t for stock i, it will be one if it is 
IPE on the information day, and zero otherwise. URi,t presents the underreaction on 
the information day t for stock i, and it will take value of one if it is underreaction on 
the information day, otherwise, it is zero.  
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6.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
6.4.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF SINGLE FACTOR ANALYSIS ON NOISE 
TRADER RISK WHEN MEASURED BY MU 
In this section, we compare noise trader risk of top 60 companies with high 
corresponding fundamentals (such as debt to equity ratio, capital expenditure per 
share, earnings per share, price to book ratio, sales per share and turnover ratio) and 
bottom 60 firms with low corresponding fundamentals in order to test for single 
fundamental factor effect on noise trader risk (measured by mu). It should be noted 
that some values are very small, and thus these are presented by zero when we retain 
four decimal places.  
 
Table 6.1 shows that there are statistically significant differences (labeled as H-L in 
the table) between firms with high debt to equity ratio (labeled as High in the table) 
and firms with low debt to equity ratio (labeled as Low in the table) in 2002-2010, 
2003, 2007 and 2010. The magnitude that we observe is relatively small (not 
economical) but is statistically significant. For instance, the H-L values for 2002-2010, 
2003, 2007 and 2010 are 0.0000, 0.0002, 0.0003 and 0.0002 respectively. If we 
consider the period 2010, we find a positive mean of noise trader risk in high debt to 
equity ratio portfolio of 0.0015 and a positive mean of noise trader risk in low debt to 
equity ratio portfolio of 0.0013 implying that there is higher magnitude of noise trader 
risk in firms with high leverage firms. Similar effect is observed in 2003 but the 
opposite effect is observed in 2007 where there is more noise trader risk in low debt to 
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equity firms. One major conclusion can be drawn from this analysis in that leverage 
affects noise trader risk.  
 
The t-statistics for difference between noise trader risk in ‘High’ capital expenditure 
per share portfolio and in ‘Low’ capital expenditure per share portfolio shows that 
there is statistically significant difference between firms with high CAPEX and firms 
with low CAPEX (see Table 6.1). The observed results suggest that noise trader risk is 
more pronounced in firms that spend more on capital expenditure (high CAPEX) in 
2006 and 2009. The opposite effect is captured in 2004 and 2007. We use this as 
evidence that CAPEX affects noise trader risk.  
 
As shown in section of earnings per share from Table 6.1, there is statistically 
significant difference in noise trader risk between firms with high earnings per share 
and firms with low earnings per share. Our results suggest that firms with high 
profitability will have more noise trader risk than firms with low profitability in 2006, 
and there is lower noise trader risk in firms with high profitability than firms with low 
profitability in 2003, 2004 and 2007. Consequently, we conclude that profitability 
affects noise trader risk.  
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Table 6.1: Single Fundamental Analysis of Noise Trader Risk when Measured by Mu   
Fundamentals 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Debt to Equity ratio  
 
High 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0015 
Low 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0013 
H-L 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
t-Statistic 2.5668*** -0.7181 3.1696*** 1.1170 0.3874 0.7211 2.1211** 0.0949 -0.0830 3.3801*** 
CAPEX per Share 
 
High 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0015 
Low 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0014 
H-L 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0001 
t-Statistic 2.5491** 0.8114 -1.7282* -2.5758** 1.4359 3.5811*** 3.5260*** -0.0756 -3.1535*** 0.7904 
Earnings per Share 
 
High 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0014 
Low 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0014 
H-L 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
t-Statistic 0.4091 -0.5103 -3.6040*** -3.4593*** 0.3330 3.1556*** 3.2372*** 0.8084 1.3323 -0.3156 
Price to Book ratio 
 
High 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0013 
Low 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0015 
H-L 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 
t-Statistic -1.2300 -1.5933 -0.4963 2.9613*** -2.8930*** -0.0951 -0.5139 0.8827 3.3661*** -2.1359** 
Sales per Share 
 
High 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0014 
Low 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0014 
H-L 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
t-Statistic 0.6756 -0.0642 -1.5752 -1.7553* 2.0907** 1.4829 0.8993 0.6910 -2.0403** 0.7578 
Turnover Ratio High 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0015 
 
Low 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0013 
 
H-L 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003 
 
t-Statistic 3.9672*** 0.1274 0.0542 2.2910** -0.9544 2.8964*** 4.4408*** -0.4047 -1.1952 3.3135*** 
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The observations of price to book ratio in Table 6.1 show that there is no statistically 
significant difference in noise trader risk across level of price to book ratio in the 
period of 2002-2010. However, when we test the difference across individual years, it 
shows that firms with higher ratio will have more noise trader risk thanfirms with 
lower ratio in 2004 and 2005, but the opposite result is found in 2009 and 2010. It 
implies that price to book ratio influences the noise trader risk.  
 
The t-statistics of sales per share shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference in noise trader risk across firm size in the period of 2002 - 2010. The 
observations of individual years find that there is more noise trader risk from larg 
firms in 2009, and there is more noise trader risk from small firms in 2004 and 2005. 
In other words, firm size plays a role in terms of affecting noise trader risk.  
 
As shown in section of turnover ratio of Table 6.1, there is statistically significant 
difference in noise trader risk between firms with high turnover ratio and firms with 
low turnover ratio in 2002-2010, 2004, 2006 and 2010. It suggests that noise traders 
prefer firms with high liquidity than firms with low liquidity except for the period 
2007. Consequently, we conclude that liquidity affect noise trader risk.  
 
6.4.2 CORRELATION AMONG FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS   
Table 6.2 presents the correlation matrix of Guangxi Guitang (Group) Company 
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Limited. It suggests that fundamental factors are correlated but there is no serious 
multicollinearity problem among fundamental factors. The correlation matrices of the 
remaining companies are shown in Appendix 6.1, suggesting that there is no serious 
multicollinearity for other firms as well.  
 
Recall that another way to test for multicollinearity is to calculate VIF. As discussed 
in section 6.3.1.2, we first run regressions with each variable as dependent variable on 
all the remaining variables as independent variables, and then collect the R2 of these 
regressions. In the end, VIF of each independent variable is calculated as, 
VIF=1/(1-R2). Appendix 6.2 presents there are 12 companies which exhibit that VIF 
is greater than 10, when CAPEX is dependent variable. There are less than 10% of 
companies which show that CAPEX are correlated with other finance factors. Similar 
results are found when other finance factors are used as dependent variables 
respectively. It implies that there is no severe multicollinearity problem.
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Table 6.2: The Correlation Matrix of Guangxi Guitang (Group) Company Limited 
  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to 
equity 
Ratio 
Earnings  
per 
Share 
Price 
to 
Book 
ratio 
Capital 
Expenditure  
per Share 
Sales  
per 
Share 
Turnover 
Ratio 
 
1.00 
     
Debt to 
Equity 
Ratio 
 
-0.56 1.00 
    
Earnings 
per Share 
 
0.28 -0.45 1.00 
   
Price to 
book ratio 
 
0.44 -0.46 0.23 1.00 
  
Capital 
Expenditure 
per Share 
 
-0.40 0.72 -0.37 -0.17 1.00 
 
Sales per 
Share 
0.28 -0.62 0.65 0.21 -0.78 1.00 
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6.4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EACH FINANCE FACTOR AS SINGLE 
EXPLANATORY OF NOISE TRADER RISK (MEASURED BY MU) 
Table 6.3 presents the number and percentage of statistically significant relationship 
(including positive relationship and negative relationship) between noise trader risk 
(measured by mu) and each fundamental factor for period 2002-2010 by estimating 
Equation 6.1 to Equation 6.6 at various levels of significance. Observed results 
suggest that finance fundamentals are associated with the potential for noise trading, 
including both positive effect and negative effect. Note that we do not report the 
appendices about the effects of each fundamental effect for brevity purposes. 
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Table 6.3: The Relationship between Noise Trader Risk (measured by Mu) and Fundamental Factors for period 2002-2010  
  Equation 6.1 Equation 6.2 Equation 6.3 Equation 6.4 Equation 6.5 Equation 6.6 
  Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
Capital Expenditure Earnings per Share Price to Book Ratio Sales per Share 
At 1% level of significance   
Number of Significant 140 176 173 172 168 172 
POSITIVE 49 90 80 67 51 80 
NEGATIVE 91 86 93 105 117 92 
Percentage of Significant 77.78% 97.78% 96.11% 95.56% 93.33% 95.56% 
POSITIVE 27.22% 50.00% 44.44% 37.22% 28.33% 44.44% 
NEGATIVE 50.56% 47.78% 51.67% 58.33% 65.00% 51.11% 
At 5% level of significance    
Number of Significant 150 178 175 174 170 173 
POSITIVE 51 91 80 68 51 81 
NEGATIVE 99 87 95 106 119 92 
Percentage of Significant 83.33% 98.89% 97.22% 96.67% 94.44% 96.11% 
POSITIVE 28.33% 50.56% 44.44% 37.78% 28.33% 45.00% 
NEGATIVE 55.00% 48.33% 52.78% 58.89% 66.11% 51.11% 
At 10% level of significance    
Number of Significant 155 178 176 177 171 174 
POSITIVE 53 91 81 70 52 81 
NEGATIVE 102 87 95 107 119 93 
Percentage of Significant 86.11% 98.89% 97.78% 98.33% 95.00% 96.67% 
POSITIVE 29.44% 50.56% 45.00% 38.89% 28.89% 45.00% 
NEGATIVE 56.67% 48.33% 52.78% 59.44% 66.11% 51.67% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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6.4.4 MULTIPLE FACTOR ANALYSIS OF NOISE TRADER RISK MEASURED 
BY MU 
Table 6.4 presents the number and percentage of statistically significant relationship 
between noise trader risk (measured by mu) and fundamental factors for period 
2002-2010 by estimating Equation 6.7. Moreover, Table 6.4 summarizes the results of 
positive relationship and negative relationship at various levels of significance, and 
Appendix 6.3 shows coefficients (B-,C ) which are estimates of corresponding 
fundamental factors in Equation 6.7 for 180 companies. 
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Table 6.4: The Relationship between Noise Trader Risk (Measured by Mu) and Fundamental Factors for Period 2002-2010  
  
Turnover Ratio 
 
Debt to Equity Ratio 
 
Capital Expenditure per 
Share 
 
Earnings per 
Share 
 
Price to book ratio 
 
Sales per Share 
 
At 1% level of significance    
Number of Significant 94 127 122 127 131 129 
Positive 44 70 58 60 58 70 
Negative 50 57 64 67 73 59 
Percentage of Significant 52.22% 70.56% 67.78% 70.56% 72.78% 71.67% 
Positive 24.44% 38.89% 32.22% 33.33% 32.22% 38.89% 
Negative 27.78% 31.67% 35.56% 37.22% 40.56% 32.78% 
At 5% level of significance    
Number of Significant 112 133 133 136 141 138 
Positive 53 74 61 64 64 75 
Negative 59 59 72 72 77 63 
Percentage of Significant 62.22% 73.89% 73.89% 75.56% 78.33% 76.67% 
Positive 29.44% 41.11% 33.89% 35.56% 35.56% 41.67% 
Negative 32.78% 32.78% 40.00% 40.00% 42.78% 35.00% 
At 10% level of significance    
Number of Significant 118 137 141 146 145 146 
Positive 57 77 64 69 66 79 
Negative 61 60 77 77 79 67 
Percentage of Significant 65.56% 76.11% 78.33% 81.11% 80.56% 81.11% 
Positive 31.67% 42.78% 35.56% 38.33% 36.67% 43.89% 
Negative 33.89% 33.33% 42.78% 42.78% 43.89% 37.22% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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6.4.4.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND TURNOVER 
RATIO (LIQUIDITY) 
Observations from the section on turnover ratio (liquidity) show that there are 118 
(65.56%) firms which exhibit statistically significant relationship between noise trader 
risk and liquidity at 10% level of confidence. In addition, there are 112 companies 
(62.22%) and 94 firms (52.22%) which exhibit statistically significant liquidity effect 
at 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. We consider this as strong evidence 
of liquidity affecting noise trader risk as the analysis controls for other factors. 
 
The observed results of positive liquidity effect show that there are there are 57 
companies (31.67%) with statistically significant positive liquidity effect on noise 
trader risk (a rise in liquidity will cause more noise trader risk) at 10% level of 
confidence. Moreover, empirical results show that there are 53 firms (29.44%) and 44 
stocks (24.44%) illustrating that positive liquidity effect on noise trader risk at 5% and 
1% level of significance respectively. Appendix 6.3 shows that Guangdong Electric 
Power Development Company Limited, Zhuhai Zhongfu Enterprise Company 
Limited, Shandong Haihua Co.,Ltd, Wanxiang Qianchao Company Limited and China 
Resource Sanjiu Medical and Pharmaceutical Company Limited are the top five 
companies with the largest positive liquidity effect on noise trader risk.  
 
As for the negative liquidity effect (a rise in liquidity will decrease noise trader risk), 
our results show that there are 61 stocks (33.89%) at 10 % level of confidence. In 
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addition, there are 59 (32.78%) firms and 50 (27.78%) firms with statistically 
significant negative relationship between noise trader risk and liquidity at 5% and 1% 
level of confidence respectively. Appendix 6.3 shows that Wuliangye Yibin Company 
Limited, Luzhou Lao Jiao Company Limited, Beijing Shougang Company Limited, 
Wuhan Department Store Group Company Limited and Shandong Xinneng Taishan 
Power Generation Company Limited are the top five companies which exhibit the 
largest negative liquidity effect on noise trader risk. The higher probability of negative 
liquidity effect than positive effect implies that a decrease in liquidity will cause more 
noise trader risk on the information day.  
 
6.4.4.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND DEBT TO 
EQUITY RATIO (LEVERAGE) 
Table 6.4 shows that there are 137 stocks (76.11%) which exhibit that noise trader 
risk and debt to equity ratio (leverage) are statistically significantly related at 10% 
level of confidence. Additionally, there are 133 stocks (73.89%) and 127 companies 
(70.56%) which have leverage effect on noise trader risk at 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively.  
 
With regards to the positive relationship between noise trader risk and leverage, Table 
6.4 shows that there are 77 companies (42.78%) at 10% level of confidence. A 
positive relationship implies that information referring to a rise in leverage will cause 
more noise trader risk. In addition, there are 74 stocks (41.11%) and 70 firms (38.89%) 
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where we find that noise trader risk and leverage are statistically significantly 
positively related at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. Appendix 6.3 shows 
that Wuliangye Yibin Company Limited, Shenzhen Airport Company Limited, Shan 
Dong Dong-E E-Jiao Company Limited, Lonkey Industrial Company Limited and 
Guangzhou Cifco Industry Company Limited are the top five companies with the 
largest positive leverage effect on noise trader risk.  
 
Observations of statistically significant negative leverage effect illustrate that 60 
companies (33.33%) are statistically significant at 10% level of confidence. A 
negative leverage effect implies that more leverage will cause less noise trader risk. In 
addition, there are 59 stocks (32.78%) and 57 firms (31.67%) which illustrate 
negative relationship between leverage and noise trader risk at 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively. Appendix 6.3 shows that Guoyuan Securities Company 
Limited, Changsha Tongcheng Holdings Company Limited, Searainbow Holding 
Company Limited, Shanghai Kehua Bio-Engineering Company Limited and 
Kingdream Public Company Limited are the top five companies with the biggest 
negative leverage effect on noise trader risk. The higher probability of positive 
leverage effect than negative effect implies that information referring to a rise in 
leverage (more debt) will cause more noise trader risk.  
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6.4.4.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURE PER SHARE (CAPEX) 
The observations of column of capital expenditure (CAPEX) indicate that there are 
141 (78.33%) firms which exhibit statistically significant relationship between noise 
trader risk and CAPEX at 10% level of confidence. In addition, there are 133 
companies (73.89%) and 122 firms (67.78%) which exhibit that noise trader risk and 
CAPEX are related at 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.  
 
As shown in Table 6.4, there are 64 companies (35.56%) which exhibit statistically 
significant positive relationship between noise trader risk and CAPEX at 10% level of 
confidence. A positive CAPEX effect suggests that more CAPEX will cause more 
noise trader risk. In addition, there are 61 firms (33.89%) and 58 stocks (32.22%) 
which illustrate that a rise in CAPEX will lead to more noise trader risk at 5% and 1% 
level of significance respectively. Appendix 6.3 Shenzhen Fountain Corporation, 
Shenyang Ingenious Development Company Limited, Dongfang Electronics 
Company Limited, Shahe Industrial Company Limited and Shanghai Kehua 
Bio-Engineering Company Limited are the top five companies with the biggest 
positive capital expenditure effect on noise trader risk.  
 
As for the negative CAPEX effect, our results show that there are 77 stocks (42.78%) 
at 10 % level of confidence. A negative relationship between CAPEX and noise trader 
risk implies that an increase in capital expenditure will cause less noise trader risk. In 
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addition, we find 72 (40.00%) firms and 64 (35.56%) firms with statistically 
significant negative relationship between noise trader risk and capital expenditure at 5% 
and 1% level of confidence respectively. Appendix 6.3 shows that Xinjiang Tianshan 
Wool Tex Stock Company Limited, Changjiang Securities Company Limited, 
Kingdream Public Company Limited, Beijing Ccid Media Investments Company 
Limited and Northeast Electric Development Company Limited are the top five 
companies which exhibit the biggest negative capital expenditure effect on noise 
trader risk. The higher probability of negative CAPEX effect than positive effect 
implies that an increase in capital expenditure will cause less noise trader risk.  
 
6.4.4.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND EARNINGS 
PER SHARE (PROFITABILITY)  
The observations of column of earnings per share (profitability) demonstrate that 146 
(81.11%) firms exhibit statistically significant relationship between noise trader risk 
and earnings per share at 10% level of confidence. In addition, there are 136 
companies (75.56%) and 127 firms (70.56%) which exhibit that noise trader risk and 
profitability are related at 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.  
 
The positive relationship between noise trader risk and earnings per share indicates 
that a rise in profitability will cause more noise trader risk. The empirical results show 
that there are 69 companies (38.33%), 64 firms (35.56%) and 60 stocks (33.33%) 
which illustrate that information referring to a rise in profitability will lead to more 
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noise trader risk at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. Appendix 6.3 
Xuanhua Construction Machinery Company Limited, Sichuan New Hope 
Agribusiness Company Limited, Hefei Department Store Group Company Limited, 
Northeast Electric Development Company Limited and Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone Real Estate（Group）Company Limited are the top five companies with the 
highest positive profitability effect on noise trader risk.  
 
As for the negative profitability effect, we find that that there are 77 stocks (42.78%) 
at 10 % level of confidence. A negative profitability effect implies that there is less 
noise trader risk on the information day when information referring to a rise in 
profitability is released in the stock market. In addition, observed results show that 
there are 72 (40.00%) firms and 67 (37.22%) firms with statistically significant 
negative relationship between noise trader risk and earnings per share at 5% and 1% 
level of confidence respectively. Appendix 6.3 shows that Wanxiang Qianchao 
Company Limited, Changsha Tongcheng Holdings Company Limited, Beijing Ccid 
Media Investments Company Limited, China Cifco Industry Company Limited and 
Jiangsu Wujiang China Eastern Silk Market Company Limited are the top five 
companies which exhibit the biggest negative profitability effect on noise trader risk. 
The higher probability of negative profitability effect than positive effect implies that 
information referring to a rise in profitability causes less noise trader risk.  
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6.4.4.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND PRICE TO 
BOOK RATIO  
Table 6.4 shows that there are 145 stocks (80.56%) which exhibit that noise trader 
risk and price to book ratio are statistically significant related at 10% level of 
confidence. Additionally, there are 141 stocks (78.33%) and 131 companies (72.78%) 
which have statistically significant price to book ratio  effect on noise trader risk at 5% 
and 1% level of confidence respectively.  
 
With regards to the positive relationship, Table 6.4 shows that there are 66 companies 
(36.67%) which exhibit statistically significant relationship between noise trader risk 
and price to book ratio at 10% level of confidence. A positive relationship between 
noise trader risk and price to book ratio suggests that noise trader risk will prefer 
firms with higher ratio. In addition, there are 64 stocks (35.56%) and 58 firms 
(32.22%) where we find that noise trader risk and price to book ratio are statistically 
significant positively related at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. Appendix 
6.3 shows that Luxi Chemical Group Company Limited, Hebei Iron And Steel 
Company Limited, Tianjin Good Hand Railway Holding Company Limited, 
Dongguan Winnerway Industrial Zone Company Limited and Jilin Power Share 
Company Limited are the top five companies with the largest positive price to book 
ratio effect on noise trader risk.  
 
Observations of negative price to book ratio effect show that 79 companies (43.89%) 
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have statistically significant results at 10% level of confidence. It implies that firms 
with higher ratio will have less noise trader risk. In addition, there are 77 stocks 
(42.78%) and 73 firms (40.56%) which shows negative relationship between price to 
book ratio and noise trader risk at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. 
Appendix 6.3 shows that Xinjiang Tianshan Cement Company Limited, Shenzhen 
Zhenye (Group) Company Limited, China International Marine Containers (Group) 
Company Limited, Shenzhen Airport Company Limited and Shan Dong Dong-E 
E-Jiao Company Limited are the top five companies with the biggest negative price to 
book ratio effect on noise trader risk. The higher probability of negative price to book 
ratio effect than positive effect implies that information referring to a rise in price to 
book ratio causes less noise trader risk.  
 
6.4.4.6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOISE TRADER RISK AND SALES PER 
SHARE (SIZE) 
Table 6.4 shows that there are 146 stocks (81.11%) which exhibit statistically 
significant relationship between noise trader risk and sales per share (firm size) at 10% 
level of confidence. Moreover, our findings show that 138 stocks (76.67%) and 129 
companies (71.76%) have statistically significant firm size effect on noise trader risk 
at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively.  
 
Observed results of the positive relationship between noise trader risk and sales per 
share in the Table 6.4 show that there are 79 companies (43.89%) at 10% level of 
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confidence. A positive relationship between noise trader risk and firm size suggests 
that noise trader risk will prefer firms with larger size. In addition, there are 75 stocks 
(41.67%) and 70 firms (38.89%) where noise trader risk and sales per share are 
statistically significant positively related at5% and 1% level of confidence 
respectively. Appendix 6.3 shows that Xinjiang Tianshan Wool Tex Stock Company 
Limited, Shenzhen Fountain Corporation, Shenzhen Zhongjin Lingnan Nonfemet 
Company Limited, Shenzhen Properties and Resources Development (Group) 
Company Limited and Searainbow Holding Company Limited are the top five 
companies with the largest positive size effect on noise trader risk.  
 
Observations of negative size effect show that 67 companies (37.22%) are statistically 
significant at 10% level of confidence. A negative size effect implies large firm will 
have less noise trader risk. In addition, there are 63 stocks (35.00%) and 59 firms 
(32.78%) which shows negative relationship between size  and noise trader risk at 5% 
and 1% level of confidence respectively. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Palomino (1996) who shows that noise traders prevail more in small firms. Appendix 
6.3 shows that Guangdong Baolihua New Energy Stock Company Limited, Taifu 
Industry Company Limited, Shijiazhuang Baoshi Electronic Glass Company Limited, 
Shenzhen Agricultural Products Company Limited and Shan Dong Dong-E E-Jiao 
Company Limited are the top five companies with the biggest negative size effect on 
noise trader risk. The higher probability of positive size effect than negative effect 
implies that large firm causes more noise trader risk. 
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6.4.5 FUNDAMENTAL EFFECTS ON NOISE TRADER RISK (MU) COMBINING 
WITH EFFECTS OF SEASONALITY, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MARKET 
SENTIMENT 
Table 6.5 A to Table 6.5 D present fundamental effects on noise trader risk with 
combing effects of seasonality, financial crisis and market sentiment by estimating 
Equation 6.8. Note that we do not report the appendices of this equation for brevity 
purposes. Observed results confirm that finance fundamentals are associated with the 
potential for noise trading, and there are effects of financial crisis, seasonality and 
market sentiment on noise trader risk. 
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Table 6.5A: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010  
  
Turnover Ratio 
 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Capital Expenditure 
per Share 
 
Earnings per 
Share 
 
Price to Book ratio 
 
Sales per 
Share 
 
At 1% level of significance    
Number of Significant 96 150 156 149 149 154 
Positive 41 83 72 66 86 56 
Negative 55 67 84 83 63 98 
Percentage of Significant 53.33% 83.33% 86.67% 82.78% 82.78% 85.56% 
Positive 22.78% 46.11% 40.00% 36.67% 47.78% 31.11% 
Negative 30.56% 37.22% 46.67% 46.11% 35.00% 54.44% 
At 5% level of significance    
Number of Significant 112 157 157 159 155 161 
Positive 46 86 73 68 88 62 
Negative 66 71 84 91 67 99 
Percentage of Significant 62.22% 87.22% 87.22% 88.33% 86.11% 89.44% 
Positive 25.56% 47.78% 40.56% 37.78% 48.89% 34.44% 
Negative 36.67% 39.44% 46.67% 50.56% 37.22% 55.00% 
At 10% level of significance    
Number of Significant 123 160 162 162 158 166 
Positive 52 87 75 70 90 64 
Negative 71 73 87 92 68 102 
Percentage of Significant 68.33% 88.89% 90.00% 90.00% 87.78% 92.22% 
Positive 28.89% 48.33% 41.67% 38.89% 50.00% 35.56% 
Negative 39.44% 40.56% 48.33% 51.11% 37.78% 56.67% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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Table 6.5.B: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 
  Global Financial Crisis Monday Tuesday Thursday Friday 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of Significant 145 24 16 18 26 
POSITIVE 53 17 7 11 14 
NEGATIVE 92 7 9 7 12 
Percentage of Significant 80.56% 13.33% 8.89% 10.00% 14.44% 
POSITIVE 29.44% 9.44% 3.89% 6.11% 7.78% 
NEGATIVE 51.11% 3.89% 5.00% 3.89% 6.67% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 148 36 29 32 37 
POSITIVE 55 24 14 18 19 
NEGATIVE 93 12 15 14 18 
Percentage of Significant 82.22% 20.00% 16.11% 17.78% 20.56% 
POSITIVE 30.56% 13.33% 7.78% 10.00% 10.56% 
NEGATIVE 51.67% 6.67% 8.33% 7.78% 10.00% 
At 10% level of significance 
Number of Significant 149 43 39 45 49 
POSITIVE 55 27 19 28 23 
NEGATIVE 94 16 20 17 26 
Percentage of Significant 82.78% 23.89% 21.67% 25.00% 27.22% 
POSITIVE 30.56% 15.00% 10.56% 15.56% 12.78% 
NEGATIVE 52.22% 8.89% 11.11% 9.44% 14.44% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 
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Table 6.5.C: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 
  January March April May June July August September October November December 
At 1% level of significance 
Number of Significant 97 96 122 114 127 132 125 125 130 121 123 
POSITIVE 35 40 49 49 57 58 59 57 60 68 73 
NEGATIVE 62 56 73 65 70 74 66 68 70 53 50 
Percentage of Significant 53.89% 53.33% 67.78% 63.33% 70.56% 73.33% 69.44% 69.44% 72.22% 67.22% 68.33% 
POSITIVE 19.44% 22.22% 27.22% 27.22% 31.67% 32.22% 32.78% 31.67% 33.33% 37.78% 40.56% 
NEGATIVE 34.44% 31.11% 40.56% 36.11% 38.89% 41.11% 36.67% 37.78% 38.89% 29.44% 27.78% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 109 111 133 124 136 144 137 133 143 131 137 
POSITIVE 40 48 58 53 61 62 64 62 65 74 81 
NEGATIVE 69 63 75 71 75 82 73 71 78 57 56 
Percentage of Significant 60.56% 61.67% 73.89% 68.89% 75.56% 80.00% 76.11% 73.89% 79.44% 72.78% 76.11% 
POSITIVE 22.22% 26.67% 32.22% 29.44% 33.89% 34.44% 35.56% 34.44% 36.11% 41.11% 45.00% 
NEGATIVE 38.33% 35.00% 41.67% 39.44% 41.67% 45.56% 40.56% 39.44% 43.33% 31.67% 31.11% 
At 10% level of significance 
Number of Significant 117 117 137 127 143 148 142 140 149 133 138 
POSITIVE 45 50 61 55 66 65 67 64 70 74 81 
NEGATIVE 72 67 76 72 77 83 75 76 79 59 57 
Percentage of Significant 65.00% 65.00% 76.11% 70.56% 79.44% 82.22% 78.89% 77.78% 82.78% 73.89% 76.67% 
POSITIVE 25.00% 27.78% 33.89% 30.56% 36.67% 36.11% 37.22% 35.56% 38.89% 41.11% 45.00% 
NEGATIVE 40.00% 37.22% 42.22% 40.00% 42.78% 46.11% 41.67% 42.22% 43.89% 32.78% 31.67% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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Table 6.5.D: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment on Noise Trader Risk for Period 2002-2010 
  Pre-long-holiday Pre-short-holiday Post-long-holiday Post-short-holiday Bullish Market 
At 1% level of significance 
Number of Significant 46 61 32 20 152 
POSITIVE 21 25 16 15 66 
NEGATIVE 25 36 16 5 86 
Percentage of Significant 25.56% 33.89% 17.78% 11.11% 84.44% 
POSITIVE 11.67% 13.89% 8.89% 8.33% 36.67% 
NEGATIVE 13.89% 20.00% 8.89% 2.78% 47.78% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 55 69 39 20 158 
POSITIVE 26 29 22 15 67 
NEGATIVE 29 40 17 5 91 
Percentage of Significant 30.56% 38.33% 21.67% 11.11% 87.78% 
POSITIVE 14.44% 16.11% 12.22% 8.33% 37.22% 
NEGATIVE 16.11% 22.22% 9.44% 2.78% 50.56% 
At 10% level of significance 
Number of Significant 60 82 45 23 159 
POSITIVE 28 36 25 15 67 
NEGATIVE 32 46 20 8 92 
Percentage of Significant 33.33% 45.56% 25.00% 12.78% 88.33% 
POSITIVE 15.56% 20.00% 13.89% 8.33% 37.22% 
NEGATIVE 17.78% 25.56% 11.11% 4.44% 51.11% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 
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6.4.6 BINARY CHOICE ESTIMATES: OVERREACTION AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FACTOR 
Table 6.6 presents the number and percentage of statistically significant relationship 
between overreaction and fundamental factors for period 2002-2010 after estimating 
Equation 6.9. Moreover, Table 6.6 summarizes the results of positive relationship and 
negative relationship at various levels of significance and for brevity purposes we do 
not report the coefficients which are estimates of corresponding fundamental factors 
in Equation 6.9 for 180 companies. As discussed in Chapter Three, overreaction 
implies that Chinese traders are opposing noise traders but they overshoot their 
forecasting error. In order words, information traders cause noise trader risk by 
overreaction. Note that we do not report appendices of this equation for brevity 
purposes.
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Table 6.6: The Relationship between Overreaction and Fundamental Factors for period 2002 -2010 
  Turnover ratio  Debt to Equity Ratio Earnings per Share  
Capital Expenditure 
per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio  
Sales per Share 
At 1% level of significance    
Number of Significant 81 45 36 30 46 37 
POSITIVE 81 26 22 18 33 22 
NEGATIVE 0 19 14 12 13 15 
Percentage of Significant 45.00% 25.00% 20.00% 16.67% 25.56% 20.56% 
POSITIVE 45.00% 14.44% 12.22% 10.00% 18.33% 12.22% 
NEGATIVE 0.00% 10.56% 7.78% 6.67% 7.22% 8.33% 
At 5% level of significance    
Number of Significant 103 64 64 59 70 59 
POSITIVE 103 38 35 29 46 39 
NEGATIVE 0 26 29 30 24 20 
Percentage of Significant 57.22% 35.56% 35.56% 32.78% 38.89% 32.78% 
POSITIVE 57.22% 21.11% 19.44% 16.11% 25.56% 21.67% 
NEGATIVE 0.00% 14.44% 16.11% 16.67% 13.33% 11.11% 
At 10% level of significance   
Number of Significant 121 79 71 75 89 72 
POSITIVE 120 46 39 37 56 47 
NEGATIVE 1 33 32 38 33 25 
Percentage of Significant 67.22% 43.89% 39.44% 41.67% 49.44% 40.00% 
POSITIVE 66.67% 25.56% 21.67% 20.56% 31.11% 26.11% 
NEGATIVE 0.56% 18.33% 17.78% 21.11% 18.33% 13.89% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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6.4.6.1 OVERREACTION AND LIQUIDITY 
The observations of column of turnover ratio (proxy for liquidity) show that there are 
121 (67.22%) firms which exhibit statistically significant relationship between 
overreaction and turnover ratio at 10% level of confidence. In addition, there are 103 
companies (57.22%) and 81 firms (45.00%) which exhibit that overreaction and 
turnover ratio are related at 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.  
 
A positive relationship between overreaction and turnover ratio indicates that a rise in 
liquidity will cause more overreaction. In other word, an increase in turnover ratio 
will lead information traders to overreact more which in turn will result in more noise 
trader risk in the stock market. The empirical results show that there are 120 
companies (66.67%), 103 firms (57.22%) and 81 stocks (45.00%) which illustrate the 
positive liquidity effect on noise trader risk at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively. Guangdong Electric Power Development Company Limited, Beijing 
Shougang Company Limited, Bengang Steel Plates Company Limited, China 
Resource Sanjiu Medical & Pharmaceutical Company Limited and Yantai Changyu 
Pioneer Wine Company Limited are the top five companies with the biggest positive 
liquidity effect on overreaction.  
 
As for the negative liquidity effect (a rise in liquidity will decrease overreaction) on 
overreaction, the results show that there is one stock (0.56%) at 10 % level of 
confidence and this company is Huayi Compressor Company Limited. In addition, 
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there is no firm with statistically significant negative relationship between 
overreaction and turnover ratio at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively.  
 
6.4.6.2 OVERREACTION AND LEVERAGE EFFECT 
Table 6.6 shows that there are 79 stocks (43.89%) which exhibit that overreaction and 
debt to equity ratio are statistically significantly related at 10% level of confidence. 
Additionally, there are 64 stocks (35.56%) and 45 companies (25.00%) which have 
leverage effect on noise trader risk at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively.  
 
Referring to the positive relationship between overreaction and debt to equity ratio, 
Table 6.6 shows that there are 46 companies (25.56%), 38 stocks (21.11%) and 26 
firms (14.44%) where noise trader risk and debt to equity ratio are statistically 
significantly positively related at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. A 
positive relationship implies that a rise in leverage will cause more overreaction. He 
Bei Cheng De Lolo Company Limited, Dongfang Electronics Company Limited, 
Shan Dong Dong-E E-Jiao Company Limited, Hualan Biological Engineering 
Industry Company Limited, Tianjin Good Hand Railway Holding Company Limited 
are the top five companies with the largest positive leverage effect on overreaction.  
 
The observations from negative leverage effect show that 33 companies (18.33%) 
were statistically significant at 10% level of confidence. A negative leverage effect 
implies that when a firm increases their leverage it has a tendency to cause less 
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overreaction. In addition, there are 26 stocks (14.44%) and 19 firms (10.56%) which 
shows negative relationship between debt to equity ratio and noise trader risk at 5% 
and 1% level of confidence respectively. Shenzhen Kaifa Technology Co., Ltd, Softto 
Company Limited, Wuhan Department Store Group Company Limited, Northeast 
Electric Development Company Limited and Shanghai Kehua Bio-Engineering 
Company Limited are the top five companies with the biggest negative leverage effect 
on overreaction.  
 
6.4.6.3 OVERREACTION AND PROFITABILITY 
The observations of column of earnings per share show that 71 (39.44%) firms which 
exhibit statistically significant relationship between overreaction and earnings per 
share at 10% level of confidence. In addition, there are 64 companies (35.56%) and 
36 firms (20.00%) which exhibit that overreaction and earnings per share are related 
at 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.  
 
Empirical results of the positive relationship show that there are 39 companies 
(21.67%) which illustrate that information referring to a rise in profitability will cause 
more overreaction at 10% level of confidence. A positive relationship suggests that 
information traders are more likely to cause noise trader risk by overreaction when 
there good news in terms of profitability. Additionally, there are 35 firms (19.44%) 
and 22 stocks (12.22%) with statistically significant positive relationship at 5% and 1% 
level of significance respectively. Xuanhua Construction Machinery Company 
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Limited, Xinjiang Tianshan Wool Tex Stock Company Limited, Lonkey Industrial 
Company Limited, Guangzhou Beijing New Building Materials Public Company 
Limited and Shanghai Kehua Bio-Engineering Company Limited are the top five 
companies with the biggest positive profitability effect on overreaction.  
 
As for the negative profitability effect, the observed results show that there are 32 
stocks (17.78%) at 10 % level of confidence. A negative profitability effect suggests a 
rise in profitability of firm will cause less overreaction. In addition, we document 29 
(16.11%) firms and 14 (7.78%) firms with statistically significant negative 
relationship between overreaction and earnings per share at 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively. Sound Environmental Resources Company Limited, Taifu 
Industry Company Limited, Huatian Hotel Group Company Limited, Beijing Ccid 
Media Investments Company Limited, Jiangsu Wujiang China Eastern Silk Market 
Company Limited are the top five companies which exhibit the biggest negative 
profitability effect on overreaction.  
 
6.4.6.4 OVERREACTION AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE  
As shown in Table 6.6, there are 75 (41.67%) firms which exhibit statistically 
significant relationship between overreaction and capital expenditure at 10% level of 
confidence. In addition, there are 59 companies (32.78%) and 30 firms (16.67%) 
where noise trader risk and capital expenditure are related at 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively.  
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A positive capital expenditure effect on overreaction indicates that information traders 
will be more likely to overreact on the information day when there is a rise in capital 
expenditure. The empirical results show that there are 37 companies (20.56%), 29 
firms (16.11%) and 18 stocks (10.00%) which illustrate that a rise in capital 
expenditure will lead to more noise trader risk at 10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively. On the other hand, we also find a negative capital 
expenditure effect as there are 38 stocks (21.11%) at 10 % level of confidence. It 
implies that there is a probability of 21.11% that a rise in capital expenditure will lead 
information traders to take less overreaction.  
 
6.4.6.5 OVERREACTION AND FIRM SIZE EFFECT  
Table 6.6 shows that there are 89 stocks (49.44%) which exhibit a significant 
relationship between noise trader risk and price to book ratio at 10% level of 
confidence. Additionally, there are 70 stocks (38.89%) and 46 companies (25.56%) 
which have statistically significant price to book ratio effect on overreaction at 5% 
and 1% level of confidence respectively.  
 
In terms of the positive relationship, Table 6.6 shows that there are 56 companies 
(31.11%), 46 stocks (25.56%) and 33 firms (18.33%) which depict a positive 
relationship between overreaction and price to book ratio at 10%, 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively. A positive relationship implies that firms with higher ratio 
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tend to have more overreaction. Ningxia Meili Paper Industry Company Limited, 
Luxi Chemical Group Company Limited, Xinxing Ductile Iron Pipes Company 
Limited, Guangdong Provincial Expressway Development Company Limited and 
Xian Kaiyuan Holding Group Company Limited are the top five companies with the 
largest positive price to book ratio effect on overreaction.  
 
The observations of negative price to book ratio effect on overreaction show that 33 
companies (18.33%) are statistically significant at 10% level of confidence. In 
addition, there are 24 stocks (13.33%) and 13 firms (7.22%) which shows negative 
relationship between price to book ratio and overreaction at 5% and 1% level of 
confidence respectively.  
 
6.4.6.6 OVERREACTION AND SIZE  
As shown in Table 6.6, there are 72 stocks (40.00%), 59 stocks (32.78%) and 37 
companies (20.56%) where we find statistically significant relationship between 
overreaction and size (sales per share) at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence 
respectively.  Similar to the other variables we find both positive and negative 
effects. 
 
6.4.7 BINARY CHOICE ESTIMATES: EXPLAINING IPE WITH FUNDAMENTAL 
FACTORS 
Table 6.7 presents the number and percentage of statistically significant relationship 
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between IPE and fundamental factors for period 2002-2010 by estimating Equation 
6.10. Moreover, Table 6.7 summarizes the results of positive relationship and negative 
relationship at various levels of significance and for brevity purposes we do not report 
the coefficients which are estimates of corresponding fundamental factors in Equation 
6.10 for 180 companies. As discussed in Chapter Three, when the information traders 
do not oppose the noise traders but decides to join them by adding to the existing 
errors, this is regarded as an information pricing error (IPE). In other words, IPE 
implies that sophisticated users like professional traders behave as noise traders and 
increase noise trader risk. In addition, it is to be noted that Eviews cannot estimate 
these values for two firms and the sample was reduced to 178 firms.
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Table 6.7: The Relationship between IPE and Fundamental Factors for period 2002 -2010 
  Turnover ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
Earnings per 
Share 
Price to Book ratio 
Capital Expenditure 
per Share 
Sales per Share 
At 1% level of significance    
Number of Significant 50 36 30 27 28 40 
POSITIVE 50 15 16 19 18 27 
NEGATIVE 0 21 14 8 10 13 
Percentage of Significant 28.09% 20.22% 16.85% 15.17% 15.73% 22.47% 
POSITIVE 28.09% 8.43% 8.99% 10.67% 10.11% 15.17% 
NEGATIVE 0.00% 11.80% 7.87% 4.49% 5.62% 7.30% 
At 5% level of significance   
Number of Significant 77 56 54 46 56 54 
POSITIVE 77 27 28 24 36 33 
NEGATIVE 0 29 26 22 20 21 
Percentage of Significant 43.26% 31.46% 30.34% 25.84% 31.46% 30.34% 
POSITIVE 43.26% 15.17% 15.73% 13.48% 20.22% 18.54% 
NEGATIVE 0.00% 16.29% 14.61% 12.36% 11.24% 11.80% 
At 10% level of significance    
Number of Significant 97 69 66 63 71 62 
POSITIVE 97 34 34 32 45 37 
NEGATIVE 0 35 32 31 26 25 
Percentage of Significant 54.49% 38.76% 37.08% 35.39% 39.89% 34.83% 
POSITIVE 54.49% 19.10% 19.10% 17.98% 25.28% 20.79% 
NEGATIVE 0.00% 19.66% 17.98% 17.42% 14.61% 14.04% 
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 
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6.4.7.1 IPE AND LIQUIDITY 
The observations of column of turnover ratio show that there are 97 (54.49%) firms 
which exhibit statistically significant relationship between overreaction and turnover 
ratio at 10% level of confidence. In addition, there are 77 companies (43.26%) and 50 
firms (28.09%) which have statistically significant positive relationship between 
overreaction and turnover ratio at 5% and 1% level of confidence. Interestingly, all 
these firms have positive liquidity effect on IPE. It implies that information traders are 
more likely to behave as noise traders on days when liquidity is high.  
 
6.4.7.2 IPE AND LEVERAGE 
Table 6.7 shows that there are 69 stocks (38.76%), 56 companies (31.46%) and 36 
(20.22%) firms where there is a relationship between IPE and leverage (measured by 
debt to equity ratio). We find both a positive and a negative relationship. For instance 
there are 34 companies (19.10%) with positive relationship and 35 companies 
(19.66%) for negative relationship at 10% level of confidence. A positive (negative) 
relationship implies that a rise in firm’s debt will cause more (less) information 
traders to take the same activities as noise traders. 
 
6.4.7.3 IPE AND PROFITABILITY  
The observations from the column of earnings per share show that there are 66 
(37.08%), 54 (30.34%) and 30 (16.85%) firms which exhibit statistically significant 
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relationship between IPE and profitability at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively (see Table 6.7). Empirical results of statistically significant positive 
relationship show that 34 companies (19.10%) and 32 stocks (17.98%) for the 
negative relationship at 10% level of confidence. A positive (negative) relationship 
implies that IPE increase (decrease) with an increase in profitability 
6.4.7.4 IPE AND PRICE TO BOOK RATIO 
The observations of column of price to book ratio find that there are 63 (35.39%), 46 
(25.84%) and 27 (15.17%) firms which exhibit a relationship between price to book 
ratio and IPE at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. In terms of 
positive relationship, we find that there are 32 companies (17.98%) that exhibit a 
statistically significant relationship. On the other hand, we find 31 companies 
(17.42%) with statistically significant negative relationship at 10% level of 
confidence. The general conclusion that can be drawn is that price to book ratio 
matters when it comes to IPE. 
6.4.7.5 IPE AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Table 6.7 shows that there are 71 stocks (39.89%), 56 companies (31.46%) and 28 
(15.73%) firms which exhibit a relationship between capital expenditure and IPE. We 
find that there is a larger proportion of positive relationship than negative relationship 
for this variable implying IPE is more pronounced when there is more capital 
spending. As shown in Table 6.7, there are 62 stocks (34.83%), 54 stocks (30.34%) 
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and 40 companies (22.47%) which exhibit statistically significant relationship 
between IPE and sales per share (size) at 10%, 5% and 1% level of confidence 
respectively.  
 
6.4.8 BINARY CHOICE ESTIMATES: UNDERREACTION WITH 
FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS 
Table 6.8 presents the number and percentage of statistically significant relationship 
between underreaction and fundamental factors for period 2002-2010 by estimating 
Equation 6.11. Moreover, Table 6.8 summarizes the results of positive relationship 
and negative relationship at various levels of significance and for brevity purposes we 
do not report the coefficients which are estimates of corresponding fundamental 
factors in Equation 6.11 for 180 companies. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
underreaction occurs when a noise trader commit an error and the information traders 
oppose them but fails to ensure that EMH holds. It shows that the information traders 
has taken the accurate strategy but underreacted to this news arrival.  
 
Our results show that finance fundamentals have major influence on underreaction in 
that (1) liquidity affects 55.06% of the firms, (2) leverage affects 38.76% of our 
sample, (3) profitability affects 36.52% of companies, (4) price to book ratio matters 
in 34.83% of firms, (5) capital expenditure plays an important role in just under 40% 
of our sample and (6) size (sales per share) affects 35.39% of firms. Furthermore, we 
find both positive and negative relationships between underreaction and the various 
 278 
 
finance fundamentals.
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Table 6.8: The Relationship between Underreaction and Fundamental Factors for period 2002 -2010 
  Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Earnings per Share 
Price to book 
ratio 
Sales per Share 
At 1% level of significance   
Number of Significant 51 36 28 30 26 41 
POSITIVE 51 15 18 16 18 28 
NEGATIVE 0 21 10 14 8 13 
Percentage of Significant 28.65% 20.22% 15.73% 16.85% 14.61% 23.03% 
POSITIVE 28.65% 8.43% 10.11% 8.99% 10.11% 15.73% 
NEGATIVE 0.00% 11.80% 5.62% 7.87% 4.49% 7.30% 
At 5% level of significance    
Number of Significant 78 56 56 53 45 55 
POSITIVE 78 27 36 28 23 34 
NEGATIVE 0 29 20 25 22 21 
Percentage of Significant 43.82% 31.46% 31.46% 29.78% 25.28% 30.90% 
POSITIVE 43.82% 15.17% 20.22% 15.73% 12.92% 19.10% 
NEGATIVE 0.00% 16.29% 11.24% 14.04% 12.36% 11.80% 
At 10% level of significance   
Number of Significant 98 69 71 65 62 63 
POSITIVE 98 34 45 34 31 38 
NEGATIVE 0 35 26 31 31 25 
Percentage of Significant 55.06% 38.76% 39.89% 36.52% 34.83% 35.39% 
POSITIVE 55.06% 19.10% 25.28% 19.10% 17.42% 21.35% 
NEGATIVE 0.00% 19.66% 14.61% 17.42% 17.42% 14.04% 
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 
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6.4.9 ROBUSTNESS TEST USING BEHAVIOURAL ERROR AS A MEASURE OF 
NOISE TRADER RISK 
So far we have tested whether fundamental factors affect noise trader risk. The 
evidence provided shows that finance fundamentals are key factors influencing noise 
trader risk where noise trader risk was estimated using mu. We repeat these 
procedures using behavioural error as another proxy for noise trader risk as a 
robustness test. Appendices 6.4 to 6.7 provide details of our results which reinforce 
our general finding that finance fundamentals are important factors.  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The unique contribution of this thesis is documented in this chapter where we explain 
noise trader risk using finance fundamentals as the literature is silent in this field. 
Even though finance fundamentals are correlated with each other, there is no evidence 
to provide that multicollinearity is a major econometric problem in the analysis. Our 
results show that finance fundamentals like liquidity, leverage, profitability, size, 
capital expenditure, and price to book ratio affect (1) noise traders risk, (2) 
overreaction, (3) IPE and (4) underreaction. The implication is that arbitrageurs need 
to understand the source of the noise trading before they oppose them.
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies  
 
 SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.02  1.00  
    
EPS 0.46  0.05  1.00  
   
P/B 0.30  -0.04  0.16  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.08  0.59  -0.22  -0.18  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.44  0.02  0.73  0.22  -0.25  1.00  
 
 
 TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.20  1.00  
    
EPS 0.35  -0.42  1.00  
   
P/B 0.33  0.03  0.00  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.30  -0.09  0.07  -0.18  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.01  -0.24  0.40  -0.03  0.79  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.46  1.00  
    
EPS 0.13  -0.63  1.00  
   
P/B 0.38  -0.54  0.25  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.34  -0.41  0.15  0.44  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.27  -0.80  0.71  0.38  0.50  1.00  
 
 
 GUOXING RONGDA RLST 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.26  1.00  
    
EPS 0.11  -0.25  1.00  
   
P/B -0.28  0.84  -0.27  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.07  -0.16  -0.12  -0.25  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.04  0.49  -0.19  0.16  0.28  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.34  1.00  
    
EPS 0.34  -0.77  1.00  
   
P/B 0.31  -0.43  0.71  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.24  -0.06  -0.10  -0.27  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.36  -0.69  0.85  0.83  -0.36  1.00  
 
 
 GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.03  1.00  
    
EPS 0.11  0.51  1.00  
   
P/B -0.37  -0.05  -0.36  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.12  0.19  -0.03  -0.14  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.53  -0.07  0.27  -0.73  0.24  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 282 
 
Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 JIZHONG ENERGY RES. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.03  1.00  
    
EPS 0.38  0.31  1.00  
   
P/B -0.05  0.15  0.20  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.19  0.53  0.70  0.22  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.25  0.54  0.75  0.34  0.82  1.00  
 
 
 XUANHUA CON.MCH. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.37  1.00  
    
EPS -0.15  0.00  1.00  
   
P/B -0.17  -0.21  0.48  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.32  0.46  0.25  0.20  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.36  -0.67  0.02  0.11  -0.33  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.34  1.00  
    
EPS 0.04  0.29  1.00  
   
P/B -0.09  -0.59  0.26  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.21  0.57  0.47  -0.23  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.30  0.71  0.28  -0.33  0.35  1.00  
 
 
 BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.53  1.00  
    
EPS 0.46  0.85  1.00  
   
P/B 0.43  0.39  0.45  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.31  0.77  0.71  0.22  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.62  0.92  0.79  0.46  0.65  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.49  1.00  
    
EPS 0.15  0.16  1.00  
   
P/B 0.51  0.37  0.15  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.30  0.33  0.58  0.33  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.42  0.68  0.45  0.51  0.51  1.00  
 
 
 XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.10  1.00  
    
EPS 0.11  -0.60  1.00  
   
P/B 0.20  -0.30  0.40  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.03  -0.34  0.63  0.17  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.26  -0.25  0.81  0.35  0.41  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP) 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.31  1.00  
    
EPS -0.11  -0.23  1.00  
   
P/B -0.12  0.25  -0.27  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.23  0.21  -0.03  -0.08  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.42  0.10  -0.24  -0.13  -0.25  1.00  
 
 
 SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.24  1.00  
    
EPS -0.19  -0.21  1.00  
   
P/B 0.22  0.60  -0.33  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.04  -0.07  0.52  -0.02  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.21  0.05  -0.01  0.15  -0.23  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.24  1.00  
    
EPS -0.27  0.06  1.00  
   
P/B 0.41  0.13  -0.09  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.08  0.91  0.02  0.44  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.27  -0.43  0.22  0.29  -0.23  1.00  
 
 
 XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.32  1.00  
    
EPS -0.04  -0.12  1.00  
   
P/B 0.26  0.14  -0.10  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.32  0.69  0.35  0.17  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.05  0.14  0.02  -0.17  -0.10  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 MCC MEILI PAPERIND. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.08  1.00  
    
EPS -0.07  0.17  1.00  
   
P/B 0.26  -0.31  -0.58  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.13  0.07  -0.25  0.69  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.37  -0.11  0.01  0.20  0.28  1.00  
 
 
 JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.19  1.00  
    
EPS 0.14  0.43  1.00  
   
P/B 0.28  0.32  0.79  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.11  0.02  0.04  0.32  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.26  0.57  0.71  0.63  0.08  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.57  1.00  
    
EPS 0.50  -0.40  1.00  
   
P/B 0.33  -0.15  0.22  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.31  0.42  -0.08  -0.23  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.02  -0.07  -0.17  -0.01  -0.46  1.00  
 
 
 GUANGDONG GOWORLD 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.35  1.00  
    
EPS 0.38  -0.65  1.00  
   
P/B 0.13  -0.25  0.07  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.33  0.55  -0.59  -0.07  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.52  -0.39  0.81  -0.12  -0.50  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SOUND ENV.RESOURCES 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.31  1.00  
    
EPS 0.09  0.38  1.00  
   
P/B -0.33  -0.11  -0.33  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.41  0.51  0.45  -0.65  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.13  0.48  0.89  -0.24  0.52  1.00  
 
 
 DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.42  1.00  
    
EPS 0.36  0.30  1.00  
   
P/B 0.02  0.08  -0.51  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.05  -0.03  0.22  -0.32  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.29  -0.26  -0.74  0.53  -0.21  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.20  1.00  
    
EPS 0.25  0.20  1.00  
   
P/B 0.35  0.18  -0.07  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.19  0.59  0.13  0.13  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.37  0.74  0.58  0.28  0.69  1.00  
 
 
 TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.13  1.00  
    
EPS -0.08  -0.14  1.00  
   
P/B -0.11  -0.50  0.15  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.05  0.30  0.19  -0.22  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.02  0.15  0.76  0.09  0.03  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.02  1.00  
    
EPS 0.24  -0.25  1.00  
   
P/B 0.22  -0.11  0.33  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.26  0.36  -0.02  0.24  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.19  0.80  0.18  0.03  0.48  1.00  
 
 
 WULIANGYE YIBIN 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.08  1.00  
    
EPS 0.01  0.73  1.00  
   
P/B 0.11  0.06  0.36  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.07  -0.10  -0.42  -0.44  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.07  0.79  0.93  0.25  -0.44  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.11  1.00  
    
EPS 0.10  0.67  1.00  
   
P/B 0.10  0.63  0.31  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.09  -0.15  -0.51  -0.01  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.13  0.71  0.94  0.30  -0.52  1.00  
 
 
 HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.00  1.00  
    
EPS -0.06  -0.73  1.00  
   
P/B 0.06  -0.67  0.71  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.12  -0.32  0.20  -0.18  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.05  -0.78  0.97  0.76  0.15  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.13  1.00  
    
EPS -0.10  -0.18  1.00  
   
P/B 0.44  -0.14  0.13  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.27  -0.05  0.15  -0.04  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.23  0.30  -0.54  0.19  -0.24  1.00  
 
 
 ANGANG STEEL 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.09  1.00  
    
EPS 0.06  0.03  1.00  
   
P/B 0.00  -0.02  0.47  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.05  0.54  0.52  0.36  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.03  0.48  0.49  0.24  0.56  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 XIANDAI INVESTMENT 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.33  1.00  
    
EPS 0.40  -0.79  1.00  
   
P/B 0.44  -0.55  0.57  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.54  0.55  -0.84  -0.64  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.55  -0.55  0.82  0.62  -0.95  1.00  
 
 
 TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.47  1.00  
    
EPS 0.30  -0.27  1.00  
   
P/B 0.01  0.02  -0.23  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.30  -0.48  0.10  -0.07  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.43  -0.94  0.23  -0.12  0.39  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.17  1.00  
    
EPS -0.11  -0.02  1.00  
   
P/B 0.27  0.31  -0.33  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.19  -0.58  -0.15  -0.50  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.17  0.50  0.18  0.55  -0.82  1.00  
 
 
 HUNAN VALIN STEEL 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.07  1.00  
    
EPS 0.05  -0.22  1.00  
   
P/B 0.08  -0.51  0.17  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.15  0.89  -0.26  -0.51  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.20  0.84  0.06  -0.35  0.70  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.22  1.00  
    
EPS 0.23  0.83  1.00  
   
P/B -0.07  0.57  0.31  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.20  0.75  0.84  0.41  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.07  0.88  0.78  0.49  0.65  1.00  
 
 
 CSG HOLDING 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.05  1.00  
    
EPS 0.14  0.31  1.00  
   
P/B 0.14  -0.31  0.00  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.24  0.56  0.32  -0.29  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.34  0.30  0.76  0.20  0.35  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.19  1.00  
    
EPS -0.14  0.74  1.00  
   
P/B 0.12  0.02  0.27  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.07  -0.60  -0.46  0.04  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.14  0.72  0.49  0.00  -0.60  1.00  
 
 
 CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.27  1.00  
    
EPS 0.19  0.16  1.00  
   
P/B 0.05  0.30  0.32  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.02  -0.12  0.13  0.01  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.03  -0.47  0.32  -0.06  -0.35  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.02  1.00  
    
EPS 0.31  -0.41  1.00  
   
P/B 0.11  0.28  -0.11  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.21  0.57  0.29  0.01  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.46  -0.11  0.55  -0.14  0.49  1.00  
 
 
 CHINA BAOAN GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.32  1.00  
    
EPS 0.42  -0.60  1.00  
   
P/B 0.16  -0.31  0.45  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.34  -0.07  0.59  0.20  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.40  -0.40  0.83  0.16  0.69  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.10  1.00  
    
EPS 0.12  0.56  1.00  
   
P/B -0.08  0.14  0.18  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.22  0.81  0.71  0.14  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.23  0.61  0.83  0.05  0.85  1.00  
 
 
 YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.07  1.00  
    
EPS -0.04  -0.42  1.00  
   
P/B 0.14  0.33  0.17  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.04  -0.54  0.72  -0.01  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.04  -0.58  0.95  0.10  0.75  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.36  1.00  
    
EPS -0.23  -0.59  1.00  
   
P/B 0.01  -0.31  0.30  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.47  0.58  -0.42  -0.51  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.40  0.96  -0.63  -0.37  0.69  1.00  
 
 
 JIANGLING MOTORS 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.03  1.00  
    
EPS -0.08  -0.75  1.00  
   
P/B 0.09  0.31  -0.16  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.03  -0.66  0.77  0.03  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.03  -0.64  0.91  -0.10  0.67  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HONG YUAN SECS. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.22  1.00  
    
EPS -0.06  -0.23  1.00  
   
P/B -0.06  0.50  0.24  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.14  0.30  0.46  0.40  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.22  -0.29  0.59  0.12  -0.04  1.00  
 
 
 LUZHOU LAO JIAO 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.27  1.00  
    
EPS 0.13  -0.76  1.00  
   
P/B 0.09  -0.63  0.48  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.03  -0.17  -0.04  0.76  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.19  -0.88  0.94  0.64  0.15  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 NORTHEAST PHARM. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.37  1.00  
    
EPS 0.26  0.22  1.00  
   
P/B 0.33  0.73  0.43  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.13  0.09  0.90  0.33  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.41  0.40  0.76  0.51  0.68  1.00  
 
 
 TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.30  1.00  
    
EPS 0.30  0.42  1.00  
   
P/B 0.31  0.68  0.25  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.29  0.03  -0.16  0.15  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.38  0.88  0.66  0.63  0.04  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 GREE ELECT.APP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.03  1.00  
    
EPS -0.11  0.56  1.00  
   
P/B 0.04  0.13  0.39  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.08  0.25  -0.05  0.05  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.05  0.55  0.87  0.58  0.14  1.00  
 
 
 TIANJIN TEDA 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.11  1.00  
    
EPS 0.11  0.01  1.00  
   
P/B 0.29  -0.09  0.14  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.25  0.69  -0.13  -0.12  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.22  0.28  0.57  0.23  -0.25  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHANDONG JINLING MNG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.25  1.00  
    
EPS 0.42  -0.65  1.00  
   
P/B 0.19  -0.51  0.43  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.23  0.26  -0.28  -0.28  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.26  -0.75  0.80  0.49  -0.20  1.00  
 
 
 ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.15  1.00  
    
EPS -0.26  -0.53  1.00  
   
P/B 0.38  -0.34  0.26  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.29  -0.35  0.47  -0.06  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.40  0.17  -0.54  0.28  -0.73  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SOFTTO 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.50  1.00  
    
EPS -0.11  -0.04  1.00  
   
P/B -0.47  0.76  -0.04  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.13  0.03  0.62  -0.05  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.01  -0.34  0.60  -0.07  0.38  1.00  
 
 
 FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.26  1.00  
    
EPS -0.04  -0.05  1.00  
   
P/B 0.16  -0.06  -0.19  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.22  0.73  -0.03  -0.17  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.15  -0.59  0.16  -0.14  -0.56  1.00  
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 JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.33  1.00  
    
EPS -0.13  -0.54  1.00  
   
P/B 0.19  -0.08  -0.08  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.17  -0.55  -0.21  0.30  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.25  0.38  0.02  0.16  -0.62  1.00  
 
 
 QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.04  1.00  
    
EPS 0.18  -0.55  1.00  
   
P/B -0.03  -0.50  0.73  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.07  -0.33  0.55  0.52  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.15  -0.57  0.94  0.75  0.55  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HUAWEN MDA.INV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.39  1.00  
    
EPS -0.03  -0.22  1.00  
   
P/B 0.54  -0.48  -0.14  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.24  0.66  -0.22  -0.35  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.28  -0.91  0.45  0.36  -0.67  1.00  
 
 
 FAW CAR 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.24  1.00  
    
EPS 0.09  -0.47  1.00  
   
P/B 0.15  -0.04  0.32  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.02  -0.44  0.64  -0.13  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.15  -0.49  0.91  0.46  0.59  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 YUNNAN ALUM. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.06  1.00  
    
EPS 0.04  0.13  1.00  
   
P/B 0.28  -0.07  0.57  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.23  0.37  -0.42  -0.24  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.38  0.47  0.37  0.42  -0.17  1.00  
 
 
 SHANDONG HAIHUA 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.03  1.00  
    
EPS 0.10  0.13  1.00  
   
P/B 0.33  -0.50  -0.02  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.15  0.60  0.34  -0.31  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.27  0.60  0.43  -0.18  0.34  1.00  
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 SHANXI TAIGANG STL. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.06  1.00  
    
EPS -0.09  0.50  1.00  
   
P/B 0.04  0.48  0.40  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.04  0.68  0.64  0.79  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.11  0.86  0.58  0.51  0.70  1.00  
 
 
 HEBEI IRON & STEEL 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.43  1.00  
    
EPS 0.10  0.34  1.00  
   
P/B 0.19  0.24  0.27  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.43  0.72  0.07  0.29  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.33  0.90  0.39  0.37  0.57  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.21  1.00  
    
EPS -0.06  -0.13  1.00  
   
P/B 0.17  0.20  0.18  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.02  -0.39  0.24  0.37  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.20  -0.57  0.66  -0.13  0.30  1.00  
 
 
 GD MIDEA HOLDING 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.07  1.00  
    
EPS -0.23  0.10  1.00  
   
P/B -0.11  0.42  0.47  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.16  -0.02  -0.46  -0.52  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.16  0.01  0.94  0.46  -0.47  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP) 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.00  1.00  
    
EPS 0.24  0.46  1.00  
   
P/B 0.23  0.48  0.23  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.04  -0.10  -0.06  -0.21  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.35  0.03  -0.37  -0.28  0.27  1.00  
 
 
 KONKA GROUP 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.04  1.00  
    
EPS 0.17  0.40  1.00  
   
P/B 0.17  0.25  -0.05  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.11  -0.43  -0.67  0.44  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.13  0.93  0.43  0.11  -0.63  1.00  
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 SHN.FOUNTAIN 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.44  1.00  
    
EPS -0.07  -0.17  1.00  
   
P/B 0.35  -0.63  0.38  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.14  0.38  -0.25  -0.37  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.00  -0.09  0.10  0.35  -0.33  1.00  
 
 
 XI'AN AIR.INTL. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.29  1.00  
    
EPS 0.10  0.25  1.00  
   
P/B 0.33  0.64  0.23  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.21  0.05  -0.24  -0.37  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.05  0.32  0.75  0.23  -0.36  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.26  1.00  
    
EPS 0.06  0.61  1.00  
   
P/B 0.10  0.21  0.00  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.34  0.65  0.49  0.54  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.09  0.66  0.77  -0.13  0.51  1.00  
 
 
 ZTE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.12  1.00  
    
EPS -0.23  0.45  1.00  
   
P/B 0.19  0.59  0.07  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.29  0.55  -0.26  0.59  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.07  0.84  0.80  0.39  0.15  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GUOYUAN SECURITIES 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.10  1.00  
    
EPS 0.10  -0.19  1.00  
   
P/B -0.08  -0.10  0.38  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.19  -0.13  0.50  -0.13  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.17  -0.04  -0.71  -0.35  -0.57  1.00  
 
 
 GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.15  1.00  
    
EPS -0.01  -0.09  1.00  
   
P/B -0.03  -0.55  0.10  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.12  0.86  -0.17  -0.43  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.12  0.02  0.82  -0.13  -0.09  1.00  
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 SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.40  1.00  
    
EPS 0.24  -0.76  1.00  
   
P/B 0.15  -0.59  0.51  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.04  -0.35  -0.05  0.36  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.32  -0.94  0.65  0.64  0.54  1.00  
 
 
 XINXING DUCTILEIRON 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.15  1.00  
    
EPS -0.19  0.27  1.00  
   
P/B 0.00  -0.24  -0.53  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.10  0.39  0.32  -0.46  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.08  0.73  0.66  -0.48  0.44  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.08  1.00  
    
EPS 0.09  -0.51  1.00  
   
P/B 0.16  0.26  0.21  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.07  0.66  -0.52  0.25  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.43  0.58  -0.07  -0.01  0.12  1.00  
 
 
 HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.13  1.00  
    
EPS 0.08  -0.57  1.00  
   
P/B -0.12  0.02  0.15  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.30  -0.40  0.37  -0.17  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.48  -0.66  0.54  -0.31  0.54  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.) 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.18  1.00  
    
EPS 0.16  -0.38  1.00  
   
P/B 0.11  0.20  0.08  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.10  0.03  0.16  -0.32  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.01  0.27  0.41  0.33  0.03  1.00  
 
 
 WANXIANG QIANGCHAO 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.02  1.00  
    
EPS 0.09  0.53  1.00  
   
P/B 0.19  0.40  0.40  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.18  -0.41  -0.44  -0.43  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.30  0.51  0.69  0.47  -0.74  1.00  
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 SUNING UNIVERSAL 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.07  1.00  
    
EPS -0.05  0.27  1.00  
   
P/B 0.13  0.51  0.17  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.15  0.26  -0.23  -0.10  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.16  0.35  0.68  0.52  -0.44  1.00  
 
 
 TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.29  1.00  
    
EPS 0.27  0.47  1.00  
   
P/B 0.19  0.12  0.12  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.26  0.42  0.97  0.03  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.36  0.63  0.93  0.08  0.93  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 BEIJING SHOUGANG 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.29  1.00  
    
EPS -0.34  0.55  1.00  
   
P/B 0.15  -0.56  -0.18  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.41  0.02  -0.22  0.08  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.24  0.34  0.07  -0.58  0.45  1.00  
 
 
 SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.19  1.00  
    
EPS -0.14  -0.20  1.00  
   
P/B 0.18  -0.19  0.55  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.05  0.28  -0.09  -0.16  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.47  -0.11  -0.02  0.27  -0.11  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SGIS SONGSHAN 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.11  1.00  
    
EPS -0.16  -0.20  1.00  
   
P/B 0.25  0.07  0.10  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.01  -0.06  0.68  -0.07  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.00  0.64  -0.01  0.19  -0.23  1.00  
 
 
 CHINA UNION HDG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.28  1.00  
    
EPS 0.02  -0.09  1.00  
   
P/B 0.18  0.10  0.22  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.17  0.72  0.18  0.05  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.22  0.74  0.38  0.26  0.81  1.00  
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 CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.45  1.00  
    
EPS 0.42  0.43  1.00  
   
P/B -0.01  0.18  0.27  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.26  -0.52  -0.54  -0.26  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.15  -0.53  -0.50  -0.72  0.74  1.00  
 
 
 TAIFU INDUSTRY 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.24  1.00  
    
EPS -0.04  -0.08  1.00  
   
P/B 0.07  -0.69  -0.30  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.20  -0.18  0.30  0.01  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.18  0.37  -0.19  -0.40  -0.29  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.12  1.00  
    
EPS -0.03  -0.48  1.00  
   
P/B 0.08  -0.12  0.66  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.27  0.04  0.16  0.23  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.22  0.21  0.47  0.41  0.69  1.00  
 
 
 ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.21  1.00  
    
EPS 0.08  -0.30  1.00  
   
P/B 0.02  0.13  0.02  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.49  -0.10  -0.04  0.01  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.33  -0.64  0.59  -0.31  0.27  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.23  1.00  
    
EPS -0.26  0.68  1.00  
   
P/B 0.57  -0.19  -0.33  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.31  0.86  0.59  -0.27  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.06  -0.35  -0.26  0.16  -0.18  1.00  
 
 
 MINSHENG INV.MAN. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.12  1.00  
    
EPS -0.34  0.17  1.00  
   
P/B -0.14  0.39  0.24  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.01  -0.16  0.02  0.07  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.34  -0.57  -0.44  -0.59  0.04  1.00  
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 HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.02  1.00  
    
EPS -0.08  -0.65  1.00  
   
P/B 0.10  -0.68  0.86  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.09  0.49  -0.43  -0.52  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.10  -0.41  0.87  0.80  -0.47  1.00  
 
 
 WUXI LITTLE SWAN 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.36  1.00  
    
EPS 0.06  -0.57  1.00  
   
P/B 0.09  -0.19  0.17  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.40  -0.36  0.13  0.20  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.19  -0.56  0.41  0.13  0.21  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 KINGDREAM PUBLIC 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.03  1.00  
    
EPS -0.15  -0.17  1.00  
   
P/B 0.42  -0.32  -0.18  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.35  -0.08  -0.24  0.67  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.46  0.33  -0.29  0.33  0.57  1.00  
 
 
 TANGSHAN CERAMIC 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.04  1.00  
    
EPS -0.11  -0.18  1.00  
   
P/B 0.22  0.38  -0.20  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.18  -0.08  -0.08  -0.34  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.42  -0.18  0.23  -0.81  0.41  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HUAYI COMPR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.14  1.00  
    
EPS 0.29  0.19  1.00  
   
P/B 0.53  0.17  0.32  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.12  0.59  0.25  0.14  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.54  0.54  0.64  0.64  0.37  1.00  
 
 
 SHANDONG SHENGLI 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.48  1.00  
    
EPS 0.23  -0.15  1.00  
   
P/B 0.48  0.50  0.16  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.12  -0.05  -0.31  -0.38  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.36  0.24  0.65  0.29  -0.52  1.00  
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 YUYUAN HOLDING 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.10  1.00  
    
EPS -0.10  -0.48  1.00  
   
P/B 0.26  0.17  -0.28  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.30  -0.22  0.36  -0.27  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.06  -0.20  0.31  -0.09  -0.26  1.00  
 
 
 CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.28  1.00  
    
EPS 0.42  0.59  1.00  
   
P/B 0.36  0.16  0.60  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.19  0.15  -0.12  -0.23  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.32  0.92  0.75  0.39  0.02  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JILIN CHM.FIBRE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.41  1.00  
    
EPS -0.05  -0.20  1.00  
   
P/B 0.37  0.41  0.32  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.37  0.14  0.42  0.33  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.56  0.81  0.02  0.34  0.50  1.00  
 
 
 NANJING ZHONGBEI 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.02  1.00  
    
EPS 0.26  -0.03  1.00  
   
P/B 0.31  -0.09  0.76  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.10  -0.19  -0.32  -0.46  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.49  0.28  0.46  0.29  -0.34  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.41  1.00  
    
EPS -0.35  0.42  1.00  
   
P/B 0.36  -0.59  -0.04  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.13  0.73  0.35  -0.32  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.44  -0.31  -0.53  0.10  -0.08  1.00  
 
 
 HUATIAN HOTEL GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.38  1.00  
    
EPS 0.07  0.56  1.00  
   
P/B 0.31  0.43  0.57  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.23  -0.23  0.48  -0.03  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.16  0.75  0.72  0.20  0.17  1.00  
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 GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.30  1.00  
    
EPS 0.36  0.41  1.00  
   
P/B 0.24  -0.22  0.22  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.40  0.94  0.35  -0.20  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.33  -0.01  0.67  0.03  0.04  1.00  
 
 
 ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.06  1.00  
    
EPS -0.22  0.20  1.00  
   
P/B -0.12  0.92  0.33  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.10  0.14  0.00  0.07  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.15  0.26  -0.50  0.06  0.37  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.36  1.00  
    
EPS 0.24  -0.80  1.00  
   
P/B 0.28  -0.51  0.30  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.30  -0.63  0.83  0.26  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.30  -0.92  0.93  0.39  0.76  1.00  
 
 
 LVJING REALESTATE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.27  1.00  
    
EPS 0.19  -0.25  1.00  
   
P/B 0.08  -0.23  -0.28  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.16  -0.05  0.16  0.26  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.41  0.25  0.25  -0.09  0.03  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.28  1.00  
    
EPS -0.39  -0.33  1.00  
   
P/B 0.36  0.17  -0.45  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.14  -0.01  0.59  -0.29  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.17  -0.15  0.28  -0.53  0.23  1.00  
 
 
 HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.23  1.00  
    
EPS 0.20  -0.37  1.00  
   
P/B -0.07  0.06  0.16  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.25  0.39  -0.37  0.17  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.23  -0.35  0.24  -0.33  0.13  1.00  
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SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00 
DEBT -0.20  1.00 
EPS -0.24  0.54 1.00 
P/B -0.30  0.79 0.58 1.00 
CAPEX -0.07  0.23 0.52 0.36 1.00 
SIZE -0.38  0.63 0.66 0.71 0.15 1.00 
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
DEBT -0.30  1.00 
EPS -0.24  0.57 1.00 
P/B 0.20 0.10  -0.10 1.00 
CAPEX -0.15  0.44 0.72 -0.23 1.00 
SIZE 0.11  -0.73  -0.26  -0.55 -0.16 1.00 
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
DEBT -0.13  1.00  
EPS 0.04  -0.49  1.00 
P/B 0.15  -0.67  0.73 1.00 
CAPEX 0.12 0.23 0.04 -0.26 1.00 
SIZE -0.08  -0.75  0.60 0.59 -0.24 1.00 
CHINA CALXON GROUP 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00 
DEBT 0.25 1.00 
EPS -0.07  -0.08  1.00 
P/B 0.30 0.89 0.03 1.00 
CAPEX 0.05 0.02  -0.01 0.08 1.00 
SIZE 0.08  -0.10  0.10 0.11 -0.52 1.00 
SOUTH HUITON 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00 
DEBT 0.01 1.00 
EPS -0.30  0.24 1.00 
P/B -0.19  0.24 0.32 1.00 
CAPEX -0.09  0.87 0.56 0.22 1.00 
SIZE 0.27 0.11  -0.57 0.05 -0.10 1.00 
JIANGSU HUAXICUN 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
DEBT -0.09  1.00  
EPS -0.43  -0.17  1.00 
P/B 0.13  -0.54  0.36 1.00 
CAPEX -0.38  0.26 0.53 0.20 1.00 
SIZE 0.34 0.54  -0.48  -0.30 -0.14 1.00 
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.04  1.00  
    
EPS 0.13  0.20  1.00  
   
P/B -0.11  0.96  0.20  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.11  0.38  0.68  0.37  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.44  -0.03  0.39  -0.03  0.21  1.00  
 
 
 BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.44  1.00  
    
EPS 0.14  -0.40  1.00  
   
P/B 0.13  -0.28  -0.16  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.20  0.18  0.14  0.09  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.52  -0.92  0.24  0.42  -0.29  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHENZHEN AIRPORT 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.14  1.00  
    
EPS 0.16  -0.29  1.00  
   
P/B 0.27  0.06  0.30  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.20  -0.05  -0.20  -0.17  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.16  -0.62  0.44  -0.11  -0.15  1.00  
 
 
 BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.03  1.00  
    
EPS -0.31  -0.46  1.00  
   
P/B 0.35  -0.13  -0.38  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.24  -0.59  0.73  -0.28  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.20  0.13  -0.47  0.04  -0.38  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 BENGANG STEEL PLATES 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.10  1.00  
    
EPS -0.01  -0.53  1.00  
   
P/B 0.06  0.29  -0.03  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.09  0.34  0.04  0.00  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.05  0.11  0.16  -0.24  0.40  1.00  
 
 
 SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.36  1.00  
    
EPS -0.28  0.02  1.00  
   
P/B 0.43  0.55  -0.37  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.22  0.16  0.73  -0.25  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.24  -0.32  0.30  -0.76  0.36  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 SUNDIRO HOLDING 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.34  1.00  
    
EPS 0.44  -0.32  1.00  
   
P/B 0.30  -0.47  0.15  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.54  -0.17  0.67  0.16  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.12  0.81  -0.07  -0.53  0.05  1.00  
 
 
 AN HUI WENERGY 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.27  1.00  
    
EPS -0.31  -0.48  1.00  
   
P/B 0.06  -0.24  0.64  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.46  0.84  -0.41  -0.16  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.39  0.87  -0.47  -0.31  0.82  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHONGQING YUKAIFA 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.10  1.00  
    
EPS 0.11  -0.06  1.00  
   
P/B -0.07  -0.44  -0.52  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.04  -0.15  -0.23  -0.15  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.17  0.12  0.60  -0.58  0.24  1.00  
 
 
 SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.11  1.00  
    
EPS -0.07  0.31  1.00  
   
P/B 0.29  -0.04  -0.13  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.30  0.52  -0.06  -0.44  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.17  0.22  0.47  -0.44  -0.04  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHENYANG CHM.IND. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.34  1.00  
    
EPS 0.27  -0.13  1.00  
   
P/B 0.52  0.31  0.19  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.46  0.46  0.40  0.12  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.53  0.48  0.29  0.41  0.57  1.00  
 
 
 INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.50  1.00  
    
EPS 0.26  -0.46  1.00  
   
P/B -0.11  0.30  -0.06  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.45  -0.87  0.41  -0.14  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.50  -0.77  0.62  -0.19  0.87  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 DONGFANG ELECTRONICS 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.16  1.00  
    
EPS -0.04  -0.25  1.00  
   
P/B -0.03  -0.32  0.86  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.21  -0.63  0.70  0.88  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.33  0.72  -0.34  -0.45  -0.73  1.00  
 
 
 SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.06  1.00  
    
EPS -0.03  -0.27  1.00  
   
P/B -0.01  -0.54  0.14  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.06  -0.34  0.71  0.26  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.01  0.80  -0.17  -0.66  -0.18  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.18  1.00  
    
EPS -0.33  -0.65  1.00  
   
P/B -0.01  0.08  0.20  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.10  0.76  -0.52  0.07  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.22  0.88  -0.62  -0.11  0.75  1.00  
 
 
 CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.16  1.00  
    
EPS -0.06  -0.42  1.00  
   
P/B -0.16  0.96  -0.34  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.16  -0.48  -0.18  -0.60  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.08  -0.72  0.85  -0.62  0.07  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 NORTHEAST SECURITIES 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.12  1.00  
    
EPS 0.02  0.24  1.00  
   
P/B -0.18  0.18  0.16  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.19  -0.29  0.02  -0.12  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.11  0.32  0.22  0.36  0.06  1.00  
 
 
 NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.20  1.00  
    
EPS -0.02  -0.20  1.00  
   
P/B 0.49  -0.09  -0.19  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.12  0.90  -0.30  -0.08  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.10  0.82  -0.18  -0.10  0.76  1.00  
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 TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.10  1.00  
    
EPS 0.02  -0.06  1.00  
   
P/B 0.04  -0.12  0.63  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.18  0.69  -0.21  -0.15  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.25  0.34  -0.33  -0.39  0.79  1.00  
 
 
 SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.16  1.00  
    
EPS 0.23  -0.80  1.00  
   
P/B 0.16  -0.57  0.45  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.26  -0.19  -0.19  -0.12  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.27  -0.69  0.83  0.53  -0.42  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 YANG GUANG 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.32  1.00  
    
EPS 0.07  0.08  1.00  
   
P/B -0.03  -0.44  -0.07  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.20  -0.02  0.21  0.17  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.19  0.15  0.67  -0.05  0.16  1.00  
 
 
 JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.42  1.00  
    
EPS 0.21  -0.45  1.00  
   
P/B 0.21  -0.51  0.54  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.15  -0.08  0.44  0.50  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.51  -0.52  0.64  0.50  -0.07  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.20  1.00  
    
EPS 0.12  -0.85  1.00  
   
P/B 0.24  -0.62  0.65  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.18  0.54  -0.51  -0.26  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.33  -0.86  0.74  0.63  -0.68  1.00  
 
 
 CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.11  1.00  
    
EPS -0.16  0.12  1.00  
   
P/B 0.05  -0.62  0.01  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.31  0.51  0.20  -0.12  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.13  0.57  0.21  -0.24  0.34  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 SHENZHEN DEV.BANK 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.15  1.00  
    
EPS 0.16  -0.20  1.00  
   
P/B 0.03  0.61  -0.21  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.00  -0.09  -0.18  -0.33  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.30  -0.47  0.74  -0.33  -0.15  1.00  
 
 
 CHINA VANKE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.19  1.00  
    
EPS -0.27  0.82  1.00  
   
P/B -0.09  0.41  0.30  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.11  -0.36  -0.41  -0.20  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.25  0.84  0.94  0.46  -0.44  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.15  1.00  
    
EPS 0.23  0.04  1.00  
   
P/B 0.02  -0.01  -0.18  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.26  0.25  -0.51  0.24  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.36  0.24  0.44  0.14  -0.61  1.00  
 
 
 LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.56  1.00  
    
EPS 0.32  0.33  1.00  
   
P/B 0.19  0.05  -0.14  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.07  0.02  0.39  0.13  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.57  0.79  0.60  -0.07  0.17  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHN.ACCORD PHARM. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.26  1.00  
    
EPS 0.17  0.92  1.00  
   
P/B 0.11  0.31  0.22  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.23  0.79  0.80  0.49  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.23  0.96  0.96  0.16  0.80  1.00  
 
 
 RONGAN PROPERTY 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.40  1.00  
    
EPS -0.12  0.51  1.00  
   
P/B -0.03  0.32  0.39  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.39  -0.10  -0.18  0.25  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.01  0.58  0.29  0.71  0.38  1.00  
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 XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.36  1.00  
    
EPS 0.30  0.45  1.00  
   
P/B 0.06  -0.42  -0.01  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.28  0.34  0.62  0.14  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.51  0.69  0.79  -0.24  0.54  1.00  
 
 
 SHN.TELLUS HLDG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.28  1.00  
    
EPS -0.17  0.34  1.00  
   
P/B 0.22  -0.09  -0.10  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.10  0.53  -0.37  -0.06  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.32  0.86  0.06  -0.28  0.75  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHN.FIYTA HDG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.56  1.00  
    
EPS 0.50  0.91  1.00  
   
P/B -0.22  -0.29  -0.14  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.28  0.10  0.06  -0.27  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.52  0.89  0.90  -0.33  0.19  1.00  
 
 
 SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.08  1.00  
    
EPS 0.06  -0.57  1.00  
   
P/B -0.03  -0.13  0.32  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.27  0.02  0.37  -0.28  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.45  -0.27  0.39  -0.02  0.51  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHAHE INDUSTRIAL 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.07  1.00  
    
EPS 0.07  -0.48  1.00  
   
P/B 0.03  0.28  0.10  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.03  0.25  -0.17  -0.25  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.16  -0.57  0.63  0.05  -0.50  1.00  
 
 
 SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.47  1.00  
    
EPS 0.24  0.47  1.00  
   
P/B 0.27  0.23  0.01  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.04  0.09  -0.09  0.71  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.48  0.90  0.57  0.21  0.03  1.00  
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 SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.26  1.00  
    
EPS 0.25  -0.17  1.00  
   
P/B 0.09  0.61  -0.11  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.03  0.10  -0.18  0.07  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.04  0.09  0.39  -0.29  -0.05  1.00  
 
 
 SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.20  1.00  
    
EPS -0.26  -0.78  1.00  
   
P/B 0.57  0.35  -0.32  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.15  -0.20  0.38  -0.31  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.32  0.72  -0.77  0.65  -0.40  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.44  1.00  
    
EPS -0.09  0.01  1.00  
   
P/B 0.37  -0.25  0.38  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.38  0.24  0.67  -0.02  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.41  -0.35  -0.36  0.10  -0.80  1.00  
 
 
 NAFINE CHM.IND.GP. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.09  1.00  
    
EPS -0.14  -0.44  1.00  
   
P/B 0.20  0.93  -0.22  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.36  -0.15  0.11  -0.06  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.11  -0.11  -0.04  -0.03  0.46  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.35  1.00  
    
EPS 0.33  0.54  1.00  
   
P/B 0.08  0.59  0.43  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.19  0.45  0.71  0.58  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.32  0.98  0.53  0.57  0.43  1.00  
 
 
 SHENZHEN SEG 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.52  1.00  
    
EPS -0.11  0.09  1.00  
   
P/B 0.13  0.16  -0.41  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.38  0.65  0.37  0.02  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.53  0.96  0.10  0.07  0.76  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.49  1.00  
    
EPS -0.26  -0.01  1.00  
   
P/B 0.48  -0.50  -0.26  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.14  -0.69  -0.08  0.21  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.29  -0.22  0.04  0.04  -0.22  1.00  
 
 
 TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.08  1.00  
    
EPS -0.10  -0.40  1.00  
   
P/B 0.25  -0.37  -0.06  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.36  -0.20  0.46  -0.30  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.44  0.15  -0.03  0.16  -0.53  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SEARAINBOW HOLDING 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.34  1.00  
    
EPS -0.14  0.11  1.00  
   
P/B -0.05  0.61  0.07  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.11  0.29  0.52  0.24  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.18  0.71  0.17  0.34  0.58  1.00  
 
 
 BEIJING NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.26  1.00  
    
EPS 0.35  0.24  1.00  
   
P/B 0.35  -0.19  0.36  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.17  0.46  0.73  -0.07  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.44  0.57  0.82  0.25  0.72  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HUBEI FUXING SCTC. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.15  1.00  
    
EPS 0.29  -0.47  1.00  
   
P/B -0.08  0.00  -0.33  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.04  0.41  -0.20  -0.52  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.38  -0.05  0.76  -0.50  0.19  1.00  
 
 
 YELAND GROUP 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.31  1.00  
    
EPS 0.10  -0.09  1.00  
   
P/B 0.14  -0.02  -0.28  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.15  -0.19  -0.75  0.50  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.27  0.18  0.61  -0.20  -0.59  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.) 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.04  1.00  
    
EPS 0.12  -0.23  1.00  
   
P/B -0.02  0.51  -0.39  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.28  0.45  -0.27  0.74  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.08  -0.26  -0.23  -0.22  -0.39  1.00  
 
 
 YUNNAN TIN 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.40  1.00  
    
EPS 0.19  0.35  1.00  
   
P/B 0.08  0.64  0.35  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.27  0.48  0.59  0.27  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.35  0.87  0.53  0.60  0.63  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ADVD.TECH.& MATS. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.34  1.00  
    
EPS 0.16  0.24  1.00  
   
P/B 0.24  0.16  0.58  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.12  0.42  0.18  -0.06  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.45  0.69  0.66  0.50  0.11  1.00  
 
 
 SHANXI XISHAN 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.14  1.00  
    
EPS 0.12  0.52  1.00  
   
P/B -0.07  0.29  0.37  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.01  0.65  0.11  0.17  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.10  0.44  0.73  0.57  0.27  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.14  1.00  
    
EPS 0.32  0.12  1.00  
   
P/B 0.40  -0.38  0.41  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.24  0.48  0.00  0.05  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.23  0.57  -0.12  -0.60  0.18  1.00  
 
 
 CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.23  1.00  
    
EPS 0.28  -0.81  1.00  
   
P/B 0.27  -0.64  0.54  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.11  -0.59  0.45  0.29  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.33  -0.91  0.78  0.63  0.58  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.20  1.00  
    
EPS 0.12  0.51  1.00  
   
P/B 0.18  0.14  0.66  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.02  0.38  0.43  0.24  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.15  0.50  0.98  0.70  0.39  1.00  
 
 
 CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.12  1.00  
    
EPS -0.11  0.63  1.00  
   
P/B -0.09  0.26  0.09  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.09  0.72  0.54  -0.02  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.05  0.59  0.89  0.12  0.55  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT -0.41  1.00  
    
EPS 0.03  -0.39  1.00  
   
P/B 0.08  -0.48  0.76  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.08  0.37  -0.37  -0.55  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.12  0.59  -0.40  -0.32  0.50  1.00  
 
 
 SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.29  1.00  
    
EPS 0.01  -0.62  1.00  
   
P/B 0.19  -0.44  0.51  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.30  0.02  -0.05  -0.24  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.47  0.51  -0.14  0.12  -0.29  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.28  1.00  
    
EPS -0.16  -0.68  1.00  
   
P/B -0.03  -0.61  0.56  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.44  0.62  -0.31  -0.68  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.54  0.77  -0.46  -0.51  0.81  1.00  
 
 
 JILIN PWR.SHARE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.08  1.00  
    
EPS -0.16  -0.03  1.00  
   
P/B 0.27  0.32  0.44  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.04  0.97  -0.02  0.16  1.00  
 
SIZE 0.13  0.95  -0.12  0.30  0.94  1.00  
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Appendix 6.1: Correlation Matrix for 180 Companies (Continued) 
 
 ZHEJIANG NHU 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.21  1.00  
    
EPS -0.09  -0.82  1.00  
   
P/B -0.10  -0.16  0.06  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.16  0.03  0.04  -0.44  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.17  -0.75  0.72  0.51  -0.24  1.00  
 
 
 HAN'S LASER TECH. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.18  1.00  
    
EPS -0.34  -0.31  1.00  
   
P/B -0.18  0.27  0.12  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.58  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.08  0.21  0.12  -0.12  0.68  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.23  1.00  
    
EPS -0.30  0.01  1.00  
   
P/B -0.37  -0.07  0.55  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.24  -0.17  -0.59  -0.64  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.29  0.08  0.92  0.54  -0.52  1.00  
 
 
 SUNING APPLIANCE 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.02  1.00  
    
EPS -0.46  -0.48  1.00  
   
P/B -0.18  0.68  -0.17  1.00  
  
CAPEX 0.31  -0.07  -0.51  0.11  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.51  -0.33  0.96  -0.04  -0.53  1.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 
 
VOL DEBT EPS P/B CAPEX SIZE 
VOL 1.00  
     
DEBT 0.13  1.00  
    
EPS -0.21  -0.43  1.00  
   
P/B -0.37  -0.09  0.50  1.00  
  
CAPEX -0.30  0.50  -0.24  0.44  1.00  
 
SIZE -0.10  -0.63  0.71  0.39  -0.42  1.00  
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies  
  
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
GUANGXI GUITANG 0.52 2.08 0.77 4.36 0.32 1.47 0.76 4.21 0.38 1.61 0.68 3.14 
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL 0.56 2.28 0.56 2.28 0.12 1.14 0.44 1.79 0.28 1.40 0.39 1.64 
TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC 0.43 1.76 0.76 4.14 0.16 1.18 0.74 3.85 0.33 1.48 0.19 1.23 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH 0.57 2.34 0.78 4.48 0.39 1.63 0.43 1.76 0.31 1.44 0.76 4.18 
GUOXING RONGDA RLST 0.12 1.14 0.54 2.15 0.79 4.77 0.24 1.31 0.11 1.13 0.84 6.18 
HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  0.80 5.05 0.89 9.28 0.76 4.23 0.40 1.68 0.20 1.25 0.74 3.81 
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. 0.42 1.72 0.64 2.82 0.55 2.25 0.16 1.19 0.28 1.39 0.38 1.60 
JIZHONG ENERGY RES. 0.63 2.73 0.77 4.39 0.15 1.17 0.71 3.44 0.19 1.23 0.36 1.57 
XUANHUA CON.MCH. 0.26 1.34 0.46 1.87 0.34 1.52 0.32 1.47 0.23 1.30 0.57 2.33 
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. 0.48 1.92 0.53 2.15 0.58 2.37 0.45 1.82 0.17 1.21 0.77 4.29 
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. 0.75 3.93 0.88 8.13 0.30 1.42 0.63 2.72 0.43 1.75 0.91 11.25 
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE 0.42 1.71 0.65 2.83 0.39 1.64 0.44 1.78 0.37 1.58 0.54 2.18 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  0.88 8.26 0.78 4.50 0.20 1.25 0.46 1.86 0.13 1.16 0.55 2.21 
SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  0.19 1.23 0.33 1.49 0.19 1.24 0.16 1.20 0.31 1.45 0.28 1.38 
SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. 0.42 1.72 0.16 1.19 0.46 1.86 0.37 1.59 0.14 1.17 0.38 1.62 
SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION 0.19 1.24 0.43 1.75 0.63 2.69 0.93 14.36 0.31 1.44 0.92 13.28 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  0.42 1.74 0.19 1.23 0.21 1.26 0.72 3.56 0.25 1.33 0.68 3.16 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. 0.40 1.66 0.22 1.28 0.75 4.03 0.63 2.70 0.20 1.25 0.28 1.40 
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE 0.75 3.97 0.62 2.64 0.73 3.71 0.23 1.29 0.14 1.17 0.34 1.52 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 0.31 1.45 0.27 1.36 0.15 1.18 0.40 1.68 0.45 1.83 0.43 1.75 
GUANGDONG GOWORLD  0.80 5.09 0.77 4.41 0.17 1.20 0.41 1.68 0.37 1.59 0.55 2.24 
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies (Continued) 
  
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
SOUND ENV.RESOURCES  0.81  5.32  0.83  6.00  0.56  2.29  0.68  3.13  0.22  1.28  0.42  1.72  
DONGGUAN DEV.(HDG.) 0.62  2.60  0.60  2.48  0.42  1.74  0.11  1.12  0.26  1.36  0.25  1.33  
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  0.63  2.74  0.87  7.88  0.31  1.46  0.61  2.58  0.22  1.28  0.65  2.86  
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 0.72  3.51  0.70  3.38  0.28  1.39  0.27  1.37  0.02  1.02  0.49  1.95  
CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. 0.55  2.24  0.84  6.36  0.22  1.28  0.36  1.57  0.16  1.20  0.82  5.60  
WULIANGYE YIBIN   0.88  8.29  0.91  11.33  0.32  1.46  0.44  1.78  0.10  1.12  0.72  3.61  
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS 0.89  9.47  0.91  11.61  0.45  1.81  0.39  1.63  0.03  1.03  0.73  3.74  
HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. 0.94  17.00  0.95  21.75  0.74  3.80  0.46  1.85  0.08  1.09  0.72  3.53  
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. 0.35  1.54  0.44  1.78  0.29  1.41  0.12  1.13  0.29  1.40  0.15  1.18  
ANGANG STEEL 0.50  2.02  0.47  1.87  0.26  1.36  0.58  2.39  0.02  1.02  0.49  1.97  
XIANDAI INVESTMENT 0.87  7.67  0.91  10.84  0.50  1.99  0.93  13.40  0.35  1.55  0.72  3.51  
TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  0.21  1.26  0.91  11.43  0.21  1.26  0.30  1.43  0.27  1.36  0.92  13.01  
ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  0.32  1.47  0.72  3.62  0.52  2.08  0.72  3.52  0.08  1.09  0.36  1.56  
HUNAN VALIN STEEL  0.26  1.35  0.79  4.78  0.30  1.44  0.81  5.33  0.14  1.17  0.90  10.25  
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. 0.84  6.10  0.81  5.28  0.46  1.84  0.73  3.73  0.19  1.23  0.88  8.14  
CSG HOLDING  0.62  2.63  0.69  3.21  0.27  1.38  0.42  1.72  0.19  1.24  0.38  1.62  
COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) 0.63  2.71  0.58  2.36  0.18  1.22  0.46  1.86  0.12  1.14  0.75  3.96  
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  0.43  1.75  0.61  2.58  0.18  1.21  0.39  1.63  0.12  1.14  0.54  2.19  
SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. 0.61  2.55  0.56  2.27  0.17  1.21  0.76  4.20  0.26  1.35  0.76  4.16  
CHINA BAOAN GP. 0.84  6.09  0.79  4.82  0.35  1.53  0.58  2.35  0.22  1.28  0.50  1.99  
GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. 0.72  3.58  0.85  6.63  0.10  1.12  0.86  7.16  0.09  1.09  0.69  3.19  
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies (Continued) 
  
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. 0.93  14.96  0.95  18.58  0.25  1.34  0.59  2.46  0.03  1.03  0.62  2.60  
GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. 0.41  1.69  0.94  17.42  0.35  1.53  0.66  2.90  0.31  1.46  0.92  12.95  
JIANGLING MOTORS 0.90  10.50  0.84  6.43  0.21  1.27  0.65  2.87  0.06  1.06  0.65  2.84  
HONG YUAN SECS. 0.66  2.94  0.52  2.09  0.41  1.69  0.50  1.99  0.15  1.17  0.49  1.95  
LUZHOU LAO JIAO 0.94  16.33  0.96  27.24  0.87  7.58  0.82  5.41  0.11  1.12  0.84  6.28  
NORTHEAST PHARM.  0.85  6.75  0.66  2.96  0.61  2.59  0.82  5.63  0.26  1.34  0.59  2.45  
TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  0.62  2.61  0.89  9.40  0.50  1.98  0.19  1.24  0.25  1.33  0.84  6.42  
GREE ELECT.APP. 0.84  6.22  0.87  7.49  0.43  1.74  0.24  1.32  0.11  1.12  0.42  1.73  
TIANJIN TEDA 0.40  1.67  0.69  3.19  0.15  1.18  0.73  3.67  0.15  1.17  0.74  3.90  
SHANDONG JINLING MNG. 0.69  3.25  0.74  3.90  0.31  1.45  0.14  1.16  0.21  1.26  0.60  2.51  
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 0.57  2.33  0.70  3.36  0.46  1.85  0.60  2.48  0.31  1.45  0.39  1.64  
SOFTTO 0.55  2.23  0.54  2.18  0.65  2.88  0.41  1.69  0.29  1.41  0.72  3.51  
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 0.06  1.06  0.44  1.78  0.16  1.20  0.58  2.41  0.11  1.12  0.58  2.41  
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. 0.67  3.06  0.56  2.27  0.35  1.55  0.81  5.18  0.17  1.21  0.77  4.31  
QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  0.89  8.85  0.89  9.32  0.61  2.57  0.34  1.50  0.09  1.09  0.34  1.51  
HUAWEN MDA.INV. 0.44  1.79  0.90  9.75  0.42  1.74  0.47  1.89  0.33  1.49  0.88  8.61  
FAW CAR  0.85  6.81  0.88  8.09  0.46  1.86  0.57  2.35  0.10  1.11  0.33  1.49  
YUNNAN ALUM.  0.54  2.15  0.57  2.31  0.51  2.05  0.47  1.90  0.26  1.34  0.56  2.29  
SHANDONG HAIHUA 0.33  1.48  0.56  2.25  0.35  1.55  0.47  1.88  0.25  1.33  0.66  2.98  
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. 0.46  1.86  0.77  4.43  0.64  2.77  0.79  4.81  0.03  1.03  0.75  4.00  
HEBEI IRON & STEEL  0.24  1.32  0.87  7.80  0.34  1.51  0.65  2.90  0.23  1.30  0.91  11.16  
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies (Continued) 
  
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. 0.57  2.32  0.69  3.26  0.34  1.52  0.38  1.61  0.07  1.08  0.52  2.06  
GD MIDEA HOLDING  0.90  10.07  0.90  10.05  0.50  2.00  0.37  1.58  0.08  1.09  0.30  1.43  
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  0.41  1.69  0.37  1.59  0.37  1.58  0.11  1.12  0.17  1.21  0.48  1.91  
KONKA GROUP  0.64  2.75  0.95  20.54  0.57  2.34  0.87  7.72  0.17  1.21  0.93  14.43  
SHN.FOUNTAIN  0.22  1.28  0.24  1.31  0.57  2.31  0.26  1.36  0.25  1.33  0.50  2.01  
XI'AN AIR.INTL. 0.58  2.36  0.65  2.89  0.60  2.52  0.45  1.83  0.17  1.20  0.61  2.56  
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN 0.61  2.56  0.73  3.75  0.54  2.19  0.71  3.41  0.18  1.22  0.60  2.49  
ZTE  0.83  6.03  0.94  17.39  0.46  1.85  0.70  3.30  0.13  1.14  0.92  11.83  
GUOYUAN SECURITIES 0.58  2.40  0.65  2.86  0.37  1.60  0.51  2.05  0.07  1.07  0.15  1.18  
GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. 0.73  3.69  0.74  3.79  0.39  1.63  0.75  4.05  0.09  1.10  0.79  4.71  
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 0.73  3.73  0.93  14.72  0.45  1.83  0.61  2.59  0.25  1.33  0.93  14.60  
XINXING DUCTILEIRON 0.60  2.53  0.78  4.45  0.39  1.65  0.32  1.48  0.14  1.17  0.62  2.62  
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 0.55  2.20  0.66  2.97  0.43  1.74  0.55  2.24  0.31  1.46  0.79  4.79  
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. 0.48  1.94  0.73  3.77  0.29  1.42  0.31  1.46  0.34  1.52  0.54  2.17  
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  0.46  1.84  0.42  1.72  0.27  1.37  0.19  1.24  0.09  1.09  0.41  1.68  
WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  0.55  2.21  0.74  3.85  0.28  1.40  0.57  2.30  0.14  1.17  0.36  1.56  
SUNING UNIVERSAL  0.54  2.18  0.71  3.47  0.47  1.88  0.38  1.63  0.09  1.10  0.45  1.82  
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. 0.95  19.98  0.94  16.69  0.16  1.19  0.95  20.54  0.21  1.27  0.58  2.40  
BEIJING SHOUGANG 0.41  1.68  0.61  2.59  0.62  2.64  0.46  1.85  0.32  1.46  0.56  2.29  
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. 0.39  1.64  0.28  1.38  0.41  1.71  0.13  1.15  0.31  1.45  0.17  1.20  
SGIS SONGSHAN  0.66  2.92  0.59  2.44  0.16  1.19  0.64  2.75  0.20  1.25  0.59  2.42  
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies (Continued) 
  
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
CHINA UNION HDG. 0.45  1.81  0.82  5.68  0.17  1.20  0.71  3.39  0.11  1.12  0.73  3.74  
CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 0.40  1.68  0.87  7.49  0.70  3.39  0.71  3.49  0.31  1.45  0.48  1.91  
TAIFU INDUSTRY  0.38  1.62  0.32  1.48  0.68  3.09  0.18  1.22  0.15  1.17  0.61  2.56  
SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 0.81  5.14  0.80  5.06  0.52  2.07  0.65  2.82  0.10  1.11  0.64  2.81  
ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. 0.48  1.91  0.72  3.61  0.22  1.28  0.31  1.46  0.29  1.41  0.45  1.82  
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  0.50  2.02  0.20  1.24  0.40  1.66  0.77  4.32  0.36  1.55  0.82  5.47  
MINSHENG INV.MAN. 0.24  1.31  0.58  2.41  0.36  1.57  0.04  1.05  0.16  1.20  0.36  1.56  
HEFEI DEPT.STORE GP. 0.90  10.35  0.87  7.41  0.82  5.41  0.40  1.67  0.23  1.30  0.69  3.18  
WUXI LITTLE SWAN  0.37  1.59  0.33  1.49  0.06  1.07  0.24  1.31  0.24  1.32  0.55  2.24  
KINGDREAM PUBLIC  0.80  5.08  0.25  1.34  0.60  2.53  0.73  3.75  0.18  1.21  0.27  1.36  
TANGSHAN CERAMIC  0.11  1.12  0.75  4.05  0.73  3.71  0.20  1.25  0.22  1.28  0.21  1.27  
HUAYI COMPR.  0.51  2.03  0.80  4.88  0.52  2.08  0.37  1.58  0.37  1.59  0.57  2.35  
SHANDONG SHENGLI  0.56  2.30  0.65  2.86  0.46  1.87  0.41  1.68  0.38  1.61  0.51  2.04  
YUYUAN HOLDING 0.42  1.72  0.27  1.37  0.15  1.18  0.36  1.56  0.13  1.15  0.24  1.32  
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  0.70  3.31  0.92  13.07  0.52  2.08  0.15  1.17  0.24  1.32  0.90  9.97  
JILIN CHM.FIBRE 0.40  1.67  0.84  6.14  0.45  1.82  0.54  2.20  0.41  1.70  0.81  5.20  
NANJING ZHONGBEI 0.67  2.99  0.50  2.00  0.69  3.21  0.33  1.50  0.33  1.49  0.16  1.18  
CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  0.42  1.73  0.39  1.64  0.45  1.81  0.61  2.58  0.34  1.53  0.75  4.04  
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. 0.88  8.39  0.81  5.18  0.68  3.10  0.69  3.18  0.26  1.35  0.79  4.78  
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. 0.76  4.11  0.68  3.17  0.37  1.60  0.92  12.64  0.39  1.63  0.93  14.93  
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. 0.41  1.71  0.53  2.14  0.88  8.37  0.20  1.24  0.08  1.09  0.89  8.73  
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies (Continued) 
  
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. 0.92  12.98  0.96  22.63  0.30  1.43  0.71  3.43  0.18  1.23  0.89  9.10  
LVJING REALESTATE 0.33  1.50  0.38  1.62  0.29  1.40  0.20  1.25  0.36  1.57  0.37  1.59  
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. 0.54  2.18  0.29  1.42  0.41  1.70  0.40  1.68  0.23  1.29  0.19  1.23  
HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  0.35  1.55  0.46  1.85  0.32  1.46  0.46  1.85  0.14  1.16  0.34  1.52  
SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. 0.63  2.69  0.68  3.12  0.74  3.83  0.41  1.71  0.15  1.18  0.66  2.92  
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  0.61  2.58  0.77  4.37  0.53  2.13  0.55  2.22  0.15  1.18  0.76  4.10  
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  0.66  2.97  0.68  3.16  0.71  3.47  0.25  1.33  0.13  1.15  0.68  3.15  
CHINA CALXON GROUP  0.07  1.07  0.56  2.28  0.89  8.78  0.46  1.84  0.11  1.12  0.88  8.45  
SOUTH HUITON 0.74  3.83  0.46  1.85  0.27  1.37  0.89  8.97  0.13  1.15  0.85  6.57  
JIANGSU HUAXICUN 0.50  2.00  0.50  2.01  0.49  1.95  0.49  1.95  0.36  1.56  0.61  2.55  
SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  0.53  2.15  0.33  1.50  0.94  16.16  0.53  2.13  0.28  1.40  0.94  16.01  
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) 0.33  1.48  0.91  10.56  0.39  1.64  0.27  1.37  0.29  1.40  0.89  8.72  
SHENZHEN AIRPORT  0.32  1.47  0.51  2.06  0.23  1.30  0.12  1.13  0.13  1.15  0.42  1.71  
BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 0.65  2.83  0.30  1.42  0.36  1.56  0.64  2.77  0.19  1.23  0.49  1.98  
BENGANG STEEL PLATES  0.40  1.67  0.27  1.37  0.21  1.26  0.30  1.44  0.04  1.05  0.51  2.06  
SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  0.59  2.45  0.64  2.77  0.73  3.77  0.61  2.57  0.27  1.36  0.43  1.75  
SUNDIRO HOLDING 0.51  2.04  0.74  3.84  0.35  1.54  0.54  2.19  0.39  1.64  0.74  3.86  
AN HUI WENERGY  0.61  2.54  0.82  5.54  0.54  2.17  0.79  4.70  0.44  1.78  0.85  6.75  
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  0.68  3.14  0.57  2.32  0.64  2.74  0.46  1.84  0.05  1.05  0.48  1.91  
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. 0.37  1.59  0.52  2.07  0.55  2.23  0.64  2.75  0.30  1.42  0.56  2.28  
SHENYANG CHM.IND.  0.36  1.56  0.49  1.97  0.39  1.65  0.56  2.26  0.45  1.81  0.46  1.86  
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies (Continued) 
  
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  0.53  2.11  0.87  7.46  0.22  1.28  0.90  9.77  0.31  1.44  0.82  5.54  
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  0.76  4.19  0.72  3.58  0.94  16.44  0.94  17.96  0.22  1.28  0.67  3.01  
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  0.52  2.08  0.74  3.78  0.46  1.85  0.57  2.30  0.02  1.02  0.69  3.25  
SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN.   0.53  2.13  0.82  5.62  0.24  1.32  0.62  2.61  0.14  1.16  0.84  6.27  
CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  0.83  5.74  0.89  9.50  0.95  21.78  0.59  2.41  0.07  1.07  0.96  24.29  
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  0.09  1.10  0.25  1.33  0.19  1.24  0.16  1.19  0.10  1.11  0.24  1.31  
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  0.16  1.20  0.69  3.21  0.30  1.43  0.82  5.69  0.30  1.44  0.86  7.22  
TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. 0.43  1.77  0.78  4.65  0.54  2.17  0.86  7.31  0.14  1.17  0.66  2.98  
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  0.81  5.39  0.82  5.68  0.43  1.74  0.66  2.92  0.11  1.13  0.86  6.92  
YANG GUANG  0.46  1.87  0.47  1.88  0.23  1.30  0.11  1.13  0.17  1.20  0.29  1.40  
JIAOZUO WANGFANG ALUM. 0.66  2.98  0.72  3.58  0.60  2.52  0.60  2.52  0.33  1.50  0.43  1.74  
JILIN AODONG PHARM.GP. 0.77  4.40  0.85  6.53  0.54  2.15  0.54  2.16  0.16  1.20  0.85  6.87  
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. 0.13  1.15  0.37  1.58  0.46  1.85  0.40  1.67  0.16  1.19  0.67  3.07  
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  0.59  2.46  0.68  3.17  0.50  2.00  0.21  1.27  0.14  1.16  0.50  2.01  
CHINA VANKE  0.90  10.36  0.92  12.22  0.36  1.56  0.20  1.25  0.08  1.09  0.72  3.56  
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. 0.31  1.44  0.65  2.83  0.28  1.38  0.68  3.09  0.15  1.17  0.39  1.65  
LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU 0.49  1.97  0.77  4.31  0.15  1.17  0.21  1.27  0.40  1.67  0.68  3.08  
SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  0.94  15.66  0.97  39.92  0.60  2.51  0.79  4.81  0.12  1.14  0.95  18.19  
RONGAN PROPERTY 0.41  1.68  0.75  3.94  0.60  2.50  0.39  1.65  0.33  1.50  0.65  2.85  
XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. 0.72  3.56  0.82  5.51  0.35  1.54  0.43  1.76  0.35  1.54  0.56  2.30  
SHN.TELLUS HLDG. 0.55  2.21  0.91  10.56  0.31  1.45  0.76  4.11  0.16  1.19  0.86  7.10  
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies (Continued) 
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
SHN.FIYTA HDG. 0.89 8.98 0.86 7.35 0.30 1.42 0.18 1.21 0.37 1.58 0.87 7.78 
SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 0.60 2.52 0.47 1.88 0.33 1.50 0.53 2.13 0.25 1.34 0.47 1.87 
SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  0.49 1.97 0.65 2.84 0.25 1.33 0.36 1.56 0.12 1.13 0.48 1.91 
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  0.34 1.52 0.85 6.60 0.59 2.46 0.56 2.30 0.34 1.51 0.82 5.68 
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. 0.27 1.37 0.36 1.55 0.55 2.25 0.04 1.04 0.21 1.27 0.56 2.27 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. 0.76 4.11 0.80 4.98 0.65 2.88 0.23 1.30 0.38 1.60 0.66 2.96 
GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.) 0.65 2.86 0.71 3.49 0.36 1.57 0.82 5.66 0.36 1.56 0.25 1.33 
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  0.53 2.13 0.29 1.41 0.92 13.28 0.34 1.52 0.33 1.49 0.93 15.36 
HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. 0.59 2.45 0.97 29.40 0.50 2.02 0.61 2.54 0.20 1.25 0.97 31.40 
SHENZHEN SEG  0.54 2.16 0.97 36.01 0.47 1.89 0.81 5.26 0.32 1.48 0.96 25.10 
DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE  0.21 1.27 0.37 1.58 0.43 1.77 0.69 3.26 0.43 1.74 0.79 4.69 
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. 0.39 1.65 0.43 1.75 0.30 1.42 0.52 2.09 0.26 1.35 0.37 1.59 
SEARAINBOW HOLDING  0.31 1.46 0.70 3.37 0.46 1.84 0.57 2.33 0.18 1.22 0.74 3.81 
BEIJING NEW BLDG.MATS. PUBLIC  0.82 5.56 0.83 5.89 0.44 1.77 0.71 3.47 0.28 1.40 0.56 2.28 
HUBEI FUXING SCTC. 0.81 5.30 0.80 4.90 0.48 1.92 0.52 2.08 0.20 1.24 0.48 1.94 
YELAND GROUP 0.67 3.04 0.46 1.86 0.33 1.49 0.72 3.53 0.19 1.23 0.25 1.34 
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  0.28 1.39 0.30 1.43 0.65 2.89 0.67 3.03 0.17 1.21 0.29 1.42 
YUNNAN TIN  0.45 1.83 0.83 6.02 0.50 1.98 0.51 2.05 0.23 1.30 0.82 5.47 
ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  0.66 2.96 0.82 5.48 0.39 1.65 0.40 1.67 0.27 1.37 0.72 3.56 
SHANXI XISHAN  0.67 3.06 0.67 3.05 0.35 1.54 0.55 2.22 0.06 1.06 0.65 2.86 
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT 0.31 1.46 0.49 1.98 0.60 2.50 0.41 1.69 0.27 1.38 0.57 2.31 
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Appendix 6.2: Variance Inflation Factors for 180 Companies (Continued) 
  
Dependent Variable Earnings per 
Share 
Sales per 
Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CAPEX  
Turnover 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Companies R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF R2 VIF 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. 0.67  3.07  0.85  6.51  0.45  1.81  0.39  1.63  0.16  1.19  0.87  7.64  
YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  0.96  25.32  0.96  26.64  0.56  2.25  0.25  1.33  0.09  1.10  0.40  1.66  
CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. 0.82  5.43  0.80  5.12  0.18  1.22  0.59  2.42  0.04  1.04  0.66  2.93  
JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET  0.64  2.77  0.53  2.13  0.72  3.62  0.46  1.86  0.21  1.27  0.56  2.29  
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  0.48  1.92  0.49  1.94  0.43  1.75  0.17  1.21  0.31  1.45  0.66  2.96  
GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  0.60  2.49  0.83  5.88  0.72  3.55  0.82  5.65  0.43  1.76  0.75  3.97  
JILIN PWR.SHARE 0.60  2.49  0.94  17.64  0.76  4.15  0.98  43.17  0.20  1.25  0.97  33.48  
ZHEJIANG NHU 0.75  4.05  0.78  4.54  0.50  2.00  0.23  1.29  0.09  1.10  0.74  3.80  
HAN'S LASER TECH. 0.24  1.32  0.60  2.52  0.55  2.21  0.72  3.57  0.17  1.20  0.30  1.42  
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 0.87  7.67  0.86  7.02  0.52  2.09  0.55  2.21  0.20  1.25  0.18  1.22  
SUNING APPLIANCE  0.95  19.14  0.94  15.98  0.63  2.71  0.54  2.18  0.31  1.44  0.76  4.25  
HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 0.60  2.49  0.70  3.32  0.67  3.06  0.69  3.20  0.23  1.30  0.49  1.97  
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Appendix 6.3: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Mu) for Period 2002-2010 (Coefficients of Equation 6.7)  
Companies Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio  
Earnings per 
Share 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Sales per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
GUANGXI GUITANG -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
SICHUAN SHENGDAINDL -0.002*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 
TIANJIN XINMAO SCTC 0.000 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
SHAANXI QINCHUAN MCH -0.001** -0.002 0.006*** -0.001 0.000** 0.000** 
GUOXING RONGDA RLST -0.002** 0.005*** 0.001*** -0.003 -0.001*** 0.000*** 
HEBEI CHENGDE LOLO  0.000 0.001*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
GOHIGH DATA NETWORKS TECH. -0.003*** 0.001*** -0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
JIZHONG ENERGY RES. 0.000 -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
XUANHUA CON.MCH. 0.000 0.003*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WUHAN KAIDI ELEC.PWR. -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
BEIJING SHUNXINAGRIC. 0.004*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ANHUI ANKAI AUTOMOBILE 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.008*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000* 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN CMT  0.000*** 0.001*** -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 
SICHUAN JINYU AUTMB.CITY (GROUP)  0.002*** 0.000 -0.008*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 
SICHUAN JOINT-WIT MED.& PHARM.IND. 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000** 
SHAANXI JINYE SCI.TECH. & EDUCATION -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
XINJIANG TIANSHAN WOOL TEX STOCK  0.000 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.058*** 0.006*** 0.000*** 
MCC MEILI PAPERIND. -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000* 
JIANGSU JIANGHUAI ENGINE 0.000** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 
YUEYANG XCH.PETROCH. 0.000 -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
GUANGDONG GOWORLD  -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.3: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Mu) for Period 2002-2010 (Coefficients of Equation 6.7) (Continued) 
Companies Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio  
Earnings per 
Share 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Sales per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
LUXI CHEMICAL GROUP  0.004*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.001*** 
TELLING TELECM.HLDG. 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CITIC GUOAN INFO.IND. 0.000 -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
WULIANGYE YIBIN   -0.025*** 0.286*** 0.005*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
SICHUAN NEW HOPE AGRIBUSINESS 0.002*** -0.001 0.020*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HENAN SHUANGHUIINV.& DEV. 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
TIANJIN JINBIN DEV. -0.003** 0.001*** -0.006 -0.007*** 0.000* 0.000*** 
ANGANG STEEL 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 
XIANDAI INVESTMENT 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 
TIANJIN FAW XIALI AUTMB.  0.001 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.006*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
ANHUI BBCA BIOCHEMICAL  -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
HUNAN VALIN STEEL  -0.013*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
HENAN SHENHUO CAA.& PWR. -0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CSG HOLDING  0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
COFCO PROPERTY (GP.) 0.001*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
CHINA MERCHANTSPR.DEV.  -0.002** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
SHENZHEN KAIFA TECH. 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001* 0.000*** 0.000 
CHINA BAOAN GP. -0.007*** 0.000 -0.002* 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
GUANGXI LIUGONGMCH. 0.000 0.000 0.003*** -0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
YUNNAN BAIYAO GP. 0.002* 0.000 0.002*** -0.001 0.000 0.000 
GUANGDONG ELEC.PWR.DEV. 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.3: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Mu) for Period 2002-2010 (Coefficients of Equation 6.7) (Continued) 
Companies Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio  
Earnings per 
Share 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Sales per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
LUZHOU LAO JIAO -0.016*** 0.002*** 0.001** -0.001 0.000 0.000** 
NORTHEAST PHARM.  0.003** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
TONGLING NONFR.MTLS.GP.  -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 
GREE ELECT.APP. -0.003*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
TIANJIN TEDA 0.000 0.000** -0.007*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 
SHANDONG JINLING MNG. -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
ZHUHAI ZHONGFU ENTRE. 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
SOFTTO 0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000* 0.001*** 0.000 
FUJIAN YONGAN FOREST. 0.000 -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.001** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
JINGWEI TEXTILEMACH. 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
QINGHAI SALT LAKE POTASH  -0.002 0.000* 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
HUAWEN MDA.INV. 0.000 -0.002*** -0.009*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
FAW CAR  -0.001 0.000 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
YUNNAN ALUM.  0.004*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHANDONG HAIHUA 0.006*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
SHANXI TAIGANG STL. 0.000** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
HEBEI IRON & STEEL  -0.001 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
FINANCIAL STR.HLDG. 0.000** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
GD MIDEA HOLDING  0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHN.ZHENYE (GROUP)  0.000 0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
KONKA GROUP  0.000 0.000** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.3: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Mu) for Period 2002-2010 (Coefficients of Equation 6.7) (Continued) 
Companies Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio  
Earnings per 
Share 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Sales per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
SHENZHEN OS.CHS.TOWN -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
ZTE  -0.001 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
GUOYUAN SECURITIES 0.005** -0.020*** 0.000* 0.006*** 0.000 0.000 
GUANGDONG BAOLIHUA NEW EN.STK. 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.009*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 
SHN.ZHONGJIN LINGNAN NONFEMET 0.000 0.002*** 0.000** -0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
XINXING DUCTILEIRON 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHANXI ZHANGZE ELEC. 0.002 0.000 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 
HUBEI BIOCAUSE PHARM. -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.010*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
CHINA INTL.MAR.CTRS. (GP.)  -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 
WANXIANG QIANGCHAO  0.009*** -0.002*** -0.013*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 
SUNING UNIVERSAL  0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
TANGSHAN JIDONGCMT. -0.011*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.000** -0.001*** 0.000 
BEIJING SHOUGANG -0.013*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
SHENYANG INGENIOUS DEV. 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.004*** 0.074*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
SGIS SONGSHAN  0.000* -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CHINA UNION HDG. 0.000** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CHANGJIANG SECURITIES 0.005*** -0.001*** 0.004*** -0.018*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
TAIFU INDUSTRY  0.000 0.000*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 
SHENYANG MACH.TOOL 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ZHEJIANG INTL.GP. -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.000*** 
SHIJIAZHUANG BAOSHI ELT. GLASS  0.000*** -0.002*** 0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.000*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.3: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Mu) for Period 2002-2010 (Coefficients of Equation 6.7) (Continued) 
Companies Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio  
Earnings per 
Share 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Sales per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
WUXI LITTLE SWAN  0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
KINGDREAM PUBLIC  0.003*** -0.005*** 0.000*** -0.010*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
TANGSHAN CERAMIC  0.001 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000 
HUAYI COMPR.  -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.012*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
SHANDONG SHENGLI  0.001** 0.000 -0.007*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
YUYUAN HOLDING -0.001 -0.003*** 0.002 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
CHANGSHA TONGCHENG HDG.  0.001*** -0.006*** -0.016*** 0.000* 0.001*** 0.000*** 
JILIN CHM.FIBRE 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
NANJING ZHONGBEI -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CHIFENG FULONG THM.PWR.  -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.006*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
HUATIAN HOTEL GP. 0.000 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
GUANGDONG PRVL.EXPR. -0.001 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
ZHANGJIAJIE TSM.DEV. 0.000 0.000*** -0.001* 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000*** 
WUHAN DEPT.STORE GP. -0.014*** 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
LVJING REALESTATE 0.001 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
BEIJING CCID MEDIA INVS. 0.004*** -0.002*** -0.019*** -0.042*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
HAINAN PEARL RVR.HDG.  0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001** 0.000 
SHANDONG ZHONGRUN INV. HLDG.GP. 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
SICHUAN JINLU GROUP  0.002*** 0.004*** -0.006*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
LIVZON PHARM.GROUP  -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CHINA CALXON GROUP  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.3: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Mu) for Period 2002-2010 (Coefficients of Equation 6.7) (Continued) 
Companies Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio  
Earnings per 
Share 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Sales per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
SICHUAN SHUANGMA CEMENT  0.000 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BEJ.CENTERGATE TECHS. (HLDG.) 0.000 -0.001*** -0.002** 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
SHENZHEN AIRPORT  -0.002** 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 
BEIHAI YINHE HT.INDL. 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
BENGANG STEEL PLATES  -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHN.SEG SAMSUNGGLSS.  -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 
SUNDIRO HOLDING 0.000 0.002*** 0.009*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AN HUI WENERGY  0.000 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000*** 
CHONGQING YUKAIFA  -0.001* 0.000*** -0.004*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
SHENZHEN ENERGYGP. 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHENYANG CHM.IND.  0.003*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 
INMONG.YN.XG.ENERGY  0.000 -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
DONGFANG ELECTRONICS  0.002*** -0.006 0.001* 0.024*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 
SHN.AGRI.PRODUCTS  0.000 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001* -0.002*** 0.000*** 
SHANDONG XINNENG TAISHAN POWER GNRTN.   -0.013*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** 
CHONGQING ZONGSHEN PWR. MACHINERY  0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
NORTHEAST SECURITIES  0.000*** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
NORTHEAST ELECT.DEV.  0.003*** 0.001** 0.016*** -0.032*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
TIANJIN GHD.RY.HLDG. -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.002*** 0.000* 0.001*** 
SHAN DONG DONG-E E-JIAO  0.006*** 0.083*** 0.011*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001*** 
YANG GUANG  -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.3: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Mu) for Period 2002-2010 (Coefficients of Equation 6.7) (Continued) 
Companies Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio  
Earnings per 
Share 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Sales per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
CHONGQING CHANGAN AUTMB. 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
SHENZHEN DEV.BANK  -0.007*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
CHINA VANKE  0.000** 0.001*** -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MILORD RLST.DEV.GP. 0.000 -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.003* 0.001*** 0.000 
LONKEY INDL.GUANGZHOU -0.001 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
SHN.ACCORD PHARM.  0.000 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001* 0.000*** 0.000** 
RONGAN PROPERTY 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
XI'AN KAIYUAN HLDG.GP. 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000** 
SHN.TELLUS HLDG. 0.002* 0.000 -0.004* 0.003 0.000** 0.000*** 
SHN.FIYTA HDG. 0.000 -0.001*** 0.002* -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHN.SHENBAO INDL. 0.000 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
SHAHE INDUSTRIAL  0.000 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.047*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHN.ZHONGHENG HUAFA  0.002*** -0.001 0.003* -0.002 0.000 0.000*** 
SHENZHEN PROPS.& RES. DEV. 0.000 0.000* -0.003*** 0.000** 0.003*** 0.000*** 
SHENZHEN NEPS.BIOENG. 0.000 0.000*** -0.002** 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000*** 
GUANGDONG FENGHUA ADVD. TECH.(HLDG.)  -0.005*** 0.008*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000** 
NAFINE CHM.IND.GP.  0.001 0.000** 0.002 -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000** 
HUBEI YIHUA CHM.IND. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHENZHEN SEG  0.000 -0.004*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.000 
DONGGUAN WINNERWAY INDL. ZONE  -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.006** 0.006* 0.001*** 0.001*** 
TIANJIN GUANGYUDEV. -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** -0.006*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.3: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Mu) for Period 2002-2010 (Coefficients of Equation 6.7) (Continued) 
Companies Turnover Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio  
Earnings per 
Share 
Capital 
Expenditure per 
Share 
Sales per Share 
Price to Book 
Ratio 
HUBEI FUXING SCTC. -0.001 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
YELAND GROUP -0.001** 0.000*** -0.008*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SZ SEZ RLST.& PROPS. (GP.)  -0.009*** -0.001*** 0.020*** -0.007 0.002*** 0.000 
YUNNAN TIN  0.001** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 
ADVD.TECH.& MATS.  0.001 0.000 -0.005*** 0.003*** 0.000** 0.000 
SHANXI XISHAN  0.004*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
CHINA CIFCO INVESTMENT -0.003*** 0.013*** -0.025*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000** 
CHINA RES.SANJIU MED.& PHARM. 0.014*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 
YANTAI CHANGYU PION.WINE  0.003* -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
CHZOML.HDY.SCTC.DEV. -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000* -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
JIG.WUJIANG CHIN.ETN. SILK MARKET  -0.003*** 0.003*** -0.014*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SHIJIAZHUANG CHANGSHAN  -0.002** -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
GUODIAN CHANGYUAN ELEC. PWR.  -0.004** 0.000*** -0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
JILIN PWR.SHARE -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.000*** 
ZHEJIANG NHU -0.004*** 0.000* 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
HAN'S LASER TECH. 0.000 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 
SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 0.002*** -0.009*** 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
SUNING APPLIANCE  0.000 0.001 0.004** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 0.000 -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.4: Signal Fundamental Analysis of Noise Trader Risk when Measured by Behavioural Error 
Fundamentals   2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Debt to Equity Ratio 
 
Large 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0015 
Small 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0013 
Difference 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
t-Statistic 2.5668*** -0.7181 3.1696*** 1.1170 0.3874 0.7211 2.1211** 0.0949 -0.0830 3.3801*** 
CAPEX per Share 
 
Large 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0015 
Small 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0014 
Difference 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0001 
t-Statistic 2.5491** 0.8114 -1.7282* -2.5758** 1.4359 3.5811*** 3.5260*** -0.0756 -3.1535*** 0.7904 
Earnings per Share 
 
Large 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0014 
Small 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0014 
Difference 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
t-Statistic 0.4091 -0.5103 -3.6040*** -3.4593*** 0.3330 3.1556*** 3.2372*** 0.8084 1.3323 -0.3156 
Price to Book Ratio 
 
Large 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0013 
Small 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0015 
Difference 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 
t-Statistic -1.2300 -1.5933 -0.4963 2.9613*** -2.8930*** -0.0951 -0.5139 0.8827 3.3661*** -2.1359** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.4: Signal Fundamental Analysis of Noise Trader Risk when Measured by Behavioural Error 
Fundamentals 2002-2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Sales per Share  
 
Large 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0014 
Small 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0014 
Difference 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
t-Statistic 0.6756 -0.0642 -1.5752 -1.7553* 2.0907** 1.4829 0.8993 0.6910 -2.0403** 0.7578 
Turnover ratio Large 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0015 
 Small 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0013 
 
Difference 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003 
 
t-Statistic 3.9672*** 0.1274 0.0542 2.2910** -0.9544 2.8964*** 4.4408*** -0.4047 -1.1952 3.3135*** 
Note: *** is significant at 1% level of significance; ** is significant at 5% level of significance; * is significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Appendix 6.5: The Relationship between Noise Trader Risk (measured by BE) and Fundamental Factors for period 2002-2010  
  Equation 6.1 Equation 6.2 Equation 6.3 Equation 6.4 Equation 6.5 Equation 6.6 
  Turnover Ratio Debt to Equity ratio Capital Expenditure Earnings per Share Price to Book Ratio Sales per share 
At 1% level of significance    
Number of Significant 37 54 44 48 37 80 
POSITIVE 5 26 16 30 27 59 
NEGATIVE 32 28 28 18 10 21 
Percentage of Significant 20.56% 30.00% 24.44% 26.67% 20.56% 44.44% 
POSITIVE 2.78% 14.44% 8.89% 16.67% 15.00% 32.78% 
NEGATIVE 17.78% 15.56% 15.56% 10.00% 5.56% 11.67% 
At 5% level of significance    
Number of Significant 51 59 53 53 42 88 
POSITIVE 7 29 20 33 30 61 
NEGATIVE 44 30 33 20 12 27 
Percentage of Significant 28.33% 32.78% 29.44% 29.44% 23.33% 48.89% 
POSITIVE 3.89% 16.11% 11.11% 18.33% 16.67% 33.89% 
NEGATIVE 24.44% 16.67% 18.33% 11.11% 6.67% 15.00% 
At 10% level of significance    
Number of Significant 59 66 56 58 43 89 
POSITIVE 7 32 21 35 31 62 
NEGATIVE 52 34 35 23 12 27 
Percentage of Significant 32.78% 36.67% 31.11% 32.22% 23.89% 49.44% 
POSITIVE 3.89% 17.78% 11.67% 19.44% 17.22% 34.44% 
NEGATIVE 28.89% 18.89% 19.44% 12.78% 6.67% 15.00% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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Appendix 6.6: Fundamental Effects on Noise Trader Risk (Measured by Behavioural Error) for Period 2002-2010 (Equation 6.7) 
  Turnover Ratio  
Debt to 
Equity Ratio 
CAPEX per 
Share 
Earnings per Share  
 Price to Book 
Ratio 
Sales per 
Share  
At 1% level of significance 
Number of Significant 127 125 114 122 123 130 
Positive 25 62 51 38 91 102 
Negative 102 63 63 84 32 28 
Percentage of Significant 70.56% 69.44% 63.33% 67.78% 68.33% 72.22% 
Positive 13.89% 34.44% 28.33% 21.11% 50.56% 56.67% 
Negative 56.67% 35.00% 35.00% 46.67% 17.78% 15.56% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 134 129 123 124 128 132 
Positive 26 63 56 40 92 103 
Negative 108 66 67 84 36 29 
Percentage of Significant 74.44% 71.67% 68.33% 68.89% 71.11% 73.33% 
Positive 14.44% 35.00% 31.11% 22.22% 51.11% 57.22% 
Negative 60.00% 36.67% 37.22% 46.67% 20.00% 16.11% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of Significant 141 131 124 126 129 138 
Positive 26 64 57 41 92 106 
Negative 115 67 67 85 37 32 
Percentage of Significant 78.33% 72.78% 68.89% 70.00% 71.67% 76.67% 
Positive 14.44% 35.56% 31.67% 22.78% 51.11% 58.89% 
Negative 63.89% 37.22% 37.22% 47.22% 20.56% 17.78% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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Appendix 6.7: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise Trader Risk (BE) for 2002-2010  
  
Turnover 
Ratio 
 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
Capital Expenditure per 
Share 
 
Earnings per 
Share 
 
Price to book ratio 
 
Sales per Share 
 
At 1% level of significance    
Number of Significant 143 131 129 137 125 146 
Positive 38 68 54 49 80 93 
Negative 105 63 75 88 45 53 
Percentage of Significant 79.44% 72.78% 71.67% 76.11% 69.44% 81.11% 
Positive 21.11% 37.78% 30.00% 27.22% 44.44% 51.67% 
Negative 58.33% 35.00% 41.67% 48.89% 25.00% 29.44% 
At 5% level of significance    
Number of Significant 152 143 142 146 135 152 
Positive 40 74 59 55 86 96 
Negative 112 69 83 91 49 56 
Percentage of Significant 84.44% 79.44% 78.89% 81.11% 75.00% 84.44% 
Positive 22.22% 41.11% 32.78% 30.56% 47.78% 53.33% 
Negative 62.22% 38.33% 46.11% 50.56% 27.22% 31.11% 
At 10% level of significance    
Number of Significant 158 150 150 151 140 156 
Positive 43 79 63 56 90 98 
Negative 115 71 87 95 50 58 
Percentage of Significant 87.78% 83.33% 83.33% 83.89% 77.78% 86.67% 
Positive 23.89% 43.89% 35.00% 31.11% 50.00% 54.44% 
Negative 63.89% 39.44% 48.33% 52.78% 27.78% 32.22% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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Appendix 6.7: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise Trader Risk (BE) for 2002-2010 
(Continued) 
 
Global Financial Crisis Monday Tuesday Thursday Friday 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of Significant 131 101 101 71 102 
Positive 35 90 91 55 92 
Negative 96 11 10 16 10 
Percentage of Significant 72.78% 56.11% 56.11% 39.44% 56.67% 
Positive 19.44% 50.00% 50.56% 30.56% 51.11% 
Negative 53.33% 6.11% 5.56% 8.89% 5.56% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of Significant 143 114 117 94 120 
Positive 39 100 106 72 106 
Negative 104 14 11 22 14 
Percentage of Significant 79.44% 63.33% 65.00% 52.22% 66.67% 
Positive 21.67% 55.56% 58.89% 40.00% 58.89% 
Negative 57.78% 7.78% 6.11% 12.22% 7.78% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of Significant 152 127 124 107 128 
Positive 42 109 109 84 112 
Negative 110 18 15 23 16 
Percentage of Significant 84.44% 70.56% 68.89% 59.44% 71.11% 
Positive 23.33% 60.56% 60.56% 46.67% 62.22% 
Negative 61.11% 10.00% 8.33% 12.78% 8.89% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 
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Appendix 6.7: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise Trader Risk (BE) for 2002-2010 
(Continued) 
 
January March April May June July August September October November December 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of Significant 156 161 151 144 147 150 133 136 138 149 146 
Positive 122 152 131 118 117 109 114 125 111 134 133 
Negative 34 9 20 26 30 41 19 11 27 15 13 
Percentage of Significant 53.89% 53.33% 67.78% 63.33% 70.56% 73.33% 69.44% 69.44% 72.22% 67.22% 68.33% 
Positive 19.44% 22.22% 27.22% 27.22% 31.67% 32.22% 32.78% 31.67% 33.33% 37.78% 40.56% 
Negative 34.44% 31.11% 40.56% 36.11% 38.89% 41.11% 36.67% 37.78% 38.89% 29.44% 27.78% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of significant 162 165 162 157 153 156 140 148 150 156 157 
Positive 123 156 136 125 119 111 119 135 118 140 142 
Negative 39 9 26 32 34 45 21 13 32 16 15 
Percentage of Significant 60.56% 61.67% 73.89% 68.89% 75.56% 80.00% 76.11% 73.89% 79.44% 72.78% 76.11% 
Positive 22.22% 26.67% 32.22% 29.44% 33.89% 34.44% 35.56% 34.44% 36.11% 41.11% 45.00% 
Negative 38.33% 35.00% 41.67% 39.44% 41.67% 45.56% 40.56% 39.44% 43.33% 31.67% 31.11% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of significant 163 165 165 162 157 158 150 152 155 160 160 
Positive 124 156 139 128 122 112 127 136 121 144 145 
Negative 39 9 26 34 35 46 23 16 34 16 15 
Percentage of Significant 65.00% 65.00% 76.11% 70.56% 79.44% 82.22% 78.89% 77.78% 82.78% 73.89% 76.67% 
Positive 25.00% 27.78% 33.89% 30.56% 36.67% 36.11% 37.22% 35.56% 38.89% 41.11% 45.00% 
Negative 40.00% 37.22% 42.22% 40.00% 42.78% 46.11% 41.67% 42.22% 43.89% 32.78% 31.67% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
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Appendix 6.7: Fundamental Effects Combining with Financial Crisis, Seasonality and Market Sentiment Effects on Noise Trader Risk (BE) for 2002-2010 
(Continued) 
 
Pre-long-holiday Pre-short-holiday Post-long-holiday Post-short-holiday Bullish Market 
At 1% level of significance  
Number of significant 179 5 129 7 140 
Positive 178 5 29 5 71 
Negative 1 0 100 2 69 
Percentage of Significant 99.44% 2.78% 71.67% 3.89% 77.78% 
Positive 98.89% 2.78% 16.11% 2.78% 39.44% 
Negative 0.56% 0.00% 55.56% 1.11% 38.33% 
At 5% level of significance  
Number of significant 179 15 139 12 153 
Positive 178 14 35 9 78 
Negative 1 1 104 3 75 
Percentage of Significant 99.44% 8.33% 77.22% 6.67% 85.00% 
Positive 98.89% 7.78% 19.44% 5.00% 43.33% 
Negative 0.56% 0.56% 57.78% 1.67% 41.67% 
At 10% level of significance  
Number of significant 179 26 145 16 161 
Positive 178 25 37 11 84 
Negative 1 1 108 5 77 
Percentage of Significant 99.44% 14.44% 80.56% 8.89% 89.44% 
Positive 98.89% 13.89% 20.56% 6.11% 46.67% 
Negative 0.56% 0.56% 60.00% 2.78% 42.78% 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a relatively limited number of studies that have investigated the existence of 
noise trader risk in the stock market and its influence on stock price. The status of 
emerging financial markets and the literature review leads us to believe that stocks are 
not traded at their fundamental values. More specifically in China, there is an ongoing 
debate among academics, practitioners and government about whether irrational 
trading is driving stock market prices. It is therefore important to explore whether the 
divergence in stock prices can be explained by the noise trading theory. Few attempts 
have been made by academics but the methodology used can be questioned as they 
failed to control for information effect. Hence, the purpose of this study is to use a 
more sophisticated approach to assess and explain noise trading behaviour in China. 
 
The first empirical part of this research captures noise trading effect and thus helps us 
to shed light on how information traders and noise traders behave in Shenzhen stock 
market. It is the first study that examines noise trader risk in China by using 
IANM—where the value added is in terms of controlling for information effects. In 
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our opinion, prior literature has failed to account for information arrival as it is a long 
and expensive manual collection exercise. The concepts of overreaction, 
underreaction and IPE are tested in the Chinese market. The second empirical chapter 
of this thesis investigates whether noise trading is a profitable strategy. The first two 
empirical chapters are based on existing models which are applied in an emerging 
market context. The major contribution of this research lies in the third empirical part 
of the thesis where an attempt is made to explain the origin of noise trader risk in 
terms of finance fundamentals such as liquidity, leverage, price to book ratio, 
profitability, size, capital expenditure, financial crisis, seasonality and market 
sentiment.   
 
Section 7.2 summarizes each chapter of this thesis; section 7.3 concludes key 
contributions of the thesis; and section 7.4 suggests directions for future research on 
noise trader risk.  
 
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THESIS 
 
Chapter Two reviews the existing literature on market anomalies which cause asset 
prices to diverge from their fundamental values. One conclusion that can be drawn 
from this literature is that financial economists are working towards explaining 
market anomalies and one of unexplored explanation is noise trader risk. Noise trader 
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risk was not very well documented prior to the year 2000, and up until now there is no 
empirical work that explains market anomalies using noise trading theory other than 
the closed-end fund puzzle. Although, there have been several models that have been 
proposed, the application of some models is too restrictive while others are 
misspecified given that they fail to control for firm-specific information. The IANM 
proposed by Ramiah and Davidson (2007) appears to be a superior model in that it 
controls for information arrival. Given that this model is relatively new, it is vital to 
test it in alternative markets to find out how reliable it is. Within the irrational trading 
literature we find a lot of arguments that the Chinese stock market is driven by noise, 
and this market provides an ideal and natural testing ground for the application of 
IANM which has the capability of testing the level of noise trading on any given day 
and in any listed company.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis argues that irrational trading is a temporary effect and 
that irrational trading cannot be a persistent phenomenon. A counter argument can be 
found within the behavioural finance literature which allows for errors to persist. 
Therefore, a section of the literature looks at the difference between modern finance 
and behavioural finance. Finance practitioners are always in search of arbitrage 
opportunities and, as a result, finance academics tend to investigate market anomalies 
which can be good sources of arbitrage profits. Generally speaking, the first wave of 
studies is about detection of these anomalies and the second wave comes in terms of 
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explaining why it happens. To illustrate this point, we discuss several market 
anomalies (momentum, contrarian, overreaction and underreaction) and the arguments 
(fundamental and behavioural analyses) used to explain these irrational behaviours. 
This thesis is structured to contribute both to the detection and explanation of 
anomalies. However, the focus is not on noise trading theory. 
 
The first objective of this thesis is to capture the noise trading effect in Shenzhen 
stock market, and the empirical results are discussed in Chapter Three. The scope of 
this study is limited to 180 companies as manual collection is a long and expensive 
exercise. The information arrival is hand collected and we spent around one year in 
this process. In total there are 28478 information arrivals during the period of 2002 to 
2010. Two measures of noise trader risk are used, namely, behavioural error (a naïve 
form of noise trading activities) which is the difference between CAPM beta and 
BAPM beta, and mu (actual measure of noise trader risk) which is quantified by 
IANM. Statistically significant behavioural error and mu provide evidence of the 
existence of noise trader risk in Shenzhen stock market. According to the principles of 
IANM, noise trader risk (mu) is determined by the interaction between noise traders 
(alpha) and information traders (gamma). Time series graphs of the noise trader risk 
are also presented and they are referred to as ‘spiky graphs’ which help us to 
understand the behaviours of the noise traders and information traders. Evidence from 
these spikes indicates that information traders fail to clear pricing errors, leading to 
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the stock being either overpriced or underpriced. IANM classifies interactions 
between noise traders and information traders into underreaction [either U (+) or U 
(-)], IPE [either IPE (+) or IPE (-)] and overreaction [either O (+) or O (-)]. 
Underreaction is defined as a situation where a noise trader commits an error and 
information traders oppose them but fail to restore the equilibrium price. In this case 
information trader has taken the accurate strategy but underreacted to the news arrival. 
IPE occurs when information traders do not oppose noise traders but decide to join 
them by adding to the existing errors. In other words, IPE implies that information 
traders behave as noise traders. Overreaction indicates that information traders are 
opposing noise traders but they overshoot their estimates. The benefit of this chapter 
is that it provides a quantitative explanation to the overreaction and underreaction 
phenomenon in that market. Furthermore, this chapter enables one to observe the 
behaviour of information traders towards noise traders and circumstances where the 
information traders commit mistakes. According to the observed results, there is 
strong evidence of noise trader risk, IPE, underreaction and overreaction in Shenzhen 
stock market. In addition, when we test for noise trading behaviour within industries, 
we do not find any industrial effects, suggesting that noise trading activities occur 
more at a firm level.  
 
The objective of Chapter Four is to assess whether noise trading is a profitable 
strategy. Following the methodology of Davidson and Ramiah (2010), we test if there 
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is a relationship between stock return and lagged noise trader risk (lagged mu) which 
serves as an indication of whether equity traders are able to profit from the existence 
of noise traders. Another objective of this chapter is to test whether noise trader risk 
affects stock returns in terms of Systematic Noise Effect (increase stock return) or 
Cash Noise Effect (decrease stock return)—two phenomenon described in the 
literature. According to this theory, equity traders must adopt a noisy investment 
strategy (contrarian investment strategy) in order to maximize their profitability in 
market conditions when Systematic Noise Effect (Cash Noise Effect) prevails. The 
empirical results show that there are only 13 companies (7.22%) which exhibit a 
statistically significant relationship between returns and lagged mu for the long run 
period at 10% level of significance and that noise trading activities can be a rewarding 
strategy if we select the right stocks. Moreover, there are seven companies (3.89%) 
and four companies (2.22%) which show that stock traders are able to profit in the 
presence of noise trader risk at 5% and 1% level of confidence respectively. Such 
observed results can be viewed as weak evidence that noise trading is a profitable 
strategy in Shenzhen stock market in the long run. However, empirical results across 
each individual year suggest that investors have higher probabilities to profit from 
noise traders in the short run than in the long run. In addition, there is evidence that a 
noisy investment strategy is profitable within five companies and that a contrarian 
investment strategy is profitable in eight companies over the long run. The observed 
results across each individual year suggest that there is a higher probability to adopt 
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noisy investment strategy (contrarian investment strategy) in the short run than in the 
long run. Similar results are found by using lagged change in behavioural error to 
measure noise trader risk, but it shows a weaker opportunity to profit in the existence 
of noise trader risk. This implies that information effect should not be ignored.  
 
The major contribution of this thesis lies in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. The 
objective of Chapter Five is to assess how global financial crisis, seasonality and 
market sentiment affect noise trader risk (mu and behavioural error as the literature is 
silent in this field. To address these effects, dummy variables of financial crisis, 
seasonality and market sentiment are employed. Our findings provide evidence that 
noise traders and information traders operate differently under different market 
conditions. Consequently, financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment also 
affect noise trader risk.  
 
In Chapter Six, we explain the origin of noise trader risk in terms of finance 
fundamentals such as liquidity, leverage, price to book ratio, profitability, size and 
capital expenditure, financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment. The results 
presented are based on mu as a measure of noise trader risk but a robustness test is 
carried out using behavioural error. The first part of Chapter Six tests how 
fundamental factors explain noise trader risk. Our results from the single factor 
analysis suggest that stocks with high fundamentals tend to have different values of 
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noise trader risk than stocks with low fundamentals. In other words, fundamentals are 
able to explain noise trader risk in Shenzhen stock market. This method allows us to 
see the effect of one fundamental factor without considering the others. To address the 
joint effects on noise trader risk, a multiple regression analysis is employed where 
noise trader risk is regressed on various fundamentals. The GARCH (1,1) model is 
applied in the analysis in order to capture the time-varying volatility of variables. The 
empirical results confirm that noise trader risk can be explained by finance 
fundamentals. The second part of this Chapter is to test how finance fundamentals 
affect overreaction, IPE and underreaction. Our findings shows that finance 
fundamentals are factors of underreaction, overreaction and IPE whereby the effects 
can be either positive or negative.  
 
7.3 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
 
Some of the specific areas where this work has contributed to the body of knowledge 
are listed below:  
 
The key practical contributions have been prioritized: 
 Two major problems in the Shenzhen market are IPE (41.35%) and 
overreaction (40.22%), implying that Chinese information traders contribute to 
noise trader risk.  
 Information traders in China tend to overreact more to information 
announcements than information traders in Australia. Implicitly, this means 
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that Chinese information traders are relatively more overconfident than 
Australian information traders. 
 Evidence of underreaction, IPE and overreaction on information days suggest 
that the Chinese stock market is inefficient in China up to 99.97% of the time. 
Such a percentage is relatively high given that Ramiah and Davidson (2007) 
observed that the Australian market was inefficient around 63% of the time. 
 It is the first study that captures noise trader risk in China by employing 
IANM as developed by Ramiah and Davidson (2007).  
 Noise trading activities (underreaction, IPE and overreaction) occur more at a 
firm level than at an industry level.  
 Stock traders have higher probabilities to profit from noise trader risk in the 
short run.  
 There is weaker evidence that noise trading is a profitable strategy in the long 
run in Shenzhen stock market.  
 It is the first empirical work to explain the origin of noise trader risk in terms 
of finance fundamentals such as liquidity, leverage, sales, profitability, size 
and capital expenditure, financial crisis, seasonality and market sentiment 
across 180 companies in Shenzhen stock market.  
 There is strong evidence that finance fundamentals affect noise trader risk.  
 Financial crisis affects noise trader risk across 180 companies.  
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 Seasonality (including day of week effect, monthly effect and holiday effect) 
influence noise trader risk.  
 Market sentiment is another factor affecting noise trader risk.  
 It is the first study that explains underreaction, IPE and overreaction with 
finance fundamentals. 
 We hand collected 28478 information arrival data and this can be used by 
other researchers in this area. 
 BAPM can be applied in China. 
 IANM provides a process that enables us to quantify noise trader risk in any 
firm and on any particular day. IANM can be viewed as a universal model 
because of its flexibility. 
 We provide evidence in favour of the reliability of IANM as it was 
successfully applied in an alternative emerging market.  
 The statistically significant mu provides additional evidence that EMH does 
not hold in emerging financial markets.  
 We provide evidence that information traders are not properly equipped in 
China. 
 Similar to Ramiah and Davidson (2007), we show that noise trader risk can 
either increase or decrease on an information day.  
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 Noise trader risk is sensitive to announcements and information release is the 
tool that needs to be adopted to deal with noise traders, i.e. either to release 
information or not to release information. 
 We find more opportunities with noise trading when noise trader risk is 
proxied by mu rather than behavioural error, indicating that information effect 
should not be ignored in Shenzhen stock market.  
 We provide evidence of a higher probability of adopting a noisy investment 
strategy (contrarian investment strategy) in the short term than in the long run 
in Shenzhen stock market.  
 Finance fundamentals can affect noise trader risk in both a positive and 
negative manner. 
 Finance fundamental factors are correlated in the Shenzhen stock market but 
there is no serve multicollinearity problem.  
 It provides evidence that noise trading activities can be affected by accounting 
and finance factors.   
 The Dragon Index (a sentiment market index) has been utilised to estimate the 
behavioural beta in Shenzhen stock market by applying the behavioural asset 
pricing model (BAPM).  
 We provide evidence that noise traders exist in China by documenting 
statistically significant behavioural error (the difference between the BAPM 
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beta and the CAPM beta) suggests that there are noise traders in the Shenzhen 
stock market before controlling for information arrival. 
 
7.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
We provide evidence of the reliability of IANM when applied to Chinese stock 
market. Lately, there has been a major discussion surrounding noise trading behaviour 
in regards to high-frequency trading and algorithmic trading. We therefore think that 
IANM should be applied to this new environment to check if there is more noise 
trading platforms than traditional trading platforms. Gsell and Gomber (2009) 
describe algorithmic trading as engines that enable submissions without human input 
while Chaboud, Chiquoline, Hjalmarsson and Vega (2009), referred to CCHV 
hereafter, define it as computing trading at high frequency platforms. Many have 
touched on the effects of algorithmic trading on market volatility, liquidity and overall 
quality. Hendersshott, Jones and Menkveld (2007) find through the regression 
analysis undertaken that algorithmic trading and liquidity are positively related. In 
terms of volatility, both CCHV (2009) and Gsell (2008) find that it may have the 
potential to lower volatility. Given the gap that exists, my thesis explore the effects of 
algorithmic trading on equity markets, specifically it is hypothesized that algorithmic 
trading will cause underreaction to decrease and both overreaction and IPE to 
increase. The rationale is based on the above literature and the contention that 
algorithms trade aggressively in response to news as stated by Foucault, Moinas and 
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Biais (2010). Therefore, it is important to test whether algorithmic trading affects 
information traders and noise traders. To address algorithmic trading effect on noise 
trader risk, IANM can be adjusted by including for the new condition (algorithmic 
trading) and the proposed model can be rewritten in the following Equation 7.1.  
 
∆BEit=α	+	γIEi	t	+	λ	(D×IEit	)	+	εit																																																															   Equation 7.1 
 
The variables from Equation 3.4 remain the same. However, now we have: 
γ representing the mean change in behavioural error which can be attributed to noise 
traders after the introduction of algorithmic trading; 
λ representing the proportion of the mean changed attributed to information traders 
after the introduction of algorithmic trading 
E representing a dummy variable equal to 1 when algorithmic trading is active in the 
market and 0 when it is not. 
 
Through this model, we will be able to demonstrate that algorithmic trading has 
indeed altered the change in behavioural error in the equity market. α+γ measures 
noise trader effect and β+λ measures information trader effect on the information 
day. As discussed, when the efficient market hypothesis is active, mu will be 
µ=(α+γ)+(β+λ)	=	0 after the introduction of algorithmic trading. However, when 
µ=(α+γ)+(β+λ)	≠	0 , it implies that an inefficient market exists resulting from 
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overreaction, underreaction and IPE. Table 7.1 is a summary of the possible outcomes 
in an inefficient market as found by IANM and then adjusted for algorithmic trading.  
As can be seen from the summary in Table 7.1 (as hypothesized), algorithmic trading 
has the potential to impact overreaction, underreaction and IPE. 
 
Table 7.1: Summary of Possible Outcomes in an Inefficient Market  
Effects Before 
 
 
α 
 
β 
 
µ 
After 
 
 
α  + γ 
 
β  + λ 
 
µ 
 
Underreaction 
 
Overreaction 
 
IPE 
U(+) 
U(-) 
O(+) 
O(-) 
IPE(+) 
IPE(-) 
>0 
<0 
<0 
>0 
>0 
<0 
<0 
>0 
>0 
<0 
>0 
<0 
>0 
<0 
>0 
<0 
U(+) 
U(-) 
O(+) 
O(-) 
IPE(+) 
IPE(-) 
>0 
<0 
<0 
>0 
>0 
<0 
<0 
>0 
>0 
<0 
>0 
<0 
>0 
<0 
>0 
<0 
 
 
Furthermore, it is important for future research to (1) assess which measure of noise 
trader risk is superior, (2) test whether IANM is applicable in other markets, (3) study 
the relationship between behavioral biases and noise trading, (4) use of neuroscience 
and noise trading, (5) comparative study of noisy markets and the inclusion of a noise 
trader risk factor in a multi-factor asset pricing model and (6) investigate if and how 
high-frequency trading leads to noise trading activity.  
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